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The Case for Rough Justice Regulations
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Professor Lee has been working on ordinary deduction versus capitalization issues for over two
decades, initially from a practitioner concern about the "black hole" of capitalization without
amortization. See John Lee, A Blend ofOld Wines in a New Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond, 29 TAX
L. REv. 347,452-74,486 (1974); John Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses and Section 174: Will Snow Fall?
27 TAX LAw. 381,391-403 (1974). Over the years Lee's understanding broadened particularly as to the
policies and ideal standards supporting capitalization and the rules that should allow current deduction
or amortization. He owes much to the inspiration of Professor Alan Gunn. Alan Gunn, The Requirement
That a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COMM'L. L. REv. 443
(1974). See John Lee & Nina Murphy, Capital Expenditures: A Result in Search of a Rationale, 15 U.
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and Means Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures' second of three Hearings on Miscellaneous
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Costs, Section 195, and Clear Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, and
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INTRODUCTION

Section 162(a) allows a current deduction for the ordinary and
necessary expenses of carrying on a trade or business. 1 The "ordinary"
expense requirement of Section 162 precludes a current deduction for a
capital expenditure, as does Section 263 's prohibition of a current deduction
for payments for "new buildings or for permanent improvements or
betterments made to increase the value of any property."2 Instead such
capital expenditures are added to its basis under Section 1016. If the
''property" is depreciable, such basis is recovered through depreciation
deductions under Sections 167 or 168 over the period benefitted3 (or some

I. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994). All section references unless otherwise noted are to the Internal
Revenue Code.
2. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966).
3. Prior to [the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981] depreciation was based on the
concept that the cost of an asset should be allocated over the period it is used to produce
income. In general, property is depreciable if it is (I) used in a trade or business or for the
production of income, and (2) subject to wear and tear, decay or decline from natural causes,
exhaustion, or obsolescence. In general, depreciation is limited to the cost or other basis of
the property, less a reasonable estimate for salvage value. S. REP. No. 97-144, at 39 (1981).
To compute depreciation, absent an accelerated method, salvage value is subtracted from the
cost basis of property, and then that balance is recovered ratably over the property's estimated
useful life. Treas. Reg. section 1.167(a)-1.
Shipping Industry Coordinated Issue (Oct 7, 1996), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, /SP Paper
Addresses Depreciation of Ships Placed in Service before /981, 13 TAX NOTES 157 (1996). The tax
policy of encouraging the economy lead to Congressional authorization over the years since 1954 of
depreciation deductions probably much faster (until recent years) than economic depreciation to spur
economic growth by encouraging investment in equipment and real estate improvements. The 1954 Code
authorized accelerated depreciation at up to twice the straight line rate to encourage the economy. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 38,438 (July II, 1980), citing S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 26 (1954):
More liberal depreciation allowances are anticipated to have far-reaching economic effects.
The incentives resulting from the changes are well timed to help maintain the present high
level of investment in plant and equipment The acceleration in the speed of the tax-free
recovery of costs is of critical importance in the decision of management to incur risk. The
faster tax writeofT would increase available working capital and materially aid growing
businesses in the financing of their expansion. For all segments of the American economy,
liberalized depreciation policies should assist modernization and expansion of industrial
capacity, with resulting economic growth, increased production, and a higher standard of
living.
Small businesses and farmers particularly have a vital stake in a more liberal and
constructive depreciation policy. They are especially dependent on their current earnings or
short-term loans to obtain funds for expansion. The faster recovery of capital investment
provided by this bill will permit them to secure short-term loans which would otherwise not
be available.
/d. The same story, magnified several fold, underlies the 1981 enactment of the Accelerated Cost
Recovery System (ACRS) (now Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS)) under Section
168. Liddle v. Commissioner, 65 F.Jd 329 (3d Cir. 1995)
Congress believed that prior depreciation rules and regulations did not provide the investment
stimulus necessary for economic expansion. Further, Congress believed that the actual value
of the depreciation deduction declined over the years because of inflationary pressures. In
addition, Congress felt that prior depreciation rules governing the determination ofusefullives
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other usually shorter statutory period4). Costs capitalized to non-depreciable
property are recovered upon destruction or abandonment of such property
prior to the end of such life as a loss under Section 165. 5 Classic

were much too complex and caused unproductive disagreements between taxpayers and the
Commissioner. Thus, Congress passed a statute which "de-emphasizes the concept of useful
life.
/d. at 334. Whether such encouragement works is another, hotly debated story.
4. Clearly the ACRS and MACRS economic lives are shorter than the economic lives. In the
case of real estate for instance ACRS started off with a useful life of IS to 18 years and the current
MACRS lives are 27.5 and 39 years for residential and non-residential real estate. I.R.C. § 168(c)(l)
(1994). The Department of Treasury estimated the actual economic life of real estate improvements at
over 60 years. 2 U.S. DEP'T TREAs., TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SJMPUCITY AND EcONOMIC
GROWTH--GENERAL EXPLANATION 161 (1984) [hereinafter 2 TREAsURY I]). Similarly, aircraft (engines)
have a MACRS recovery period of seven years but with proper maintenance and reconditioning every
four years have an average service life over three times as long. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-18-004 (Jan.
23, 1996). On the other hand, to account for inflation and the tendency to obsolescence some argue that
front-loaded rates are necessary. The 1954 Code provided accelerated rates of depreciation for real estate .
(from 175% to 200% declining balance), but after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 only straight-line or
ratable recovery may be used. Thus, arguably, the pre-1981 accelerated rates and 35 year aggregate life
under the component depreciation method was closer to economic depreciation than is the current
straight-line 27.5 or 39 year life for residential and non-residential real estate. On the other hand, most
taxpayers currently leverage real estate and deduct the full amount of interest unreduced for the inflation
penalty in interest. I U.S. DEP'T TREAs., TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SJMPUCITY AND EcONOMIC
GROWTH- OVERVIEW 98 (1984)) [hereinafter TREAsURY I]. The varying treatment of real estate from
1981 to 1993 as reflected in the different periods for depreciation depending upon the year placed in
service isa consequence of (a) the historical experience of the 1981 preference (15 year life coupled with
a declining rate method) coupled with deregulation of S&L's produced "see-through" office buildings,
i.e., speculative vacant office buildings with no interior partitions, contributing to the collapse of S&L's
as the real estate bubble burst as bubbles have for the past three centuries), and (b) application of pay-go
principles to real estate with real estate revenue losers being paid for with real estate revenue raisers.
Radio Address to the Nation on Tmc Reform, I. PuB. PAPERS RONALD REAGAN 419,420 (Apr. 13, 1985).
Have you ever heard of a see-through building? Well, it's one that has no interior walls
because it has no tenants. Between 1983 and 1984, only about half of the increase in available
commercial office space was reflected in rentals. The other half resulted in vacancies. You
see, the tax benefits for investment in some kinds of real estate deals are so generous that
being able to rent space may be secondary. The result is overbuilding and high vacancy rates
in many American cities.
Albert B. Crenshaw, Building Boom for Offices Gluts Market, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1984, at AI
(reasons for boom-(!) 1981 tax act's "dramatically improved tax treatment''; (2) S&L deregulation, (3)
enormous growth of foreign investment, and (4) relatively weaker performance of other types of
investment [during the "stagflation" era of the 1970's]); see also Wendy Swallow, Office Building to
Slacken; Nationwide Glut Tempering Investor's Enthusiasm, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1986, atCl3 (same;
vacancy rate running between 15% and 25% nationally; oversupply of office space contributed to the
pressure for tax reform of the real estate industry); J. Michael Kennedy, "See-Through" Interiors: Office
Glut: It Sweeps the Country, L. A. TiMES, July 6, 1985, at 1-l. Stephen Koepp, Building a Hollow
Skyline, TIME, Aug. 26, 1985, at 42. Additionally a number of statutory amortization periods are
provided in Sections 195, 197, and 248.
5. Section 165(a) provides a deduction for "any loss sustained during the taxable year and not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise." I.R.C. § 165(a) (1994). In the case of individuals,
however, such deductible losses are limited to losses incurred in a trade or business or in any (non-trade
or -business) transaction entered into for profit. These limitations do not apply to losses arising from
casualty or theft, however. See I.R.C. § 165(c) (1994). For losses (not from casualty or theft) to be
ordinary, either from a capital asset or an expenditure, they must not arise from a sale or exchange. See
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depreciation of tangible property under Section 167 (prior to accelerated
depreciation and especially MACRS under Section 168) and amortization of
intangible property conceptually consists of allocating a capitalized cost
(usually ratably) to the tax years to which it contributes to production of
income, i.e., its useful life. Capitalization coupled with amortization is
therefore necessary to prevent the distortion (here, understatement) of the
taxpayer's net income that would result from deducting the entire cost
currently of an expenditure ''properly attributable, through amortization, to
later tax years when the capital asset becomes income producing. "6 Parallel
to Sections 162, 167, 168 and 212, the "clear-reflection-of-income"
requirement of Section 446 generally leads to capitalization of costs
providing a benefit lasting substantially beyond the close of the tax year. 7

I.RC. § 165(f) (1994) . As a practical matter, non-theft or -casualty losses must arise from the asset
becoming worthless or being abandoned. See 1 BORIS I. BITIKER & LAWRENCE LoKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES, AND GIFTS, 'IJ25.8.2 (2d ed. 1989). For special problems where
nonrecourse liabilities are present, see Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980). Accord Middleton
v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 310 (1981).
6. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1973); accord INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1992):
The primary effect of characterizing a payment as either a business expense or a capital
expenditure concerns the timing of the taxpayer's cost recovery; while business expenses are
currently deductJble, a capital expenditure usually is amortized and depreciated over the life
of the relevant asset, or where no specific asset or useful life can be ascertained, is deducted
upon dissolution of the enterprise ... Sections 1.167(a) and 336(a); Treas. Reg. section
1.176(a) ... Through provisions such as these, the Code endeavors to match expenses with
the revenues of the taxable period to which they are properly attributable, thereby resulting
in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax purposes.
/d.

7. Treas. Reg.§ 1.461-l(aXl) (as amended in 1994) ("If an expenditure results in the creation
of an asset having a useful life which extends substantially beyond the close of the taxable year, such
an expenditure may not be deductJble or may be deductible, only on part, for the taxable year in which
made."); accord Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,961, at 44-45 (Dec. 21, 1976) (footnote omitted):
[The film producer/taxpayer's) practice of currently deducting its production expenditures
does not clearly reflect income. The Service takes the position that a distortion of income
results if a taxpayer deducts expenditures in years other than the year in which income
attributable to these expenditures is realized. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,824 (Aug. 27, 1976); see
also, Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68. Put another way, in order to assure clear reflection
of income, expenditures cannot be currently deducted if they are expected to contribute more
than incidentally to the realization of income in subsequent taxable years. G.C.M. 36824,
supra, at 2; see also, O.M. 18282, ••• 1-341-75 (Sept 30, 1975), at 7-8; O.M. 17736, •••
1-4333 (July 26, 1972), at 10-11. In the present case ••• has deducted currently expenditures
(i.e., the costs incurred in producing the films) in years other than those in which income
attributable to these expenditures (i.e., payments received under the Production Agreements)
is realized. Consequently, the practice of currently deducting these payments does not clearly
reflect income.
/d. In Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass "n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971 ), Justice Blackmun determined
that in order to qualify for deduction under Section 162(a), "an item must (1) be 'paid or incurred during
the taxable year,' (2) be for 'carrying on any trade or business,' (3) be an 'expense,' (4) be a 'necessary'
expense, and (5) be an 'ordinary' expense." /d. at 352. The Court held that certain premiums paid by
a savings and loan association, pursuant to federal statutory requirement, for deposit insurance were not
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For generally, where an expenditure provides substantial future benefits,
current deduction understates the taxpayer's current income and overstates
future income. 8 Under judicially adopted financial accounting concepts, 9
capitalization - when coupled with depreciation or amortization - serves
to match (albeit usually roughly 10} an expenditure generating future income
with such income. 11 Similarly under an economic model of determining
net income, a capital expenditure is not spent in the year it is made; rather,
the expenditure is converted into a different type of property. 12 The cost
of this property then reduces gross income in each tax period according to
the change in its value between the beginning and the end of the period in
question. 13 The fact that the property actually appreciates is not relevant to
tax depreciation under Section 168 so long as there is some wear and tear
or obsolescence. 14 This leads to the delightful tax tales of Mr. Liddle's
Fiddle and Mr. Selig's Ferrari Testarossa marvelously recounted by Lee

"ordinary and necessary" expenses under Section 162(a) but were instead capital expenditures.Jd. at 354.
The premiums created a secondary reserve fund in which each insured institution retained a pro rata
interest recoverable in certain situations. !d. at 355. Although the premiums were paid during the
taxable year, were made for carrying on a trade or business and were "necessary," Justice Blackmun
found that the premiums were not "ordinary expenses" because they "served to create or enhance for [the
institution] what is essentially a separate and distinct additional asset" !d.
8. NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942,961 (4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter NCNB I], rev'd
and remanded, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (en bane) [hereinafter NCNB II]. NCNB II was overruled
by JNDOPCO. Whether this overruling of NCNB II resurrects NCNB I may be a determinative factor in
the future evolution of case law and administrative guidelines on expense/capital expenditure and
amortization.
9. Matching costs with revenues produced in a particular period is a basic financial accounting
concept under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). See Harold Dubroff et al., Tax
Accounting: The Relationship of Clear Reflection of Income to Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles, 47 ALA. L. REv. 354,358-59 (1983). Judicial acceptance of the basic financial accounting
concept of deferring deductions through capitalization until related income is recognized should not
involve the adoption, as well, of the GAAP .hierarchy of expense principles. See Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1973); Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. I (1979). But see NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 948-49.
I 0. The match is usually rough since often neither the recovery period nor the rate correspond
with anticipated, much less actual experience. A significant exception is the income forecast method of
depreciation with a three and ten year look-back under new Section 167(g).
11. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. at 16.
12. See Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation- Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for
Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REv. I, 13 (1979). Cf United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295,
300-301 (1927).
13. See Kahn, supra note 12, at 3.
14. Liddle, 65 F.3d at 332-33 (allowing seven year capital recovery under 1954 Code Section 168
of a 300-year old appreciating bass violin.). "[T)he phrase 'of a character subject to the allowance for
depreciation' refers only to that portion of section 167(a) which allows a depreciation deduction for
assets which are subject to exhaustion and wear and tear. Clearly, property that is not subject to such
exhaustion does not depreciate." ld. at 334; accord Selig v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1125
(holding that a show car that was not driven was subject to ACRS because it became obsolete). The
opposite rule applied under Section 167 depreciation of tangible property. See authorities cited in Liddle,
65 F.3d at 335.
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Sheppard and Ira Shepard. 15
The immediate genesis of the present uncertainty as to capitalization
rules began over three decades ago with the litigation as to the proper tax
treatment of business expansion/start up costs. At the time, the "black hole"
of capitalization of start up costs without amortization being available lead
many courts to permit a current deduction particularly of recurring costs in
expanding a business (often with a broad definition of business) as less
income distorting than capitalization without amortization. 16 The courts in
the 1970s 17 and the National Office in the 1980s 18 (just as the judicial tide

15. See generally Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Violins. Fe"aris, and the Music of Class
Lives, 69 TAX NOTES 669 (1995); Ira Shepard, Recent Federal Income Tax Developments, I So. FED.
TAX INST. A7 (1996).
16. See judicial authorities collected in John Lee, Start Up Costs, Section 195, and Clear
Reflection ofIncome: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, and a Touch of Basics, 6 VA. TAX
REV. I, 26 (1986) [hereinafter Lee, Clear Reflection ofIncome]; see also Brett M. Alexander, Note, An
Analysis ofJNDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1505, 1513 (1993). A major cause for
Jack of administrative or judicial amortization was association of the expenditure, even if recurring, with
the wrong asset, generally the business itself, thought like purchased goodwill, generally to have an
indefinite life. Capitalized start-up costs· traditionally were added to one of three items: (a) the
nonamortizable basis of the business created in part by them; (b) (prior to Section 197) to a
nonamortizable permit required to operate as a business; or (c) to amortizable business assets used in the
created business. Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra, at 4 n.3.
17. See, e.g., Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 782-85 (2d Cir. 1973);
Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (lOth Cir. 1974):
The start-up expenditures here challenged did not create a property interest They produced
nothing corporeal or salable. They are recurring. At the most they introduced a more efficient
method of conducting an old business. The government suggests no way in which they could
be amortized. The government's theoretical approach ignores the practicalities of the situation,
and permits a distortion of taxpayer's financial situation. If an expenditure, concededly of
temporal value, may be neither expensed nor amortized, the adoption of technological
advances is discouraged.
/d. at 1192. See generally Lee, Clear ·Reflection of Income. supra note 16, at 25, 52-57.
18. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,410 (June 18, 1980) (in addition to whether a cost creates a separate
and distinct asset, "the recurrent (or nonrecurrent) nature of the expenditure is an appropriate basis on
which to distinguish capital from ordinary expenses"); Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-11-005 (Nov. 26, 1985)
(costs of a new product package design [unique cardboard base in which a container sits and that extends
up from the base for marketing women's hose, which enjoys wide customer recognition] must be
capitalized since they create "intangible assets with useful lives in excess of the taxable year in which
such costs were incurred"), considered in Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,483 (Mar. 5, 1986); Tech. Adv. Mem.
81-41-033 (June 30, 1981) (costs incurred by a mutual savings bank in securing regulatory approval to
operate branch facilities, created a separate and distinct capital asset, while other recurring promotional
costs were deductible expenses under Section 162); Tech. Adv. Mem. 82-02-010 (Sept. 28, 1981)
(cancellation of debt to facilitate an agreement for continuation of the distribution of the taxpayer's
product does not create a separate and distinct asset); Tech. Adv. Mem. 82-04-061 (Oct. 28, 1981) (cost
of training employees and testing new equipment in newly constructed manufacturing facility does not
result in the creation or acquisition of an asset that is separate and distinct from the constructed facility);
Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-23-005 (Feb. 8, 1984) (expenditures incurred for hiring, relocating and training
employees in connection with the establishment of a new restaurant by a taxpayer with existing
restaurants in other locations, do not result in the creation or enhancement of a separate and distinct
asset); Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-24-003 (Mar. 2, 1990) (savings bank must capitalize costs to create or
acquire home equity line-of-credit loans since such loans are separate assets with lives extending beyond
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was turning) adopted a no "separate saleable asset" doctrine or rule
permitting current deduction of various business costs including business
expansion costs. We believe that the pragmatic reason for such adoption
was to accomplish the "rough justice" of current deduction where no
amortization deduction was available. 19 Some tribunals20 and now,

the current taxable year). In order to discredit the above earlier General Counsel Memoranda (GCM)
adopting the separate asset test for expensing, the Government argued in its Brief in INDOPCO that
"Petitioner also cites various technical advice memoranda and general counsel's memoranda prepared
by the IRS . . . . Such internal IRS memoranda, which do not undergo the intensive review process
accorded to formal IRS rulings and procedures intended for guidance to the public, have no precedential
force, and are thus irrelevant here." The Briefs conclusion as to policy review may be accurate as to
TAMs but not as to GCMs. Comparison of GCMs of yesteryear and the best TAMs of today and the
published revenue rulings that they consider or that are redacted from them, respectively, reveals that
the published rulings too often delete the very legal, policy and strategic analysis developed in the GCM
or TAM in the "intensive review process" to determine whether to issue a published ruling. A most
extreme case is exposed by Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977), which notes that Rev. Rut. 59-129,
1959-2 C.B. 58, was published in "digest form," merely concluding that the entity was a church without
setting forth the 14 characteristics of a church that the accompanying GCM relied upon. Of course, the
Service continued to use the 14 factors. Sadly, compare excellent Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 (June
21, 1996) (allowing current deduction of pre-<lpening costs of new stores in same business with
discussion of recurring and predominantly short-term benefits and analysis of Encyclopedia Britannica
and Sun Microsystems among other precedents as support; and then noting "that the cost of training
employees is generally deductible under section 162") with disappointing Rev. Rut. 96-62, 1996-53
I.R.B. l ("the costs of trainers and routine updates of training materials, are generally deductible as
business expenses under that section [162] even though they may have some future benefit."). Careful
deconstructing of the published ruling in light of submitted comments, particularly politically influential
interest groups, provides considerable guidance to the illuminati if not the cognoscente as well of income
tax capitalization. See notes 208-2ll infra and accompanying text. That's not what we call general
guidance. While by law GCMs and TAMs are not legal precedent, their reasoning should be taken into
consideration. E.g., Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. United States, 721 F. Supp. 436, 442 (E.D. N.Y. 1989)
("Though the court is well aware that letter rulings such as the one above has no precedent value, the
court feels that the reasoning employed is nevertheless sound."); accord Rev. Rut. 57-562, 1957-2 C.B.
159; Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,822 (July 17, 1990); Priv. Ltr. Rut. 7308109360A (Aug. 10, 1973). Law
professors and their students can learn a lot by studying them. Such rulings do constitute "substantial
authority," see note 198 infra, which today means more than precedent to many.
19. Lee, Clear Reflectional Income, supra note 16, at 25, 41, 53, 119
Current deduction under the separate, saleable asset test of recurring expenditures producing
short- or variable-term benefits does not distort the taxpayer's income. Hence, the test often
results in 'rough justice' .... A 'rough guess' as to useful life produces less distortion of
income than the 'rough justice' of a current deduction .... The most important common factor
[in Briarcliff Candy and its progeny], however, was the view that a current deduction of a
recurring expense with some future benefits was preferable to its capitalization without
amortization - 'rough justice.' ... To avoid inequity some courts, rather than functionally
challenging these definitional rules, created their own definitional separate, saleable property
test. These courts, and some commentators, thought that the "rough justice" of currently
deducting an expenditure, regardless of whether its benefits were short- or long-lived,
produced less distortion of income than no deduction at all.
/d. at 25. See also John Lee, Doping Out the Capitalization Rules After INDOPCO, 57 TAX NOTES 669,
670 (1992) [hereinafter Lee, Capitalization Rules]
The most important lessons in this area over the past 25 years or so are: (I) If an expenditure
by a new business, such as employee training, provides future benefits for a shorter period
than the life of the business, its plant, or operating permit, the capitalized expenditure should
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seemingly, the Office of Chief Counsel21 believes that a current deduction

not be added to the basis of the business, plant, or pennit, but instead should be treated as
a freestanding self-created intangible amortizable over the shorter period benefitted (where
section 195 does not apply); (2) if an expenditure, such as advertising, provides current and
future benefits and is regularly incurred in roughly the same amount year- after-year, or
almost every year, it should be currently deductible if capitalizing and amortizing would be
burdensome; and (3) if an expenditure, such as repairs, provides current and future benefits
but is not substantial in comparison to total replacement cost of the repaired item, it should
be currently deductible. Not only are these ''rough justice" approaches supported by more than
mere straws in the wind in the existing case law (and commentary), but ignoring them
brought about the widespread adoption of the separate asset doctrine in the first place.
/d. at 670; see also Alexander, supra note 16, at 1513. For a very intriguing law-and-economics flavored
argument that capitalization (without amortization) is in order where monitoring performance of assets
with unascertainable useful lives see Note, INDOPCO v. Commissioner: Form over Substance in the
Judicial Regulation of the Market for Corporate Control, 12 VA. TAX REv. 121, 131-33 (1992).
20. See, e.g., Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1978):
[T]he Government does not argue that there is some und~lying tangible or intangible asset
to which the survey costs may properly be added. ... Neither is amortization appropriate.
The useful life of the survey is very uncertain: as the trial judge found, the estimates in a
reserve study are subject to change at any time and have to be updated every few years to
take account of subsequent developments. In those circumstances, it is not compulsory to
amortize such a recurring item over a fixed time-interval. Neither is it appropriate to require
capitalization without amortization; such a requirement would clearly distort Southland's
income.
Colorado Springs Nat'/ Bank, 505 F.2d at 1192; Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275,
283-84 (1967)
[S]ections 283 and 446 are inextricably intertwined. A contrary view would encase the
general provisions of section 263 with an inflexibility and sterility neither mandated to carry
out the intent of Congress nor required for the effective discharge of respondent's revenuecollecting responsibilities. Accordingly, we tum to a determination as to whether petitioner's
method of accounting 'clearly reflects income' pursuant to the provisions of section 446...
. Income must be reflected with as much accuracy as recognized methods of accounting
permit. ... [The Commissioner] is given broad discretion in determining whether a particular
method of accounting clearly reflects income and a heavy burden is imposed upon the
taxpayer to overcome a determination by respondent in this area.
/d. at 283-84. See also Lee, Copita/ization Rules, 20.supra note 19, at 674-77. The notion of
capitalization being inextricably intertwined with clear reflection of income was convincingly stated by
Professor Gunn over two decades ago, and was long advocated by Professor Lee and reflected in
Professors Bittker and Lokken's conclusion. This position was in tum adopted by the Government on
Brief in INDOPCO, that ''the analysis properly focuses 'on whether income will be better reflected by
deducting or by capitalizing the amount in question."' Respondent's Brief at 29, INDOPCO (No. 901278). Such a clear reflection of income focus has on many other occasions convinced the Chief
Counsel's Office in its policy review of proposed private and published letter rulings and technical
advices. See notes 291-97 infra and accompanying text.
21. See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 allowed a current deduction of expenditures to remediate
soil contaminated by the taxpayer's manufacturing operations. The ruling frrst considered the potential
improvement to the land. /d. at 6-7. Adopting the test promulgated by Plainfield-Union Water Co. v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333, 338 (1962), the ruling compared the value of the land immediately before
the contamination with its value after remediation. /d. at 7. The ruling concluded that by returning the
property to its original state, the treatment failed to improve the land. /d. q Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11002 (Nov. 19, 1993) (costs of removing asbestos-containing materials from taxpayer's boiler house were
held capital expenditures since they "increased the value, use and capacity of the taxpayer's facility as
compared to its original asbestos-containing condition"). Nor did the "expenditures ... prolong the
useful life of the land, nor ... adapt the land to a new or different use." Rev. Rul. 94-38 at 7. During
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in such circumstances more clearly reflects income than capitalization
without amortization and so do we. The Joint Committee on Taxation Staff
identified ease of administration as another policy basis for allowing a
current deduction for the costs of self-created intangibles:
Under present law, many expenditures by a business that may contribute
to the creation of intangible assets are currently deductible as expenses of
doing business. Thus, for example, salaries of employees, advertising, and
other operating expenses generally are currently deductible, even though
these expenditures may create or enhance the goodwill, going concern
value, reputation, or customer base of the business. Expensing generally is
allowed under present law because of the administrative difficulty of
ascertaining the extent to which these expenditures contribute to the value
of the intangible asset. 22

Professor Lee has long agreed with Professor Alan Gunn that current
deduction is less income distorting than capitalization without amortization
when those are the only two options. 23 This article argues that we can do
better, elaborating on Professor Gunn's thought and the following thought
of Professor Boris Bittker: 24
In many . . . situations, however, the usual criteria of a capital

and after the remediation and treatment, the taxpayer continued to use the land and operate the plant in
the same manner as it did prior to the cleanup except that it disposed of hazardous waste in compliance
with environmental requirements. /d. at 7-8.
Rev. Rul. 94-38 reasoned that:
[s ]ince the land is not subject to an allowance for depreciation, amortization, or depletion, the
amounts expended to restore the land to its original condition are not subject to capitalization
under § 263(a)(2). Accordingly, the expenses incurred by X for the soil remediation and
ongoing groundwater treatment do not constitute capital expenditures under § 263.
/d. The implicit reasoning is that capitalization without amortization would distort the taxpayer's income
more than a current deduction. See Glenn R. Carrington, Capitalization after INDOPCO, 2 N.Y.U. 53RD
INST. ON FED. TAX, Ch. 25, at 25-29.
22. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, l04th CONG., IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESS OF
REPLACING TilE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 83 (comm. print 1996) (emphasis added). Cf. Gen. Couns. Mem.
33,874 (Mar. 29, 1968), considering Rev. Rul. 68-561, 1968-2 C.B. ll7:
Another objection to requiring that the salaries and advertising costs be capitalized is the
difficult task of determining the useful life of the asset acquired. The proposed G.C.M.
suggests that the maximum useful life in the case of incentive payments would be the useful
life of the building involved. Since the salaries and advertising costs do not appear to be
related to any particular building such a guideline could not be used in this area.
/d. For the policy of administrative difficulty see notes 278-84 infra and accompanying text
23. Alan Gunn, The Requirement That a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, IS
B.C. INDUS. & COMM'L L. REv. 443, 450 (1974); Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 16, at
15; Alexander, supra note 16, at 1514-16.
24. Gunn, supra note 23; l BIITKER & LoKKEN, supra note 5, at '1!20.4.1. See also Lee, Clear
Reflection ofIncome, supra note 16, at 26; Lee, Capitalization Rules supra note 19, at 679-83; Hearings
on Miscellaneous Revenue Issues bejol"e the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Select Revenue
Measures (Part 2), l 03rd Cong. 1687, 1705-07 (1993) (Prepared Statement of Professor Lee) (hereinafter
1993 Hearings).
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expenditure are either over-inclusive or under-inclusive. The "separate and
distinct additional asset" and "useful life beyond the current year" criteria,
if applied rigorously, would classify numerous purchases of minor items
as capital expenditures-an accountant's fountain pen, a carpenter's
screwdriver, a welder's goggles. The regulations explicitly permit farmers
to deduct the cost of "ordinary tools of short life or small cost, such as
hand tools, including shovels, rakes, etc."; and professional taxpayers are
allowed to deduct the cost of "books, furniture, and professional
instruments and equipment, the useful life of which is short." In a similar
vein, the Court of Claims, recognizing that the fundamental issue in this
area is whether the taxpayer's income is clearly reflected, has held that a
railroad may deduct the cost of items costing less than $500, regardless of
the asset's expected useful life, if this practice is consistently followed and
is used by the interstate Commerce Commission for rate-making purposes.
This emphasis on the long-run consequences of the taxpayer's
accounting practice acknowledges that a rule of reason is essential. If every
cost contributing to the profits of future years were to be disallowed, it
would be necessary to divide almost every salary and advertising expense
between its immediate impact on the customer and its contribution to the
company's long-lived goodwill. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court [in
Lincoln Savings] has said that "the presence of an ensuing benefit is not
controlling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect
beyond the taxable year." ... [E]ven the most routine repairs often have
a long-term impact but are, nevertheless, classified as deductible expenses
rather than as nondeductible capital expenditures.
In addition to being over-inclusive with respect to minor items, the
conventional criteria of a capital expenditure are sometimes - although
less frequently- under-inclusive. Thus, a vocational course qualifying the
taxpayer to embark on a new career does not create a "separate and distinct
additional asset" in the ordinary sense. The cost of the educational
program is nevertheless a non-deductible capital expenditure rather than a
currently deductible business expense. . . . . As with the danger of overinclusion, the best remedy against an under-inclusive application of the
capital expenditure concept is to focus on whether income will be better
reflected by deducting or by capitalizing the amount in question. This is
obviously not an easy standard to apply, but it has the virtue of
emphasizing the basic objective of the relevant statutory provisions rather
than secondary guideposts. 25
The issue of the proper standard (and rules) for capitalization has
become acute if not critical. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
INDOPC(Jl6 overruled the separate asset doctrine, 27 which Professor Lee,

25. BITIKER & LoKKEN, supra note 5, at~ 20.4.1. (footnotes omitted).
26. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 86-87. Justice Blackmun stated the issue as "whether certain
professional expenses incurred by a target corporation in the course of a friendly takeover are deductible
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still following in the footsteps of Professor Alan Gunn, had criticized long
ago. 28 INDOPCO also reinforced the presumption that expenditures
producing substantial future benefits must be capitalized (and, if that
capitalized cost qualifies as depreciable property, amortized or depreciated
over the years benefited or some usually shorter statutory period). 29 At the
same time Justice Blackmun left the door open in INDOPCO for current
deduction of some expenditures with incidental future benefits just as he had
earlier in Lincoln Savings and Loan. The result has been great controversy
with little guidance from the Court. 30 We believe that the greatest light
can be shown on the controversy by focusing on the basic standard for
resolving capitalization versus expensing controversies set forth by Tax
Court Judge Theodore Tannenwald three decades ago in Fort Howard Paper
Co. v. Commissioner: whether the taxpayer's method of tax accounting (for
the item) clearly reflects her income under Section 446. 31 This analysis
convinced Professors Alan Gunn, John Lee and Boris Bittker.
Widespread federal income tax audits of capitalization and related
issues, including amortization of self-created intangibles, 32 are anecdotally

by that corporation as 'ordinary and necessary' business expenses ...." /d. at 82. The lower courts
held for the Commissioner on the grounds of the long-term benefits that accrued to the target from the
acquisition. National Starch & Chern. Corp. v. Commissiom:r, 93 T.C. 67, 75 (1989), affd, 918 F.2d
426, 432-33 (1990). Justice Blackmun rejected the separate asset test, as had the lower courts. 503 U.S.
at 82.
27. See Notice 96-7, 1996-6 I.R.B. 22; Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M.
(CCH) 997 (1995). Lincoln Savings had held that creation or enhancement of a separate assets resulted
in capitalization, not that it was a precondition. See note 7. A Justice, probably Blackmun, put it as
follows at the oral argument: "Sufficient condition, not necessary condition." U.S. Sup. Ct. Official
Transcript at 14, INDOPCO v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992), 1991 WL 636242 (Nov. 12, 1991).
28. John Lee & Nina Murphy, Capital Expenditures: A Result in Search of a Rationale, 15 U.
RICH. L. REv. 473, 483, 525-26, 544-46 (1981) [hereinafter Lee & Murphy).
29. 503 U.S. at 87-88.
30. Justice Harry Blackmun wrote all the significant Supreme Court capitalization versus
expensing and related depreciation of intangibles opinions over the last 25 years, viz, Idaho Power,
Lincoln Savings & Loan, INDOPCO, and Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States. 507 U.S. 546
(1993). In all his judicial style was to state the broad principle without elaborating on its application.
31. 49 T.C. at 283-84.
32. 1993 Hearings, supra note 24, at 1699; Hearings on Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets
before the House Ways and Means Committee, 102d Cong. 48 (1991) (Prepared Statement of
Commissioner Fred Goldberg) (hereinafter 1991 Hearings on Intangibles);
From a tax administrator's perspective, the present situation [as to amortization of purchased
intangibles] is untenable because it embroils the government in endless factual inquiries that
are made more difficult by unsettled case law. Some courts are sympathetic to arguments that
certain intangible assets can be distinguished from goodwill and therefore can be amortized.
These decisions are dependent on the facts of the particular case, and results may differ from
court to court depending on the legal principles considered controlling. What this means in
practical terms is that both taxpayers and the system suffer intolerable inequities, costs, and
other burdens.
Tax Administration, Treasury Considering Whether a New Regulatory Business Plan Should be Issued
1993 DAILY REPoRT FOR ExEc. 234 d50 (Dec. 8, 1993) ("Treasury's objective in preparing the guidance
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reported in the tax and general press, 33 and factually reflected in the large
number of technical advice memoranda and audit guidelines touching on
these issues. Empirical studies by other agencies reveal that at the large
public corporation level (accounting for over 80% of corporate taxable
income and over 50% of all business sector profits)/4 capitalization/depreciation/expensing is the largest category of contested Section
162 items. 35 Section 162 in tum generates more tax controversies than any
other Code section. 36 The Service repeatedly asked for help from
practitioners and industry,37 but had scant response until it issued
controversial TAM's denying current deductions for substantial and nonrecurring expenses. 38 In Notice 96-7 the Internal Revenue Service

[as to capitalization] is to keep cases involving these issues out oflitigation, which is expensive both to
taxpayers and the government, the Treasury official [Robert Kilinskis] noted."); STAFF OF JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, 104th Cong., DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 2494, THRIFT CHARTER CONVERSION TAX ACT OF
1995, TOGE1HER WITIJ AN AMENDMENT IN THE NA11JRE OF SUBSTITUTE APPROVED BY HOUSE WAYS
& MEANS COMMITTEE (1995) ("[W]hether an expenditure is deductible under section 162 or must be
capitalized under section 263 is often a matter of dispute between the IRS and taxpayers, and has been
the subject of significant litigation."); see also Statement by House Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Bill Archer (R- Texas), together with Technical Explanation and Legislative Language, on H.R.
2494, Thrift Charter Conversion Tax Act of 1995, Introduced Oct. 18, 1995, available in 1995 DAILY
REPoRT FOR ExEcur!VES 203 dllO (Oct. 20, 1995).
33. See note 71 infra.
34. See note 80 infra.
35. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REP., No. GAO/GGD-95-232, TAX ADMINISTRATION,
REcuRRING ISSUES IN TAX DISPUTES OVER BUSINESS ExPENSE DEDUCTIONS (1995), available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 51-28 (1995) (1995 GAO Recurring Business
Tax Disputes).
36. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO/GGD-93-93-100, REcuRRING TAX ISSUES
TRACKED BY IRS' OFFICE OF APPEALS (1996), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 93 TAX
NOTES TODAY 98-24 (May 6, 1993) (1993 GAO Recurring Tax Issues). Only at the large public
corporation level is capitalization a real issue in audits tracked as of the early 1990s. Burgess J. W. Raby
& William L. Raby, Tax Forum 20: Practitioner Reaction to INOOPCO, 73 TAX NOTES 1581 (Dec. 30,
1996) (80% of regional and local accounting firm tax partners across the country in survey by authors
did not encounter INDOPCO in deficiencies arising out of tax audits). 1995 GAO Recu"ing Business
Tax Disputes, supra note 35, confirms this. We suspect that the biggest Section 162 issue for the business
clients of the regional CPA firms the Raby's surveyed is reasonable compensation. This is surely the case
as to the approximately 750,000 C corporations reporting annual taxable income, but less than $350,000.
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 35.
37. Brown Lists Factors That Could be Used to See If Cleanup Costs Must be Capitalized, 1993
DAILY TAX REPoRT 45 dl9 (Mar. 10, 1993); Treasury Official Sees Environmental Clean-up Guidance
This Year as Wa"anted, 1993 DAILY TAX REPoRT 88 d23 (May 10, 1993); and IRS Said Seeking Brightline Tests in Review ofEnvironmental Cleanup TAMs, 1993 DAILY TAX REPoRT 102 d6 (May 28, 1993).
38. Letter dated July 8, 1993 from Donal E. Flannery and Carol Conjura ofKPMG Peat Marwick
to Samuel Y. Sessions, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
TNT File, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 148-25 (July 8, 1993); Letter dated July 9, 1993 from former
Commissioner Donald C. Alexander and Duane H. Pellervo of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld to
Glenn R. Carrington, Assistant Chief Counsel (Income Tax and Accounting), available in LEXIS, Fed tax
Library, TNT File, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 158-18 (July 9, 1993); Letter dated July 19, 1993 from F.
David Lake of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering to Glenn Carrington, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
TNT File, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 158-32 (July 9, 1993).
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requested written comments concerning: "(1) whether general guidance
clarifying the fundamental principles of capitalization would aid in resolving
capitalization issues; (2) what specific approaches, principles, or issues
guidance should address; and (3) whether safe harbor amortization periods
should be provided for certain capitalization expenditures and what data
supports any suggested periods."39
This article is largely derived from our joint Submission of comments
pursuant to Notice 96-7. 40 It maintains that guidance as to capitalization
is needed, if for no other reason, due to the substantial amount of
transaction costs (noted above) it generates. After reviewing the alternatives
of judicial and legislative resolution of the capitalization morass, this article
recommends instead several alternative IRSffreasury regulatory approaches.
The primary proposal is promulgation of interpretative (at this time)
regulations setting forth (a) capitalization principles or standards and (b)
rules establishing a presumption of capitalization where the expenditure is
expected to. yield substantial future benefits and, most importantly setting
forth "rough justice" exceptions to such presumption. These exceptions
would apply under a balancing test effecting "structured discretionary
justice" as insightfully conceived by Administrative Law Professor Kenneth
Davis in Discretionary Justice, A Preliminary Inquiry. 41 We agree that
such an approach best channels the discretion of agency fact finders, in this
case revenue agents considering tax accounting practices after INDOPCO.
The best restriction is not to take away all of the agent's discretion, even

39. 1996-97 I.RB. 22 (Feb. 5, 1996). Chief Counsel Stuart Brown recently stated that the IRS
recognizing that there was unhappiness with the manner in which capitalization issues are being
addressed or resolved in the field, issued this notice to solicit views on whether a global response, rather
than a case-by-case or expense-by-expense response was possible. TEl Minutes of Tax Executives
Institute-Internal Revenue Service Liaison Meeting, Nov. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
TNT File 97 TAX NOTFS TODAY 20-46 (Jan. 30, 1997) (TEl-IRS Liason Minutes). "What became clear
through the process, however, was that there was no 'magic formula' for resolving the conundrum; in
other words, the IRS has not developed an approach to avoid a case-by-ca5e analysis." !d.
40. Available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 101-20 (May 22,
1996). As Professor Lee was working on converting our Submission into this article and had almost
reached part III (which then followed current Part IV), he learned of a proposed disallowance of
prepublication costs of non-academic books of a professor at the College of William & Mary (and
established author), resulting in the work in progress, "Still Chewing on That Old Rag?": Writer's
Prepublication Expenses Revisited after INDOPCO and New Section 167(g) (Writer's Prepublication
Costs Revisited). As he was completing that piece, the cyclical safety aircraft engine maintenance
(overhaul every four years) cauldron boiled over. That resulted in John Lee, Glenn Walberg & Darryl
Whitesell, Copitalizing and Depreciating Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs: More Trouble Than It's
Worth?, 17 VA. TAX REv. 1 (forthcoming Summer 1997) (hereinafter Lee, Walberg, & Whitesell,
Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs). When Lee returned to this piece, he drew upon the further thought
and research in those pieces. In all real sense all three are a joint work exploring differing aspects of this

area.
41. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 103 (1969)
[hereinafter DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE).
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case by case, as limitation riders triggered by an incremental approach
would. Rather, the agent's discretion should be directed through regulations
to factors relevant to distortion of income; and the agent should be told how
to apply these factors in a balancing formula. Additionally, such a global
approach is strongly recommended over the incrementalism evidenced in
private rulings and even more so in published revenue rulings. A global
approach is politically more viable and thus more apt to effect horizontal
equity.
Political science Professor Charles Lindblom in The Science of
"Muddling Through "42 has called for an incremental ruling approach

42. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 79 (1959);
Charles E. Lindblom, Policy Analysis, 48 AM. EcoN. REv. 298 (1958). The phrase was first used during
the American Civil War. See Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of
Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REv. 1, 104 n.253 (1992). Under incrementalism
policymakers assume that the basic policy is sound so that they make only small, incremental changes.
The notion is that the resulting inertial tendency is produced by decentralized government and the
political concerns of legislators adverse to the inevitable political fallout from any major policy change.
Shawn P. Regan, Comment, Medicaid Estate Planning: Congress· Ersatz Solution for Long-Term Health
Care, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 1217, 1258 n.241 (1995); Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the
Modem State: Why a Unitary Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate
Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 827, 861 (1966). Professor Peter Schuck describes Lindblom's insight
in economic analysis terms: "In the political sphere, Charles Lindblom described, and sought to justify,
incremental behavior- what he called 'partisan mutual adjustment'- in terms of the need to reduce
information and other decisionmaking costs." Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes,
Consequences. and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. I, 1 n.5 (1992); Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory
Model: A History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68 MINN. L. REv. 299, 316 (1983); see also JAMES
G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS {1958) {information scarcity is basis for discarding
fully rational decisionmaking model). A story of a legislative committee knowingly applying "disjointed
incrementalism" over a global approach is told in Robert M. Rhodes & Robert C. Apgar, Charting
Florida's Course: The State and Regional Planning Act of 1984, 12 FLA. Sr. U. L. REv. 583, 593 n.47
(1984). Some believe that "muddling through" is the characteristic decision making style of all American
institutions. WILLIAM 0PHULS, EcoLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 191-93 {1977). Others
question the universality of Lindblom's model. Dror, Muddling Through- Science ofInertia, 24 PuB.
ADMIN. REv. 156 (1964); Hirschman & Charles E. Lindblom, Economic Development. Research and
Development Policy Making: Some Converging Views, 7 BEHAV. SCI. 220-21 (1962) (contrast latter's
view ofpolicymaking as a generally remedial process with former's emphasis on the need for prospective
analysis in economic policymaking). Lindblom reasons that fully rational decisionmaking models are
unrealistic as both descriptions of and norms for, actual regulatory decisionmaking because
decisionmakers never have complete information. Usually they have little information beyond the past
history of the subject and their own dealings with it. "Muddling through," is a descriptive model and
a normative model of how an agency does, and should, make good decisions with incomplete
information. Daniel J. Gifford, Discretionary Decisionmaking in the Regulatory Agencies: A Conceptual
Framework, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 101, 118-20 (1983); Sheldon D. Pollack, A New Dynamics of Tax
Policy?, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 61, 99 n.22 (1995). See also Colin S. Driver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 97-98 (1983). Under the contrasting fully rational decisionmaking
model, decisionmakers clearly define the problem to be addressed, determine satisfactory level of
addressing it, collect and consider alternatives to achieve the goals developed in this process, and finally
choose the approach that effectuates such goals at the least cost. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS,
ALTERNATIVES, AND PuBLIC POLICIES 82 {1984); see Regan, supra; Edward L. Rubin, Legislative
Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L. J. 233, 282 (1991); James M.
Verdier, A Framework for Predicting Congressional Action, 41 TAX NOTES 435 (1988). For an oft-cited
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where policyrnakers within an agency can not agree. 43 Such lack of
agreement is all too evident in conflicts between field or National Office of
Chief Counsel on post-INDOPCO capitalization/expensing issues. 44 The
disagreement goes back for at least three decades and appears to reflect as
much as anything else a greater appreciation of judicial pragmatism by the
Chief Counsel's Office. 45
Lindblom46 maintains that more can be
accomplished by a series of little steps than in one big reform. 47 This
article asserts to the contrary that muddling through as the administrative
answer to capitalization/expensing issues is more likely than a global
approach to flounder on the shoals of interest group pressure. The story of
post-INDOPCO capitalization rulings shows that interest groups fare better
countering politically adverse rulings one at a time separately than in a more
global reform. 48 This is so even though global legislative reform tends to
preserve a few tax preferences for selected interest groups. 49 With
incrementalism all interest groups tend to prevail. This divided we conquer
approach was implicit in those narrow issue-specific comments made in
response to Notice 96-7. 50 In contrast, more global tax reform provisions,
such as the uniform capitalization rules of Section 263A in the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 and the amortization of purchased intangibles under Section
197 enacted in the first Clinton Administration's tax act, OBRA 1993, were
better able to achieve rough justice despite some exceptions. 51 Indeed,
some define rough justice as trading off interest groups with some winners
and some losers (and in taxes by reducing administrative costs to Treasury's

discussion of various decisionmaking models see Colin Driver, Policymaking Paradigms in
Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 396-400 (1981); see also Clayton P. Gillette & James E.
Kreier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1107-08 (1990).
43. Lindblom, supra note 42; see also GRAHAM T. AWSON, EsSENCE OF DECISION (1971 ); KARL
E. WEICK, rnE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZING (1969).
44. See notes 84, 87 and 90 infra and accompanying text.
45. This appreciation of judicial trends and implicit conflict within the Service (since the rulings
proposed by Chief Counsel were never published by the Commissioner) may be clearly seen in the
"separate asset" doctrine rulings cited in note 18, supra.
46. Lindblom is a leading pluralist thinker. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Review Essay: The Substance
of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REV. 919 (1989). His thought is close to populism. CHARLES
EDWARD LINDBLOM, POU11CS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POUTICAL EcoNOMIC SYSTEMS 173, 175
(1977) (business more influence that other interest groups in capitalist polyarchies ). Incrementalism often
(but not always) goes hand in glove with pluralism or public choice. Sheldon Pollack, Tax Reform: The
1980's in Perspective, 46 TAX L. REV. 489,490,504 (1991) (because interest groups influence narrow,
specific policymaking).
47. Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 517, 520
(1979).
48. See note 56 infra and note 21 supra.
49. See notes 75-76 infra.
50. See note 122 infra.
51. See notes 75-76 and 357 infra.
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satisfaction, notwithstanding a few tax preference exceptions). 52 Only a
global approach can satisfy the strong horizontal equity prerequisite for
fundamental tax reform, identified by then Senate Finance Committee Chair .
Bob Packwood, as "all share the pain. " 53 This article argues that only such
a global approach is likely to prevail politically, incrementalism will lose hot
issue after hot issue. 54 This is particularly true in light of House Ways and
Means Committee Chair Bill Archer's steadfast opposition to new taxes. 55
This article urges the Packwood principle of horizontal equity or all-sharethe-pain (with a few too inevitable political exceptions or pain balms) over
the Archer approach of viewing each industry-adverse post-INDOPCO
ruling as exacting a new tax. House Ways and Means Chair Bill Archer
really means no new taxes.
The proposed standard for regulatory capitalization is minimum
distortion of income both as to timing and character. The proposed rough
justice timing exceptions allowing current deduction of costs with current
and future benefits should encompass small, short-lived, or regularly
recurring costs, and the presumably rare occasions in which depreciation or
amortization poses extreme administrative difficulties. These guiding
principles and rules should be illustrated with numerous examples derived

52. See note 357 infra and accompanying text Many conunentators support trading off between
interest groups as leading to better results. E.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among
Pressure Groups for Political Influence. 98 Q.J. EcON. 371, 383-84 (1983); ROBERT ALAN DAHL,
DILEMMAS OF I'LURAUST DEMOCRACY: AIJTONOMY VS. CONTROL 31-54 (1982); Paul B. Stephan III,
Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 745, 749 (1995) ("Were minorities unable to outcompete majorities in the market for laws,
public choices, economic theory holds, would tend over time to favor actions that improve the net
welfare of society.... "). Others disagree; e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance:
Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 294-95 (1988);
see also conunentators cited in note 363 infra.
53. Sen. Packwood is reported to have agreed to the elimination of a capital gains preference in
the 1986 Code (in exchange for lower rates) so long as ''there is 'equal treatment' for all industries."
JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH 83 (1987). This was an
admirable and principled significant concession given that timber interests (in the Northwest and
Southeast) are the most vocal supporters of a capital gains preference (although accounting for only a
minute percentage of annual capital gains realizations). See John W. Lee, Critique of Cu"ent
Congressional Capital Gains Contentions, 15 VA. TAX REv. I, 27-28 (1995) [hereinafter Lee, Capital

Gains Contentions].
54. See TEl-IRS Liaison Minutes, supra note 39 ("Mr. Wheeler [General Motors Corporation, TEl
Executive Committee] said that the more the capitalization issue festers, the more Congress may be
tempted (or urged) to micromanage the area through legislation."); notes 57-59 infra and accompanying
text.
55. E.g., Eric Pianin, Panel on Entitlements Starts Its Task Averse to New Taxes, WASH. POST,
June 14, 1995, at A4 (Archer opposed "any effort to tamper with 'tax expenditures' or to raise taxes. As
far as I'm concerned, decreases in tax expenditures is the same as raising taxes ...."); Spencer Rich
& Lou Cannon, Agreement Nears on Aid to Aged; Tradeoff Possible On Social Security. Reagan Aide
Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1983, at AI; Amy S. Cohen, Outlook Bleak for Superfund Reauthorization,
67 TAX NOTES 1295, 1296 (1995).
.
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from judicial and agency ruling experience. Ideally these regulations would
go beyond stating the standard and the rules (with illustrations) to fashioning
a balancing test along the lines of Discretionary Justice. 56 Such balancing
test would weigh (a) the accounting and recordkeeping burdens to the
taxpayer (and in some circumstances the administrative costs to the Service)
of capitalizing and depreciating the future benefit costs, against (b) the
increased revenu~s to Treasury from such capitalizing and depreciating.
(Where public perceptions of inequity are strong, increased horizontal equity
could be taken into account on the benefit side of the scales). The
balancing test structuring the factfinder's discretion also would direct the
weight to be given to, and the parameters of, such "rough justice" factors
of smallness, short-lives, and recurring, as well as revenue increase. This
"second best" global solution is politically more viable than the global ideal
of capitalization of all multi-period costs, with economic depreciation over
economic lives with other complete adjustments for inflation. It is also
more politically and administratively viable than the illusory practical
incrementalism of case-by-case resolution of individual taxpayer's
capitalization issues on audit. The administrative record to date gives every
appearance of "muddling through" a political minefield with IRS reversals
on SAIF fees, 57 soil remediation, 58 and sooner-or-later cyclical aircraft

56. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 103. See James W. Colliton, Standards. Rules and
the Decline of the Courts in the Law of Taxation, 99 DICK. L. REv. 265, 266 (1995) (most of tax law
follows evolution of (1) Congress enacts broad general tax provision, (2) controversies generate judicial
and administrative interpretations or rules causing "Congress to amend the statute by providing more
detailed rules [; (3)] [a]s I.R.S. and the courts interpret these new rules, controversies again develop
which inspire Congress to provide yet more detailed rules."). For a similar evolution from general statute
through case law confusion (although hardly loophole opening) to overly detailed, generally restrictive
statutory rules in areas of mixed business personal elements such as the costs of employer ordered travel,
moves, meals and lodging, conventions, and education; see John W. Lee, Command Performance: The
Tax Treatment ofEmployer Mandated Expenses, 7 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 2, 28-9, 37, 59-61, 74-76, 93-96
(1972). Professor Bittker asked for a reprint of this article in which Professor Lee first considered some
of the issues discussed here. Moreover, a Judge Tannenwald opinion was the source of the "command
performance" symbolism. McDonell v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (CCH) 115 (1967). Professor Lee finds
the connections between Bittker, Tannenwald and himself in several doctrinal areas pleasing, but not
mere coincidence.
57. In 1992, deduction of (or amortization of capitalized) SAIF fees was a "significant issue" for
the savings and loan industry under the IRS Industry Specialization Program. John J. Monaco, Executive
Director Coordinated Examination Programs, Industry Specialization (ISP): Opportunities to Relieve
Corporate Tax Burden (Dec. 22, 1992), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 92 TAX NOTES
TODAY 256-17 (Dec. 24, 1992). Monaco claimed that significant issues differed from "coordinated
isssues" in that only the latter were governed by precise mandatory guidelines; the former might develop
into cordinated issues, but they might not. /d. The 125 "significant issues" were organized by 20
industries. !d. By 1996, the Service and Treasury had abandoned attempts to capitalize such fees. See
142 CONG. REC. S 11899-90 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (reproducing Letter dated Sept. 27, 1996 from
House Ways and Means Committee Chair Archer to House Appropriation Committee Chair Livingston).
58. One of the "significant issues" for the forest products industry was the cost of toxic waste
clean-up, but it did not appear to be a industries-wide significant issue. It did arise, however, in a 1992
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maintenance costs. 59 The proposed structured discretionary rough justice
regulations would effect the horizontal equity policy of all suffering
equally. 60
The uncertainty and political opposition to IRS capitalization rulings
can only be increased by a side effect of incrementalism as implemented
through published revenue rulings through the end of 1996. Published
rulings permitting expensing of present and future benefit expenses have
followed the "digest" format under which sparse facts and little legal
analysis is disclosed. 61 Professor Davis calls for this drafting approach
when the agency is unsure of the underlying principles. 62 Professor
Lindblom calls for it when the agency experiences internal conflicts. 63 The
higher level of analysis in the TAMs and once GCMs suggests that Chief
Counsel's Office is more sure of the underlying principles or better rules
than the published rulings would indicate. Conflict with the field and
National appeals as to the capitalization ramifications of INDOPCO is
another story. 64 The Service and Treasury should rethink the transaction

soil remediation TAM. Chief Counsel's Office capitalized the costs of soil remediation but allowed
amortization over a period equal to the remaining useful life of the taxpayer's natural gas pipeline. Since
the taxpayer was in the business of pumping natural gas, this theoretically was equal to the useful life
of the taxpayer's business or at least principal asset The Service had previously used similar approaches
as to the training costs of workers in a new nuclear power plant. Contemporaneously with the resulting
political firestorm, Treasury and the Service reversed course. Rev. Rul. 94-38, supra note 21 (allowing
a current deduction, in part because were the soil remediation costs capitalized and added to the cost of
the land, no depreciation would be available. That too would result in distortion of income, so a current
deduction was allowed.).
59. The cyclical aircraft engine overhaul issue also arose from the 1992 "Significant issues list,"
this time as to the airlines industry. The hint to agents gave rise to an audit issue resulting in Tech. Adv.
Mem. 96-180-04 (Jan. 23, 1996}, released May 3, 1996. That TAM capitalized the costs of major engine
overhauls occurring every 4 years and allowed capital recovery as if the capitalized costs were a new
aircraft or 7 years spread out over 8 years. /d. House Ways and Means Chair Archer objected to
Commissioner Margaret Richardson that this raised a "new tax burden on critical airline safety
inspections and repairs." Letter dated Sept. 19, 1996 to Commissioner Richardson from House Ways
and Means Committee Chair Archer, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, lNT File, 96 TAX NOTES
TODAY 198-43 (Oct. 9, 1996). IRS Chief Counsel Stuart Brown replied that the TAM was not binding
on other taxpayers. Letter dated Oct. 1, 1996 to Chair Archer from Chief Counsel Brown, available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 198-2 (Oct 9, 1996). This, of course, did not
satisfy Chair Archer since the industry was being audited on this issue [as Archer had planned we might
add]. Letter dated Oct. 8, 1996 to Commissioner Richardson from House Ways and Means Chair Archer
("I must repeat that the Internal Revenue Service position represents a new tax burden on critical airline
safety inspections and repairs.") available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, lNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY
198-5 (1996).
60. See notes 51 supra and 334 infra and accompanying text for horizontal equity at work
politically. Horizontal equity is defined as similarly situated taxpayers paying similar amounts of taxes.
See Lee, Entity Classijicaton, infra note 80, at 121 n. 271.
61. See notes 18 supra and 244 infra.
62. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 41.
63. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
64. See notes 87 and 90 infra.
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costs and potential political consequences of incrementalism, namely,
triggering limitation riders.
Other proposed regulatory capitalization rules would require capitalization while providing depreciation where the cost (a) recurs less frequently, (b) still provides substantial future benefits when repeated, or (c)
is quite substantial (even if providing minor increase in value). Safe harbor
uniform lives amortization, another proposed ''rough justice" remedy, should
be provided based on the tax policy of simplification, and by "approximation" through uniform useful lives producing minimum distortion of
income, thus serving the policy of administerability. Minimum distortion
of income as to character should be addressed at this time primarily through
examples in the regulations applying the "origin of the claim" doctrine,
particularly as to merger issues.
Works in progress on other specific capitalization/expensing issues
(Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs and Writer's Prepublication Costs
Revisited) explore the notion of "negotiated rule making" and its application
to fashioning such regulations. Under that scenario representatives from at
least Treasury, the Service, the Joint Committee on Taxation and the
professional groups (e.g., ABA and AICPA) would, through the process of
"collegial tax reform," agree upon the framework of such regulations. The
model is the number of such successful projects in the late 1970s and early
1980s often headed up by Professor Martin Ginsburg. 65 Other major
players with experience with this issue include, on the administrative side,
Jerry Cohen, Harry Guttman and Ken Gideon. Peter Faber has been active
on the capitalizing versus expensing issue from the ABA Tax Section side.
This time the group of colleagues might include, in addition to representatives from Treasury and the professional groups (ABA and AICP A in particular), representatives from (1) the Service (both Chief Counsel and Field
or audit); (2) academics (including some with administrative experience in

65. See Howard J. Hoffman, The Role of the Bar in the Tax Legislative Process, 37 TAX L. REv.
411, 498-502 (1982). Professor Lee probably was (subconsciously) inspired by a letter dated May 3,
1996 from Geoffrey J. Harlow, Chair Taxation Executive Committee, Illinois CPA Society, in response
to Notice 96-7:
in order to further facilitate a dialogue with respect to such general guidance by the Service
and comments by taxpayers, we recommend that the Service establish a committee for input
from taxpayers and tax practitioners with regard to the general guidance and with respect to
the specific approaches, principles or issues such general guidance should address.
/d. Professor Lee had added that Submission to his file without fully appreciating. The second,
implementing proposal is essentially what this article proposes. Professor Lee came up with the idea
thinking about the cyclical airlines problem, not then recalling the Illinois CPA proposal. He has always
had a fond spot for Illinois, besides the accident of his birth in Chicago (at three months he moved to
Bellefontaine, Ohio). On his maternal grandmother's side (who was born in Madison County, Illinois)
an ancestor was born in Illinois in 1800, the grandson of a Swiss mercenary who emigrated to Virginia
in 1777 to fight in the Revolution.
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this area, such as Professor Thomas Evans); (3) industry representatives
(perhaps as self-identified by the submitters of comments pursuant to Notice
96-7 - former Service officials with great experience in the tax accounting
areas, including Glenn Carrington and Carol Conjuga so submitted); and (4)
due to the interest by the Ways and Means Committee in some capitalization
issues and the work by various other agencies on capitalization issues,
representatives of the tax writing Committees and of GAO and CRS. This
article does not discuss the topic of negotiated regulation any further. To
emphasize that the heart of proper taxpayer treatment of current deduction
versus capitalization-cum-amortization is the standard of clear reflection of
income effected through "rough justice" minimum distortion, not future
benefit per se, these regulations could be issued under Section 44666 with
cross references under Sections 162 and 263.
II.

PROMULGATION OF
STANDARDS) AND RULES

A.

CAPITALIZATION

GENERAL

PRINCIPLES

(OR

The Case for Further Guidance as to Tax Treatment of Future
Benefit Expenditures

More for the record than in expectation of immediate enactment,
Professor Lee urged Chair Rangel's House Ways and Means Subcommittee
on Select Revenue Measures in its second 1993 Hearing on Miscellaneous
Revenue Issues "not to stop with cleanup costs, but address as well the
looming question of tax accounting for self-created intangibles in
general.'o67 (It was clear at the Hearing that no legislation on clean-up costs
or any of the other numerous issues would be forthcoming, much less the

66. The principal, possibly insurmountable, disadvantage .to this approach is the rule that the
Commissioner cannot impose an accounting method (which includes the taxpayer's expensing versus
capitalizing practice) just because it more clearly reflects income. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959 (July 25,
1972); Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,259 (Mar. 6, 1973)
We recognize that the mandate of Code§ 263 has been questioned in several recent decisions.
These courts framed the issue in terms of whether the taxpayer's method of accounting clearly
reflected income. In our opinion, however, income is not clearly reflected if an expenditure
resulting in the acquisition of an asset having a useful life greater than one year is currently
expensed.
/d. (citations omitted). Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,116 (Nov. 14, 1972) (expenditures in the nature of repairs
and maintenance resulting in the acquisition of assets with a useful life exceeding one year were still
currently deducttble; "useful life" test was not affected; de minimis rule allowing current expensing of
minor capital expenditures, was merely a rule of accounting and administrative reason, reflecting only
on the fact that Code Section 263 is not absolutely inflexible.). See generally, Peter Faber, INDOPCO:
The Still Unsolved Riddle, 47 TAX LAw. 607, 612-13 (1994).
67. 1993 Hearings, supra note 24 at 1699; see David G. Coolidge, Note, A Square Hole for a
Square Peg: Section /65 and Environmental Cleanup Costs, 14 VA. TAX REv. 779, 785 (1995).
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general subject of capitalization. Professor Lee mostly wanted to give staff
something to think about.) He described in his Prepared Statement the
substantial administrative costs that had arisen and would continue to arise
out of capitalization tax issues. 68 And so it happened.
This article elaborates that further guidance is needed regarding the
ordinary deduction versus capitalization with amortization of the costs of
self-created intangibles. The primary reason is the attention being given
these issues by revenue agents in the Field as shown in Government
Accounting Office studies69 and Congressional Hearings70 as well as the
professional, popular71 and academic journals. 72 The resulting transaction

68. I993 Hearings, supra note 24, at 1699.
69. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REP., supra note 35.
In the 117 Office of Appeals cases ... , large corporate taxpayers disagreed with IRS most
frequently over the issue of capital expenditures, which accounted for about 42% of the issues
they contested. It was also the issue with the most dollars at stake in the 117 cases,
accounting for $1.1 billion of the total $1.9 billion in proposed tax adjustments. In these
cases, the corporations argued for immediate deduction of large expenses related to events
such as corporate mergers, reorganizations, or environmental cleanups. IRS contended that
such expenditures had future benefits and should therefore be treated as capital expenditures
under Section 263, not immediately deductible in the current tax year.
Id. Accord, TEl Urges IRS to Continue Issuing Rulings on Capitalization Questions, 96 DAILY EXEC.
REv. 56 d63 (Mar. 22, 1996); Comments of Tax Executives Institute, Inc. on Notice 96-7 Request for
Comments on Further Capitalization Guidance Submitted to the Internal Revenue Service (Mar. 20,
1996), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 60-19 (Mar. 26, 1996)
(comments of TEl on Notice 96-7).
70. I993 Hearings, supra note 24, at 1698-99.
71. Is it a logical deduction? Better ask the IRS, 20 CORP. FIN. WK. 1 (Mar. 1994); Bob Perlman
(TEl President), Welcome letters to new IRS Commissioner and Assistant Treasury Secretary; Margaret
M Richardson and Leslie Samuels, 45 TAX EXEC. 222 (May 1993); Controversies over Cost
Capitalization Seen Increasing Following "INDOPCO," 1993 Daily Tax Report 25 d22 (Feb. 9, 1993);
McGee Grigsby & Cabell Chinn is, Jr., INDOPCO v. Commissioner: The Supreme Court Takes National
Starch to the Cleaners, 44 TAX EXEc. 85, 92-94 (1992); Paul Manca, Deductibility ofTakeover and NonTakeover Expenses in the Wake ofiNDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 45 TAX LAW. 815 (1992); Laura
Saunders, The Agents Run Riot, FORBES, Nov. 9, 1992, at 144; Juliann Avakian-Martin, INDOPCO
Guidance Likely to Caver Advertising, Repairs, Training, 56 TAX NOTES 545 (1992); Lee Sheppard, Is
the IRS Abusing INDOPCO? 56 TAX NoTES 1110 (1992); Aaron Pressman, IRS Plans to give Guidance
Following INDOPCO Ruling, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS REP., Aug. 3, 1992, at 14; Timothy
McCormally, TEl Warns ofIRS Agents Poised to Disallow Historically Deductible Expenditures, 55 TAX
NOTES 739 (1992); George Javaras & Todd Maynes, Business Expansion and Protection in the Post
INDOPCO World, 55 TAX NOTES 971 (1992); Richard Lipton, Lynne Schewe, & Michael Fondo,
Supreme Court Approves Focus on Long-Term Benefit in Takeover Expense Controversy, 76 J. TAX'N
324 (June 1992); Rita Zeidner, INDOPCO Provides Groundworkfor Denying Deductions, 56 TAX NOTES
970 (1992); Tax Rule Is Upheld, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at D19) ("The Government's lawyers said
more than $500 million in tax liability was at stake in 67 pending disputes over the deductibility of
merger and acquisition expenses.").
72. See, e.g., Note, INDOPCO v. Commissioner: Form over Substance in the Judicial Regulation
of the Market for Corporate Control, 12 VA. TAX REv. 121 (1992); Alexander, supra note 16; John Paul
LeBlanc, Note, The Supreme Court Attempts to "Iron Out" the Wrinkles in National Starch, 54 LA. L.
REv. 437 (1993); Jeffrey Gates Davis, Comment, INDOPCO, Inc, v. Commissioner: National Starch
Isn't the Only One Stiffed by the Supreme Court's Decision, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 1455 (1993); Sarah R.
Lyke, Note, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: National Starch Decision Adds Wrinkles to Capital
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costs of this unfettered revenue agent's discretion are unacceptable to the
taxpayers, Serviceffreasury and the courts as well as Congress. 73 This
should be self-evident from the recent enactment of Section 197, and before
that of Section 195, to end similar transaction costs as to amortization of
purchased intangibles74 and of intangibles created before a business
commences/5 respectively. Yet each time, as well as in the case of
Section 263A76 providing "uniform capitalization rules," Congress carved

Expenditure Issue, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1239 (1994); Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 19. Many
other articles deal with more narrow questions such as merger costs, environmental clean up costs, and
costs of education. E.g., James David Ruffiter, IV, Comment, Corporate Reorganization Expenses: An
Overview of the Denial of Current Federal Tax Deductibility and Resulting Capitalization, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 197 (1993); Coolidge, supra note 67, at 779; Hamish P.M. Hume, Note, The Business
ofLearning: When and How the Cast ofEducation Should be Recognized, 81 VA. L. REv. 887 (1995).
73. See note 32 supra.
74. See notes 32 supra and 170 infra.
75. Start-up cost issues were frequently raised on audit Hearings on H.R. 6883, H.R. 5616, H.R.
5729 [60-month amortization of start-up costs1 H.R. 6039, H.R. 6140, H.R. 6247, H.R. 6824, and H.R.
7009 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Camm. on Ways and Means, 96th
Con g. 45, I 01-02 (1980) (Statements of Charles M. Walker, Chairman, Section ofTaxation, A.B.A., and
Samuel M. Chase, Jr., Chairman, Legislative Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Real Estate Securities, Nat'!
Ass'n of Realtors, respectively). The Department of the Treasury "support[ed] H.R 5729 because it
would reduce the disparity in tax treatment between ordinary and necessary preopening expenses and
similar expenses incurred by an existing business." /d. at 14 (Statement of Daniel I. Halperin, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Legislation). Treasury's main concern, however, was to
"induce taxpayers with existing businesses to elect to amortize the start-up costs of a marginally related
business, thereby reducing the number of controversies in this area." /d.
76. The Senate Committee Report stated that Section 263A was not intended to modify presentlaw principles governing the determination of whether an expenditure results in a separate and distinct
asset that has a useful life substantially beyond the tax year. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-l, (a)-2 (as
amended in 1987); Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan, 403 U.S. 345 (1971 ).
Thus, if the costs of producing an intangible item such as goodwill are deductible under
current Jaw, such costs will continue to be deductible under... [Section 263A]. The uniform
capitalization rule merely will prescribe which costs associated with an asset required to be
capitalized must be included in its basis or otherwise capitalized.
S. REP. No. 99-313, at 141 & n.38 (1986). The Senate provision reached, however, production of
intangible property as well as tangible personal property. The earlier Treasury Proposals had excepted
(without explanation) from the Uniform Capitalization Rules marketing, selling, and advertising expenses
and research and development costs unrelated to particular production activities. 2 TREAsURY I, supra
note 4 at 207; UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TREAs., THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO CONGRESS FOR
FAIRNESS, EQUITY AND SIMPLICITY 203 ( 1985). The Joint Committee Staff had read Lincoln Savings
& Loan as adopting "a rule of reason approach to applying section 263, acknowledging the impracticality
of requiring that every cost with some conceivable future benefit be capitalized." Joint Comm. Staff, Tax
Proposal: Accounting (1985). Boris Bittker's influence here is evident. Compare BORIS I. BITIKER,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES AND GIFTS 1[ 20.4.1, at 20-67 {1st ed. 1981) {"If the IRS
seriously endeavored to disallow every cost contributing to the profits of future periods, it would be
necessary to divide almost every salary and advertising expense between its immediate impact on the
customer and its contribution to the company's long-lived goodwill. Recognizing this fact of business
life, the Supreme Court has said that 'the presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future
aspect is not controlling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the
taxable year."'). Judge Tannenwald's concurring opinion in Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374, 382
( 1970), pointed out that advertising and educational costs are generally currently deductible
notwithstanding future benefit. That led Professor Lee to conclude that "increase in earning power or
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out an exception from the new provision for self-created intangibles of
existing businesses, 77 leaving them subject to the existing case law.
Congress specifically had in mind the separate asset prerequisite for
capitalization (mis)reading of Lincoln Savings and Loan 78- thought to
provide a current deduction. 79
The current capitalization morass at the public corporation level (which
reports over 80% of the corporate sector income and over 56% of the
combined corporate and sole proprietor sector gross receipts combined}80

benefit to future years in not alone sufficient, otherwise all ordinary and necessary business expenditures
resulting in greater profit [or future benefit] would have to be capitalized, which is not the law." John
Lee, A Blend of Old Wines in a New Wineskin: Section I83 and Beyond, 29 TAX L. REv. 347, 462
(1974) [Lee, Section I83 and Beyond]. The Conference Report attempted to "clarify" the above
legislative history with the following poorly-proofread statement: "that, in addition to the costs
specifically excepted from capitalization under the conference agreement (e.g., research and experimental
costs, selling, marketing, advertising, and distribution expenses) are not subject to capitalization under
the uniform capitalization rules." H.R. REP. No. 99-881, at 11-305 (1986). The Bluebook shifted to a
new rationale and proves that the parenthetical was meant to close with "experimental costs":
"[C]onsistent with the long-term contract regulations under section 471, selling, marketing, advertising,
and distribution expenses were not intended to be subject to capitalization under these rules." STAFF OF
THE JOINT COMMITIEE ON TAXATION, 99th Cong. GENERAL ExPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Acr
OF 1986 510 (Comm. Print 1986) (1986 Bluebook). But even more directly, the Conference Bill
modified the Senate bill by adding "tangible" as a limitation on produced personal property.
77. The 1980 legislative history to Section 195 stated that in the case of an existing business,
eligible start-up expenditures do not include deductible ordinary and necessary business expenses paid
or incurred in connection with an expansion of the business, but as under prior law, such expenditures
would continue to be currently deductible. S. REP. No. 96-1036, at 12 (1980). The determination of
whether there is an expansion of an existing trade or business, or a creation or acquisition of a new trade
or business, is based on the facts and circumstances of each case as· under prior law. This position,
which only obliquely can be gleaned from the statute, see original Section 195(b)(2) and current
Section 195(c)(1)(B), probably is intended to preserve the victories of the banking industry in the bank
credit card start-up cases. The result, however, with subsequent conflicts as to bank expansion costs, is
complete confusion as to the scope of capitalization under Section 195. Congress had been so warned
by a witness in the Hearings. Lee, .Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 16, at 102-03. The OBRA
1993 legislative history to Section 197 simply states that "[i]t is also believed that there is no need at this
time to change the Federal income tax treatment of self-created intangible assets, such as goodwill that
is created through advertising and other similar expenditures." H.R. REP. No. I 03-111, at 760 (1993).
This immediately follows the statement that:
It is believed that much of the controversy that arises under the present law with respect to
acquired intangible assets could be eliminated by specifying a single method and period for
recovering the cost of most acquired intangible assets and by treating acquired goodwill and
going concern value as amortizable intangible assets.
Id. For a good analysis of Section 197 and its legislative background see Gregory M. Beil, Comment,
Internal Revenue Code Section 197: A Cure for the Controversy over the Amortization of Acquired
Intangible Assets, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 731, (1995).
78. Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan, 403 U.S. 345 (1971). See note 76 supra.
79. See Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 16, at 52-56.
80. The 1993 corporate income tax distribution shows the same concentration: the 7,000
corporations with assets from $100,000,000 to $ 250,000,000 reported 6.2% of corporate earnings; the
3,000 with assets from $250,000,000 to $500,000,000, 5.3%; and the 4,000 with more than
$500,000,000, 71.2%. Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, Selected Materials Relating to the Federal Tax
System Under Present Law and Various Alternative Tax Systems (JCS-1-96 Mar. 14, 1996), available
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is the largest category of Section 162 deduction/Section 263 capitalization
issues, which in tum are the largest group of audit controversies at this
level. 81 Commissioner Goldberg stated that capitalization issues were the
most common Industry Specialization Program (ISP) (Co-ordinated Audit)
issue. 82 They have greatly contributed to the confusion. These ISPs are

in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 53-8 (Mar. 15, 1996). Thus the largest
14,000 corporations (out of 4,000,000 or so corporations) reported 83.7% of corporate income. This
pattern is long-standing. John Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships,
Personal Service Corporations and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 VA. TAX REv. 57, 100-01 n. 169
(1988) (1984 data) [hereinafter Lee, Entity Classification]. These corporations make up almost all of the
publicly traded corporations and vice versa. Sole proprietors while greatly outnumbering C and S
corporations, (15,800,000 to 4,000,000 C and S corporations (roughly 50/50)) in 1993 accounted for only
29% of the combined sole proprietor and corporate sector gross receipts. We expect that corporate sector
profit margins exceed the sole proprietor sector and that the corporate sector and in particular the largest
14,000 C corporations captured an even greater percentage of the business sector income in the booms
of 1994 and particularly 1995. 1992 pre-tax corporate profits increased 16.6% with the 6,300 largest
corporations accounting for 79"A. of the total. SO/ Release on Summer 1995 Statistics ofIncome Bulletin,
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 169-22 (Aug. 29, 1995). Thus
the 56% or so of business sector gross receipts (80% x 70%) reported in 1993 has probably been
followed in 1994 and 1995 with an even greater share of the profits in the top corporations, who
incidentally employed 47% of the private sector workforce, while small business employed 53%. See
142 CONG. REC. S 2,312 (Sen. daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (Remarks of Sen. Lautenburg).
81. See note 69 supra and accompanying text
82. 1991 Hearings on Intangibles, supra note 32, at 49 (Prepared Statement of Commissioner
Goldberg) ("We also know that intangibles are among the most prevalent issues in the Large Case (ISP
& CEP) Program today. The administration of these issues demands a significant proportion of the
Service's resources. For example, 20% of the staff time of the Exam function's engineers is occupied
with evaluating intangibles.") (Footnote omitted). List of Significant Issues in the Internal Revenue
Service Industry Specialization Program, Accompanied by Explanation by John Monaco, Executive
Director, IRS Coordinated Examination Programs, 1992 DAILY TAX REPoRT 247 d32 (Dec. 23, 1992);
Monaco, supra note 57 (listing "Significant Issues"); John J. Monaco, CEP Program: Changes in the
Industry Specialization Program, 44 TAX ExEC. 163-170 (May-June 1992), available in LEXIS, Fed tax
Library, TNT File, 92 TAX NOTES TODAY 116-72 (June 4, 1992); Tax Analyst has Obtained CEP-QJP
Proposal for Changes to Coordinated Examination Programs with Comments by Counsel and Appeals,
90 TAX NOTES TODAY 151-15 (July 20, 1990) (core initial targets, debt-equity and purchased intang~bles
{viz., fall-out from LBOs}); Service Briefs CAG on Coordinated Examination Program, 90 TAX NOTES
TODAY 89-30 (Apr. 27, 1990) (same); Dan Baucum & Peter Scott, How to Survive a Large-Case Audit
Under Revised IRS Guidelines, 79 J. TAX'N 82 (Aug. 1993); Carrington, supra note 21, at 25-22 through
25-24 and 25-41 through 25-43. Roughly 1/4 of the 125 "significant issues" in the IRS Industry
Specialization Program then released involved capitalization/amortization versus expense issues. And
capitalization issues account for one Code Section (Section 263) and a subissue under another (Section
162 of course) out of the 14 Code Sections identified by GAO as accounting for almost half of the
12,000 appealed issues awaiting resolution in court 1993 GAO Recurring Tax Issues, supra note 36.
Fourteen tax code sections account for almost half of the 12,000 appealed issues awaiting resolution in
court /d. GAO also identified the 53 subsections within the 14 code sections that were most frequently
appealed or had the highest dollar amount of proposed adjustments. /d.
Data also show that issues related to these 14 code sections accounted for an average of 44
percent of all issues resolved or closed by Appeals during fiscal years 1991 and 1992, 52
percent of the proposed adjustment amounts, and 59 percent of the proposed adjustment
amounts sustained by Appeals. Capitalization accounted for between $3,047,000 and
$3,122,000 of the $56,029,000 in proposed adjustments under the 14 Code sections (and
$99,034,000 in total proposed adjustments as of September 30, 1992 or .054% to .056% of
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initially worked up in the field 83 and apparently do not have the attention
of the National Office Chief Counsel84 that TAMs enjoy (and hence do not
have the Treasury input that the National Office Chief Counsel has received
on capitalization/amortization principles or rules. Or as Tax Court Judge
Lapsley Hamblen, Jr., as Emeritus Trustee of the Virginia Annual
Conference on Federal Taxation, put it, Audit "doesn't have to try them."
The GCMs and now TAMs reveal that Chief Counsel on the other hand is
keenly aware of judicial trends in the capitalization area). 85 Indeed,
National Office Chief Counsel officials probably disagree with many of
these ISPs. Glenn Carrington (former Assistant Chief Counsel Income
Taxation and Accounting Issues) has suggested that many conflict with rules
underlying some published Revenue Rulings and TAMs progeny of
INDOPC0. 86 He also points, 87 as do many industry voices, 88 to these

the proposed adjustments under the 14 Code sections. Adjustments under Section 263 alone
were the 6th largest. The Service's rate of success on capitalization was comparatively low,
but this data reflects the situation prior to INDOPCO. Conventional wisdom, confirmed by
the trend in ISPs, holds that proposed capitalization adjustments will greatly increase, and we
suspect that the IRS' success rate here too will improve greatly ceteris paribus.
1993 Hearings, supra note 24 at 1699 (Statement of Professor Lee). Former IRS acting Chief Counsel
Peter Scott ranked 19 on list of significant issues "when an expenditure must be capitalized or may be
deducted." Controversies over Cost Copita/ization Seen Increasing Following "INDOPCO," 1993 DAILY
TAX REPoRT 25 d22 (Feb. 9, 1993) (for such list see List of Significant Issues in the Internal Revenue
Service Industry Specialization Program, Accompanied by Explanation by John Monaco, Executive
Director, IRS Coordinated Examination Programs, 1992 DAILY TAX REPORT 247 d32 (Dec. 23, 1992)).
Subsequent GAO research confirmed this pattern, revealing that the largest single category of Section
162 contested issues involving large corporate taxpayers or big deficiencies (42%) was the current
deduction vs capitalization/amortization of self-created intangibles. 1995 GAO Recurring Business Tax
Disputes, supra note 35. The GAO reviewed 117 Office of Appeals cases filed by large corporate
taxpayers, who disagreed with IRS most frequently over the issue of capital expenditures, accounting for
about 42% of the contested issues. /d. These capitalization issues had the most dollars at stake in these
117 cases, accounting for $1.1 billion of the total $1.9 billion in proposed tax adjustments. Jd. The
capitalization issues involved immediate deduction of large expenses related to (a) corporate
reorganizations or (b) environmental cleanups. !d.
83. The first step is identifying a significant issue as widespread and complex. If a significant
issue remains significant and becomes more widespread, the industry specialist is involved in the
development of the significant issue into a coordinated issue paper. If the issue is coordinated, a
coordinated issue paper is written becoming the method by which the IRS examines the cases,
procedures, processes and techniques used to audit the particular issues. Deposition of IRS National
Director of Corporate Examinations Addresses FSA and ISP Programs, available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, TNT file, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 67-84 (Apr. 6, 1995).
84. Draft Internal Revenue Service Coordinated Issue Paper Regarding Shelf Space or Slotting
Allowance, Dated Sept. 10, 1992, obtained by BHA: 1993 DAILY TAX REPoRT 33 d58 (Feb. 22, 1993),
was not approved by the Chief Counsel's Office. Glenn Carrington criticizes this ISP as inconsistent with
JNDOPCO. Carrington, supra note 21 at 25-23 through 25-24. "With respect to a draft IRS significant
issues paper on the capitalization of slotting allowances, Carrington said the position drafted at the field
level has not been approved by the IRS national office." Official Gives Update on Series of Guidance
on Tax Accounting Issues, 1993 DAILY TAX REPoRT 46 d6 (Mar. II, 1993) (33 DTR G-10, L-3,
2/22/93). Some ISPs are approved, however, by National Office audit.
85. See note 18 supra.
86. Carrington, supra note 21, at 25-22 to -24.
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ISPs as evidencing a broader interpretation of INDOPCO in the field. 89
The same split between the field and National Office as to the post/NDOPCOworld may be seen in the large number of National Office TAMs
in this area reversing the Field's call for capitalization. 90 The transactional

87. Carrington, supra note 21, at 25-41; cf Controversies Over Cost Capitalization Seen
Increasing Following '1NDOPCO," 1993 DAILY TAX REPORT 25 d22 (Feb. 9, 1993) (electronically
reproduced) (observing that revenue agents began challenging historically deductible expenditures
contrary to statements by the IRS National Office that capitalization principles have not changed after
INDOPCO); Brian McConville, ABA Tax Section Panel Wrestles with Impact oflNDOPCO, 93 TAX
NOTES TODAY 101-8 (May 11, 1993) (electronic reproduction) (noting that INDOPCO never changed
capitalization standards even though "some agents apparently view INDOPCO as the 'kitchen sink'");
Comments of TEl on Notice 96-7, supra note 69 ("despite frequent public assurances from the IRS
National Office that 'INDOPCO did not change the law regarding capitalization, agents have seized upon
that decision's reference to 'future' benefits' to support novel capitalization theories.").
88. Official Gives Update on Series of Guidance on Tax Accounting Issues, 1993 DAILY TAX
REPORT 46 d6 (Mar. 11, 1993) (electronically reproduced) ("The brooding omnipresence in the sky may
not have changed, but the battle in the trenches sure has.") (Statement of Kenneth Kempson, General
Electric Co.); Letter dated December 22, 1992 from Paul R Huard to IRS Chief Counsel Abraham N.M.
Shashy, Jr. ("[R]evenue agents are routinely relying on INDOPCO in th[e abatement, remediation, and
similar environmental] context[s] and others should not lead to a different result than would have
occurred before it was decided."), in NAM Voices Concern About IRS Guidance on Environmental
Remediation Expenses, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 187-23 (Sept 9, 1993) (electronically reproduced); see
Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992)(requesting further factual development by the examining
agent to determine whether costs of environmental assessments and audits, alternative technology
research and development, and a PCB compliance manual are deductible).
89. Carrington, supra note 21, at 25-22-4. "Mr. Shrewbridge [Bell South Corporaton, TEl
Treasurer] said that field agents seemed to be effecting policy changes through the examination process
...." TEl-IRS Liason Minutes, supra note 39. INDOPCO itself is cited by only a few of these ISPs,
e.g., Securities & Financial Services Industry Coordinated Issue Capitalization of Costs to Obtain
Management Contracts, available in, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 75-13
(Apr. 19, 1994); Settlement Guidelines Capitalization of Lease Related Expenses (Jan. 21, 1993),
available in, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 93 Tax Notes Today 179-31 (Aug. 27, 1993). Peter K.
Scott, Capitalization Requirements after INDOPCO, I 1993 So. FED. TAX INST. 1-21 (1993), points out
that the large number of 1992 IRS Coordinated Examination Program list of "significant issues"
involving capitalization, without citing INDOPCO, shows the importance of the issue. Additional proof
lies in the large numbers of TAM's and Revenue Rulings citing INDOPCO. See note 90 infra.
90. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996) (business expansion costs, i.e., start-up costs in
the same existing business currently deductible); Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-38-002 (June 3, 1996); Tech. Adv.
Mem. 95-40-003 (June 30, 1995) (overruling examining agent's disallowance of a deduction for
amounts paid for cancellation of the stock options that were above the amounts that the option holders
would have received for the cancellation of their options if the taxpayer's stock price had not been
affected by the takeover); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-27-005 (Mar. 15, 1995) (holding that taxpayer's special
bonus payments to its management investors, pursuant to leveraged buyout, were deductible because of
their compensatory nature, despite the field's contention that the origin of the payments was the
leveraged buyout); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-35-011 (May 15, 1995) (professional fees incurred by the
taxpayer from a prudency audit during utility plant construction had the requisite ''trade or business
origin" and were deductible expenses); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-13-002 (Nov. 28, 1994) (allowing a
deduction for public utility taxpayer's conservation and load management expenditures contrary to
District Director's position that expenditures' future benefits warranted capitalization); Tech. Adv.
Mem. 94-27-002 (Mar. 30, 1994) (payments to settle antitrust litigation against taxpayer for allegedly
conspiring to "unlawfully monopolize the interstate transportation of coal" held to be deductible since
the potential lability was related to misconduct in taxpayer's day-to-day business); Tech. Adv. Mem.
93-33-005 (May 7, 1993) (concluding that capitalization should not be required for taxpayer's purchase
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costs to taxpayers and the IRS in contesting the tax treatment of self-created
intangibles arising from .these ISPs might not equal the transactional costs
of determining the proper tax treatment of purchased intangibles, 91 but they
are still intolerable. The existence of this situation proves beyond a doubt
that neither the courts nor the Congress (at least initially) has been an
effective actor here. 92 At the same time following an incremental approach
here runs, as discussed below, the grave political risk of limitation riders, at
least as to specific capitalization hot spots. Horizontal equity and reducing
transaction costs is more likely to be achieved, or at least in larger part, by
a global rule. And structured discretionary rough justice is the second best
global solution here for properly channeling agent discretion. Otherwise
curbing by Congress without resolving the problem is a likely consequence.
Many of the existing ISP capitalization issues arose out of the 1980's
LBO craze.93 Mergers exploded again commencing in 1994, reaching
record-breaking peaks in 1995 and 1996, and still continuing at a fair
pace, 94 if not result, 95 with the percentage of hostile takeovers increasing

of FAC stock, rejecting the examining agent's arguments that the purchase costs produced a future
benefit for the taxpayer); Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-26-001 (Mar. 18, 1993) (additional compensation paid
to officers of subsidiary taxpayer pursuant to employment contracts and occasioned by a merger of the
taxpayer were deductible). Chief Counsel Stuart "Brown said that, beginning in 1991, the National
Office attempted to address field concerns that the technical advice process is one-sided in favor of the
taxpayer." TEl-IRS Liason Minutes, supra note 39.
91. See note 121 infra.
92. Public choice scholarship suggests that courts serve as a better actor than Congress because
less subject to "capture", see notes 125-329 infra and accompanying text. But there still remains the
problem of judicial conflict. Cf Lee, Clear Reflection of Income. supra note 16, at 5-6, 56-57 (with
judicial conflicts lose main advantage of bright-line test-certainty).
93. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO/GGD 91-88, REPORT TO THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TAX POLICY, ISSUES AND POLICY PROPOSALS REGARDING TAX TREA1MENT
OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS (1991). GAO grouped the purchased intangible assets into 7 categories: (1)
customer- or market-based assets; (2) contract-based assets, including assets supported by specific
contracts, such as covenants-not-to-compete and leases; (3) technology-based assets, including assets such
as computer software, drawings, and technical manuals; (4) statutory-based assets, e.g., patents and
copyrights; (5) workforce-based assets included trained staff and technical expertise-the Service most
disfavored this category; (6) corporate organizationaVfinancial assets including acquisition costs, legal
and auditing fees, and favorable financial arrangements; and (7) unidentifiable assets, which GAO could
not classify because of an insufficient level of detail in IRS' data. The IRS had identified these categories
in developing its ISP program. CEP-QIP Proposal for Changes to Coordinated Examination Programs,
Attachment C (Apr. 9, 1990), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY
151-15 (July 20, 1990).
94. The 1995 wave of U.S. mergers and acquisitions set a record, equaling the 1989 peak of
business consolidations, with the 1994 and 1995 takeovers swallowing up as many firms as during the
last three years of the merger mania 1980s, which now we see were only the beginning of the fourth
wave of mergers in a century. See Stephanie Strom, This Year's Wave of Mergers Heads Toward a
Record, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at A 1;); Willard Zangwill, Models for SuccessfUl Mergers, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 18, 1995, at A 14 ("Over the past year, the rate of mergers and acquisitions has rocketed and
exceeded all previous levels."). Don Bauder, Productivity one thing. and paychecks another, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Nov. 8, 1995, at CI (dollar amounts of mergers and acquisitions in first three quarters of
1995 exceeded whole of 1988 previous record), available in LEXIS, NEWs Library, Cumws.; Late
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Nights in the M&A Lnb, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 1995, at 73. In 1996, mergers commenced at a
steady but less frenetic pace than in 1995 with the same driving factors of "globalization, competition,
and deregulation" continuing. Steven Lipton, Megadeals Accelerate Merger Action After a Slowdown in
the First Quarter, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1996, at A3. By the last quarter of 1996 mergers had already
surpassed 1995 in dollar amount. Merger Mania in '96 Already Surpasses '95, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22,
1996, at D8; Ronald Yates, A Year of Buying, Selling and Spinning; Competition, Need for Technology
Among the Driving Forces, CHI. TRIB., June 2, 1996 at 3C ("fuel is provided by a superheated stock
market and low interest rates"); Peter Grier & Laurent Belsi, Technology and Competition Drive Merger
Mania in 1990s, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 24, 1996, at 1.
95. For critical views of whether the benefits of the 1990's acquisitions will tum out any better
than the 1980's merger mania see Bauder, supra note 94; Daniel Kadlec, '90s Mergers Begin to Mirror
'80s Froth, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 1995, at 3B; Kirsten Downey Grimsley, The Axe That Cuts Both
Ways; Downsizing's Human Cost Outweigh Economic Gains, Many Experts Now Say, WASH. POST, Nov.
5, 1995, at HI; accord Louis Uchitelle, Not Making It; We're Leaner, Meaner and Going Nowhere
Faster, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1996, at El (productivity did increase in manufacturing, 3% versus 1%
for economy as a whole; rub is that laid off workers tended to shift to less productive and lower pay
jobs; downsizing may hurt productivity by destroying "loyalty, job stability and continuity, increasingly
recognized as ingredients of productivity. The American Management Association, in its surveys, finds
that a majority of companies that cut staff have failed to increase productivity a year or two later."). See
also Clay Chandler, Ambivalent About Business, WASH. POST, May 12, 1996, at HI and H5. Cf
Mmjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Towards Wealth and the Income
Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119 (1994) (analyzes similar American "ambivalence about earned and unearned
income, savings and spending, and wealth in general"). Most tellingly, leading business, financial and
economic/news journals have recently criticized downsizing. E.g., Philip Zweig, The Case against
Mergers, Bus. WK., Oct. 30, 1995, at 122; Fire and forget?, THE EcoNOMIST, Apr. 20, 1996, at 51
(fewer than half of American companies that downsized in the 1990s subsequently had higher profits and
even fewer improved productivity; 90% of companies outperforming their industry had "stable"
structures; downsizing disrupts a firm's informal networks); Alex Markets and Matt Murray, Axing for
Trouble; Coli It Dumbsizing: Why Some Companies Regret Cost-Cutting, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1996,
A 1 ("They find profits are hurt, customers and suppliers lost, employees miffed."). Moreover, about 20%
of "contract workers" employed by temporary help agencies have returned to their old companies sans
benefits in "another move toward a system in which companies and employees feel less obligated to each
other." Louis Uchittelle, More Downsized Employees are Returning as Rentals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1996, at 1-1). Downsizing strikes a particularly hostile chord in the public's ears since it coincides with
stagnant wages coupled with rich stock appreciation rewards to top management as the market approved
of downsizing. Louis Uchitelle, 1995 Was Good for Companies, and Better for a Lnt ofC.E.O's, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996, at AI. Actually
[t]here is no agreement as to why inequality is rising faster in the United States than
elsewhere. Explanations include falling wages for unskilled workers as automation spreads,
low tax rates on the rich during the 1980's, relatively low minimum wages, the decline of
trade unions and the rapid rise in the 1980's of the stock and bond markets in which rich
people are heavily invested .... While incomes rose for the most affluent two-fifths of the
nation's households as the economy expanded in 1993, the rest of the country suffered from
falling incomes, after adjusting for inflation.
Keith Bradsher, Gap in Wealth in U.S. Called Widest in West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at AI and
D4. The pre-tax changes in income appear due in part to increased pay for skills (particularly those
attained through education) and decreased pay for lack of skills, which in tum may reflect to some
degree the globalization of the economy with the economic principle of "factor price equalization"
coming into play according to MIT Professor Lester Thurow. LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE
COMING EcONOMIC BATTLE AMONG JAPAN, EUROPE AND AMERICA, 52-3 (William Murrow & Co.
1992); Economic Report of the President, H. R. Doc. No. 102-177 (1992). See G. Paschal Zachary, High
Tech explains Widening Wage Gaps, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1996, at AI. The argument of capital gains
proponents "that wages have stagnated in large part because we have a Tax Code that penalizes people
who invest, people who save, people who take risks to create new jobs ... ," 141 CONG. REC. H4216
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from the 1980s' pattem.96 Already the deductibility of costs of defending
against hostile mergers is a hot issue with conflicting judicial precedents97

(daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Zimmer), is just another variant of the trickle down argument.
Wages at the bottom and middle stagnated notwithstanding capital gains tax cuts in 1978 and 1981. The
argument of a capital gains cut opponent comes closer to the mark: "Corporate America has exported
our jobs overseas for cheap labor. As trade unions have been beaten back, hard-earned benefits like
health coverage, pensions and family leave have eroded . . . . [I]n the 1980's, (payroll] taxes have
increased on working class Americans." /d. at H4253 (Remarks of Rep. Waters). See generally Lee,
Capital Gains Contentions, supra note 53, at 41, 49, 54. The actual record on economic record on job
training benefits is not good. Training and Jobs: What Works? ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 13, 19-21.
Mergers accentuated the winner-take-all and growing income disparity trends in our society as a whole.
Yates, supra note 94 ("Although mergers and acquisitions can leave employees uneasy- or worse- that
is usually not the case when it comes to those at the top. CEOs and other senior executives often walk
away from a merger or takeover with prodigious golden parachutes designed to guarantee them soft
landings."); L.M. Sixel, Surviving the merger squeeze, Hous. CHRON., May 10, 1996, at 1 (merger is
often a euphemism for downsizing with 1 in 6 job losses in 1995 attributable to mergers; 1 in 4 in 1996).
For a critique of the winner-take-all philosophy of pay "awards," see Robert H. Frank & Philip J. Cook,
The Superstar Economy; Why a Flat Tax Would Make America Less- Not More- Efficient, N.Y.
nMES, Nov. 12, 1995, at C2; Steven Pearlstein, Reshaped Economy Exacts Tough Toll; Competition,
Efficiency Grow - as Does Americans' Income Disparity; Improved Competitiveness Exacts Social
Price, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1995, at AI); Steven Pearlstein, New Economy Gives Work a Hard Edge,
WASH. POST, at Nov. 14, 1995, AI; Peter Passell, Lonely, and Rich, at the Top, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
1995, at 4-6; RC. Longworth & Sharman Stein, Battered Middle Class Turning Anxious, Angry, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 20, 1995, at IC.
96. The 1980s acquisitions often consisted of leveraged buyouts or cash purchases of control of
Target's stock ("LBOs") financed by junk bonds, often aimed at selling off unrelated T product lines
(often acquired in the third wave 1960's diversification stock and convertible debt acquisitions) to firms
in related fields, with the remaining core business being again taken public by the key management group
and financiers. Strom, supra note 94. In contrast many of these 1990s acquisitions capitalize on the
recent rally of the stock market, which sent the Standard & Poor's index of 500 stocks up about 30
percent in 1995, by financing the takeovers with steadily appreciating shares. !d. Alternatively booming
big corporation profits finance cash purchases or bank funding at low rates is available to large corporate
Purchasers. /d. Today's method of financing acquisitions (and the percentage that are "hostile") has
changed since the 1980's but the overall trend in both groups of acquisitions of and by large public
corporations is away from diversification and towards consolidation or "corporate clarity." /d.; Late
Nights, supra note 94 (58% by volume stock deals up from 51% in 1994 and 12% in 1988).
Other factors contributing to the deal-making boom include a perception of a looser
regulatory environment and a sense that in a period of a slow-growth economy, business
expansion can best be achieved by acquiring competitors. Deals also can be a way to satisfy
pushy investors who want the reduced costs and better earnings that can be achieved in some
mergers.
Strom, supra note 94; see Late Nights, supra note 94 (low interest rates and bank liquidity have lower
cost of financing and booming share prices boosting net worth have made it easier to issue new shares
to pay for deals; pattern of push towards "corporate clarity" rather than diversification of earlier decades);
Charles Stein, The Year of the Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1995, at 39 (favorable financial markets,
modest economic growth, intensified competition and globalization contribute to deals).
97. Compare In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 135 B.R 950 (Bankr. S.D.O.H. 1992) (no future
benefit found in hostile takeover) with A.E. Stanley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166 (1995)
(future benefit found in hostile takeover). A concurring opinion in Staley Mfg., relying on Delaware
corporate law, correctly pointed out that while management defending against a hostile takeover may start
with the posture of defending the company, once the bid price reaches fair market value, management's
duties to the shareholders overrides with management's duty to be auctioneers for value of company.
/d. at 205. This is corroborated by the pattern of once the sale of a company is in play it usually is sold
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and the Service's most clear change of position in light of INDOPC0. 98
At the same time current mergers bust up the acquired enterprises less often
than the 1980's LBOs did99 and more often focus or concentrate the
acquiring corporation's business with a greater likelihood of substantial
future benefit. But such future benefits may arise largely from cost cutting
measures, 100 historically generating an ordinary deduction. 101 This arti-

to one bidder or another. Arbitrageur activity results in the ''perception that a corporation is 'in play'
becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy." Hearing on Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Debt before the
Senate Finance Comm. (Part 1), JOist Cong. 7 (1989) (1989 Senate Hearing on Leveraged Buyouts)
(Statement of Secretary of Treasury Brady). "Arbitragers purchase the stock of corporations thought to
be acquisition candidates, hoping to sell the ·stock at a higher price if and when the acquisition is
concluded. By definition, arbitragers are not long-term investors, and the nature of their activity and the
demand for high rates of return on their available capital require that they tum over their investments
in a reasonably short period of time." /d. (Part 1). The "rest of the story" here is that junk bond issuers,
viz., allegedly Milkin, fed tips as to targets to arbitrageurs, viz., allegedly Boesky, et al. U.S. Judge
Approves 1980's Insider Settlements. N.Y. TIMES, Feb. II, 1997, at D4.
98. See Note, INDOPCO v. Commissioner: Form over. Substance in the Judicial Regulation of
the Market for Corporate Control, supra note 19, at 121 n.2; Davis, supra note 72, at 1472; Melissa D.
Ingalls, Note, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 1165, 1166-67 (1994).
99. A major comparable exception was Tenneco's spin off of long-held Newport News
Shipbuilding and Tenneco oil and gas interests (which were acquired by El Paso Energy Corp.), ending
one of the last big industrial conglomerates of diversified enterprises. See James Stemgold, INVESTING
IT; Tenneco "s Big Shipyard May Soon Sail Off Solo, N.Y.T!MES, Feb. 18, 1996, at 3-3 (one oflast big
industrial conglomerates); Barbara A. Nagy, Tenneco spins off EB rival; Newport News may face
takeover, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 11, 1996, at Fl (massive 5-year transformation leaving parent only
in the automotive parts and packaging businesses, joining "growing ranks of U.S. corporations that are
redefining what they do. . . . Since 1991, Tenneco has spun off or sold its gas and mineral holdings,
Case farm machinery division and Newport News Shipbuilding. Its products are also shifting - from
farm machinery and nuclear submarines to Hefty bags and Munro shock absorbers."); John N. Maclean,
Building Value, Creating Options; Tenneco Strategy: 'Sell 'Em, Spin "Em Out or Operate 'Em', CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 29, 1995, at Cl (strong Midwest core).
100. Floyd Norris, Market Place; Latest Mergers Driven by Cost Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995,
at Dl (consolidation and cost cutting, not diversification, driving current mergers). Even in LBOs,
similar cost cutting features (in addition to bust-up sales) were present Other possible sources for the
typical premium of 35% above the trading value before the tender offer in the LBO's were wealth
transfers- from employees through layoff or givebacks, senior debt holders, and or shareholders
themselves in a management LBO using insider information as to inside asset values in a management
{bust-up) LBO. Joint Committee Staff, Federal Income Tax Aspects of Corporate Financial Structures,
tOOth Cong. 58-60 (JCS-1-89 Jan. 18, 1989) (Corporate Financial Structures). Note that RJR-Nabisco
senior bonds dropped 20% in value ($1 billion) immediately after the LBO. The first aspect of reduction
of employee costs concerned populists such as Subcommittee Chair Pickle; Hearings on Tax Aspects of
Mergers and Acquisitions before the House Ways & Means Subcommittees on Oversight and Select
Revenue Measures, 99th Cong. (1985) (Statement of Subcommittee Chair Pickle); Hearings on Tax
Policy Aspects ofMergers and Acquisitions before the House Ways & Means Comm. I, 101 st Cong. (Jan.
31, 1989); id. at 312 (Statement of Rep. Drogan) (father of House-passed 1987 LBO restrictions); 1989
Senate Hearing on Leveraged Buyouts (Part 3), supra note 97, at 30 (Statement of Bruce Smart, former
CEO of target in hostile LBO); see also Hearing on Tax Treatment ofHostile Takeovers (S. 420, S. 476,
and S. 632) before the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management, 99th Cong.
(1985) (Statement of Sen. Domenici); Rostenkowski Lays Out Parameters for the LBO Inquiry, 42 TAX
NOTES 734 (Feb. 6, 1989); Corporate Financial Structures, supra at 58-63. As to the last objection, a
concern of then Finance Committee Chair Bentsen, Treasury Secretary Brady and SEC Chairman David
Ruder claimed that in the late 1980s LBOs, the "auction" of competing (LBO) bids against management
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cle argues (as did the Solicitor General in INDOPC0) 102 that mergers,
hostile or friendly, should be analyzed alternatively from a character
distortion/origin of the claim doctrine rather than just future benefit timing
distortion, as most, 103 but not quite all, 104 of the cases and rulings to date

bids insured that the Target shareholders would receive true fair market value for their stock. 1989 House
Hearing on Leveraged Buyouts, supra at (Part 1) p.8 and (Part 2) at 3-4 (Statements of Secretary Brady
and Chair Ruder, respectively); see Hearings on Tax Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions before the
House Ways & Means Subcommittees on Oversight and Select Revenue Measures, 99th Cong. (1985)
(Statement of Chief of Joint Committee Staff Brockway).
101. Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-1 C.B. 8 (costs "may reduce future operating and capital costs, these
kinds of benefits, without more, do not require capitalization of these expenditures"); Tech. Adv. Mem.
95-48-004 (Aug. 9, 1995) (allowing the deduction of costs of energy conservation programs that reduce
energy usage by taxpayer's existing customers, while requiring capitalization of the same costs related
to the acquisition of new customers); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-13-002 (Nov. 28, 1994) ("[W]ell-established
judicial authority demonstrates that the potential reduction of the Taxpayer's operating costs is not in
and of itself sufficient to require capitalization."); accord Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,784 (Mar. 29, 1968);
Tech Adv. Mem. 78-30-009 (Apr. 13, 1978) (taxpayer's purchase of competitor's product [destroyed
and not resold by the taxpayer] from inventory of a customer to induce the customer to carry taxpayer's
product, as well as costs associated with the free initial installation of taxpayer's product, are
deductible); Tech. Adv. Memo. 95-13-002 (Nov. 28, 1994) (excellent extensive doctrinal analysis). The
TEl Submission argues that contract terminations as well as any expense incurred to eliminate
duplicative trade or business operating assets following an acquisition come within this reduction of
future expenses rule. Comments of TEl. Inc. on Notice 96-7, supra note 69; accord National Retail
Federation Comments Regarding Further Capitalization Guidance dated May 6, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTFS TODAY 98-30 (May 17, 1996)
102. Note 104 infra.
I 03. Courts have consistently held that costs incurred as an incident to a corporate reorganization,
recapitalization or acquisition by another entity should be capitalized. See, e.g., INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at
79 (friendly takeover); Bilar Tool & Die Corp. v. Commissioner, 530 F.2d 708, 710 (6th Cir. 1976)
(corporate division); Vulcan Materials Co. v. United States, 446 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1971)
(recapitalization and reorganization expenditures); General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d
712 (8th Cir. 1964) (stock dividends effecting change in the capital structure) (Biackrnun, J.); Mills
Estate v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953) (recapitalization attaining altered corporate
structure); Denver & Salt Lake Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 709 (1955), appeal dismissed, 234
F. 2d 663 (lOth Cir. 1956) (merger with parent company); Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner,
122 F. 2d 268 (2d Cir. 1941) (recapitalization); Motion Picture Capital Corp. v. United States, 80 F.2d
872 (2d Cir. 1936) (merger). The Service has ruled to the same effect. Rev. Rul. 67-125, 1967-1 C.B.
31 (alteration of the capital structure); Rev. Rul. 73-580, 1973-2 C.B. 86 (corporate mergers and
acquisitions); Gen. Couns. Mern. 39,097 (Dec. 21, 1983); Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,881 (June 28, 1974).
104. Missouri Pacific Corp. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 296, 308-11 (CI. Ct. 1984); Gunn, supra
note 21, at 492-95; Lee & Murphy, supra note 28, at 521-26, 545; Calvin H. Johnson, Capitalization
after the Government's Big Win in INDOPCO, 63 TAX NOTFS 1323 (1994); Paul J. Green, The Second
Circuit Review-1986-1987 Term: Commentary: Authors Prepublication Expenses: The Second Circuit's
Response to the Capitalization versus Deduction Question: Hadley v. Commissioner, 54 BROOK. L. REv.
673, 703 (1988). Assistant Solicitor General Kent Jones in arguing 1NDOPCO relied upon Motion Picture
Capital Corp. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1936), for the proposition that
where the court- the Second Circuit emphasized that reorganization expenses don't provide
any current benefit to the corporation. They do not assist in the production of current
income, they do not - they are not incurred in the ordinary course of producing income,
certainly none of the expenses incurred by 1ndopco have anything to do with generating
income for the corporation in 1978, the year they were incurred. ·
U.S. Sup. Ct official transcript at 33-34, INDOPCO v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992), 1991 WL
636242 (Nov. 12, 1991) [hereinafter INDOPCO Oral Argument Transcript].
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including INDOPCO have done. 105
Professor Lee's Prepared Statement identified the ultimate source of the
capitalization versus expensing problem as arising from Congress' pattern
for the last decade and a half or so of carving out self-created intangibles
from its capitalizationlamortizationreforms, viz., §§ 195, 263A and 197.
I understand that at least initially a reason for such carve out was
preservation of court victories permitting current deduction of expenditures
producing intangibles with future benefit won by special interest taxpayers
(e.g., banks) under the "separate asset" rubric (recently and fatefully
overruled by the Supreme Court in INDOPCO). 106

For some time the tax-writing Committees have known that the Service
lacks the resources to examine each current deduction/capitalization/
amortization issue taxpayer-by-taxpayer. 107 Thus horizontal, and perhaps
as well vertical, 108 equity and sound administration call for a more
uniform treatment of self-created intangibles along the lines of the one-size
fits [most] all taxpayers approach of Sections 195 and 197. Politically
horizontal equity at least in the version of all-share-the-pain appears a
necessary political ingredient for regulatory reform of the unadministerable
capitalization rules.
This article proposes more of a "rough justice" general principle of
minimum distortion of income with several simple implementing rules
(current deduction for small, short-lived or recurring costs creating
intangibles, capitalization and amortization over standard lives for most
other self-created intangibles) rather than just one-size-fits-all. Such
adjustments are "Second Best." 109 But they are more attainable at least

105. Lee & Murphy, supra note 28. As Professor Lee recalls, Professor Gunn's illustration of his
thesis of capitalization to prevent character distortion with reorganizations and the costs of raising capital
convinced Lee of the strength ofGunn's distortion of income model. Bittker is now generally cited for
clear reflection of income as the principle underlying capitalization versus expensing. See Faber, supra
note 66, at 635. (It ultimately traces back through Alan Gunn to Judge Tannenwald's insightful Fort
Howard decision. See note 18 supra.) The literature and the arguments of the Solicitor General's office
in INDOPCO are further testimonials.
106. I993 Hearings, supra note 24, at 1699.
107. H.R. REP. No. 391, at 1058-60 (1987).
108. See NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 296 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting):
The legislative history [of Section 195), properly read, in no way compels the erection of a
large, unreasonable and inherently unfair tax preference. Other taxpayers must capitalize and
not deduct all at once expenditures having extended lives or applications. The taxpayer here,
and others, preeminently banks, who will benefit from the decision of the en bane majority,
can by no means merit description as "economically deprived." The benefit heaped upon them
further contributes to the deserved description of our income tax system as a disgrace.
109. The original idea of Second Best is that where there are multiple market failures, the best
solution to one market failure alone may not be the best overall solution. R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin
Lancaster, The General Thoery ofSecond Best, 24 REV. EcoN. STUD. II (1956-57). Indeed government
inaction may be the best solution since the various market failures may cancel each other out--balance
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politically than the elegant ideal of capitalization for all multi-period costs
with economic lives, depreciation rates and proper accounting for inflation
throughout the tax system. They are also more attainable politically and
infinitely more administrable than the case-by-case audit and litigation of a
muddling through incremental rulings approach.
Ideally, after public hearings and debate Congress would authorize
legislative regulations with suggested factors along the line of the proposals
in this article and our earlier Submission. 110 In 1993 a House Ways and
Means Subcommittee declined to address taxation of clean up costs, much
less capitalization in general through legislative regulations. 111 Moreover,
the pattern of Congressionally-drawn "special interest" exceptions from
capitalization under Sections 195, 197, and 263A for self-created intangibles
of existing businesses suggests that Congress would not be the best initial
actor here anyway. 112 Indeed, it is with INDOPCO's overturning of the
"separate asset" doctrine, which Congress had implicitly or explicitly
thought would provide a current deduction to existing businesses incurring
such costs, 113 that the very self-created intangibles Congress had excepted
in 1986 and 1993 ironically become the bone of contention in audit (driven
in part by the capitalization ISPs).
This article recommends that at the least the Service and Treasury issue
"interpretative" regulations, providing substantive guidance as to capitalization along the above "rough justice" lines, with numerous examples
drawn from the judicial and Service rulings, many of which are discussed
or cited. Professor Lawrence Lokken describes this approach as "rough cut"
or common-law regulations. 114 Such drafting approach (a) states more

of imperfections or two wrongs may make a right. Christopher R. Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through
Collusion: A Market Failure Defense to Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CAL. L. REV. 243, 267-68 (1993)
This article uses the term in the later developed meaning of a solution that is not the ideal solution, but
does not carry with it disadvantages that the ideal solution would.
110. 1993 Hearings, supra note 24, at 1699-1700 (Prepared statement of Professor Lee).
111. /d. at 1641 (Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Rangei)(After an aide directed Chairman
Rangel's attention to the passage in the Joint Committee Staff Hearing pamphlet passage discussing
capitalization theories as to soil remediation costs, Rangel asked the witnesses whether they didn't need
any help from Congress or was existing law good enough for them. Chairman Rangel's irony, for which
he is famous, was delicious. Lay industry representatives were happy with existing law. The attorney
wanted clarification.).
112. Notes 76 and 77 supra.
113. See note 76 supra.
114. Lawrence Lokken, New Rules BifUrcating Contingent Debt-A Good Start, 51 TAX NOTES
495, 504 (1991). This is comparable to revenue rulings published in "digest" form. See note 18 supra.
For further discussion of such process, known as "incrementalism", see notes notes 42-45 supra and
accompanying text. See generally Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform,
1985 DUKE L.J. 381.
Often, as an agency gains experience in exercising a particular power, it may formulate that
experience in more or less precise rules that would guide the staff. At the outset, the guidance
might take the form of answers to hypothetical questions about what the staff might do in
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sparsely the suggested principle and rules, supported in the Preamble by the
judicial and ruling precedents, and (b) provides number of examples with
facts and conclusions but little reasoning. The original 1956 version of the
Section 355 regulations 115 fits this description. (The published expensing
of current and future benefits revenue rulings to date have followed this
digest approach.) 116 The case-law experience literally was distilled into
rules with facts from life in the Section 183 regulations. 117 A pure
judicial precedent/general principle approach probably would eschew safe
harbors for amortization (other than the average period between recurrences)
thus leading to pressure for a current deduction when amortization as a
practical matter is unavailable. Such a rule of either depreciation or current
deduction should be explicitly stated.
Another even less bold alternative is to release the results of Notice 967 as a discussion draft rather than proposed and/or temporary regulations.
But, again, the political tax history of two decades ago highlights the risk
of wasted resources of this approach where there is substantial business
taxpayer opposition to a change in a perceived favorable status quo. 118
This clearly has been the case to date as to post-INDOPCO capitalization
private rulings.
This article recommends that the Service and the Treasury boldly issue
regulations going beyond case-by-case ruling to structured discretionary
justice regulations. Such regulations would channel the agent's discretion
through a burdens and benefits test for determining whether expensing
would distort the taxpayer's income. Such balancing test would take into
account factors such as (a) the relative smallness, regularity and shortness
of the recurrence cycle, and shortness of term benefitted; and (b) the
difficulties or impracticalities of depreciation. Additionally where the
recurrence cycle was longer, say four years or more, but shorter than the
useful life of the asset benefitted; regulations should provide that the

various circumstances. Allematively, it might simply provide a checklist or ilemize the factors
to be taken into account without explaining how to weight them. Later, an agency may stale
lentative standards in the form of a nonlegislative rule. Ultimalely, an agency may be willing
to commit itself to a legislative rule that definitively and rigidly prescribes how the power
will be exercised.
/d. at 386 (footnoles omitted).
115. See nole 224 infra.
116. Nole 18 supra.
117. See Lee, Section 183 and Beyond, supra nole 76, at 395-444.
118. For instance, in 1975 the Service issued a discussion draft of proposed regulations as to the
taxation of fringe benefits under Section 61.40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (1975). This proposal was withdrawn
and when issuance of new guidelines was in the air, Congress prohibiled issuance of regulations or
revenue rulings, etc., for a specified period which was then exlended. Archie Parnell, Congressional
Interference in Agency Enforcement: 1he IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360, 1372 & n.85 (1980).
Ultimalely, Congress enacted Section 132 in 1984.
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recurring cost would be treated as a freestanding intangible, depreciated over
the cycle. Truly bold regulations would provide, for example, five year safe
harbor amortization where there was no cyclical aspect and no definite life.
Analogous administrative precedent has allowed similar safe harbors as a
matter of "administrative convenience." This balancing of burdens and
benefits would result in Second Best Rough Justice. It also better serves the
tax policy of horizontal equity or all share the pain. This article also
considers perhaps somewhat politically risky scenarios under which the
Notice 96-7 project could evolve into a legislative regulation authorization,
which would provide the most certainty.

B.

Who is the Better Actor? The Case for IRS/Treasury Guidance

The question is who is the best actor to clarify capitalization principles
and rules. The choices are judicial, legislative, or administrative regulation, 119 presumably with interpretive regulations, or under a possible
scenario, legislative regulations. This article concludes that IRS!freasury
is the best choice for cleaning the Augean Stables of expensing/capitalizing
and amortizing self-created intangibles 120 before the mass of building
capitalization litigation hits the courts, resulting in uncertainty for some time
with unacceptable transaction costs to all of the players-shades of purchased intangibles prior to Section 197. 121 (The more likely quietus is a

119. Treasury Official Sees Environmental Clean-up Guidance This Year as Warranted, 1993
TAX REPoRT 88 d23 (May 10, 1993).
At issue, according to Kilinskis, is the form the guidance should take - whether rulings,
regulations, or legislation - and what position the government ought to adopt with respect
to cleanup costs - whether deductible in all cases, for with no recovery, or capitalize it with
some sort of recovery .... Attorney Robert Liles of Miller & Chevalier, Washington, said
taxpayers likely would be hesitant to seek such a [legislative] resolution because the revenue
estimate for the measure probably would be prohibitively large.
Liles was alluding to "paygo" rules under which a revenue loser (comparing the revenue results of tl\e
new legislative tax rule with the results under the prior rule [not necessarily the same as prior practice]
must be "paid for" by new tax rules increasing revenue or, less commonly, spending cuts. See Lee,
Capital Gains Contentions, supra note 53, at 57.
120. Whenever I try to describe the task we face every day in this area, I can't decide
whether the appropriate metaphor is Sisyphus pushing the stone up the hill or Hercules
cleaning out the stables. Even though I favor the latter because it similarly assaults my senses,
Hercules ultimately succeeded in his task. I have doubts about whether we can without
legislation. It is wishful thinking to suppose that litigation will achieve uniform results. The
courts are as frustrated as we are with the status quo.
1991 Hearings on Intangibles, supra note 32, at 50 (Prepared Statement of Commissioner Goldberg).
121. /d. at 49 (Prepared Statement of Commissioner Goldberg):
[W]e conducted a detailed analysis on three recent cases, each of which we counted on to set
precedent with respect to a particular intangible. We determined that we spent an average of
about 6,000 staff hours and at least $160,000 in out-of-pocket expenses per case. The
numbers obviously can't be universalized, but with at least !59 identified intangibles, you
draw your own conclusions.
DAILY
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limitation rider.) The case against guidance through private letter rulings
and technical advice memoranda has been made in Comments of Tax
Executives Institute, Inc. on Notice 96-7, submitted to the Internal Revenue
Service on March 20, 1996. 122 Additionally, the political danger in such

Jd. Additionally, a substantial portion of the 1990's ISP's are devoted to this area and the costs of that
program are substantial as well. "The cost of additional staffing and support items to carry out the
recommendations is projected to be approximately $4.6 million for Examination." CEP-QIP, Proposal
for Changes to Coordinated Examination Programs (Apr. 9, 1990), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
TNT File, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY 151-15 (July 20, 1990)(this appears to be for one year-48 positions
were added in the National and Regional Offices). Commissioner Goldberg pointed out that transaction
costs to taxpayers of such controversies were correspondingly substantial:
We don't have good data on the burden to taxpayers, but we know that it must be heavy.
In order to avail themselves of the benefits of amortization of intangtbles - unlike tangible
assets where it might be a matter of picking up the Code and turning to section 168 taxpayers must expend enormous amounts of money in obtaining expert advice. Anecdotally,
staff members of the Office of Appraisal Services informally have been told that, in a typical
one billion dollar acquisition involving intangtb1es, a taxpayer will expend 10 staff years of
expert appraisal analysis, at a cost which may reach one million dollars.
And many taxpayers face these costs. Of CEP taxpayers currently under examination the largest corporate taxpayers in the system - at least 10% have potential disputes over the
amortization of intangibles. In General Program cases - the remaining corporate taxpayers
- at least 10% of corporations under examination have claimed amortization for acquired
intangibles. These smaller cases often do not have expert appraisal reports, thus the Service
and the taxpayer must "start from scratch" long after the fact to reconstruct whether the
intangible meets the tests for amortization. And again, if a controversy is litigated, it is
reasonable to assume that many of the taxpayers on the other side of these controversies incur
litigation costs and attorneys fees commensurate with or far greater than ours."
1991 Hearing on Intangibles, supra note 32, at 49 (Prepared Statement of Commissioner Goldberg).
122. Available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 60-19(Mar. 26, 1996).
See also our Submission, supra note 40; American Bar Association Comments Concerning Guidance
Regarding Capitalization Issues dated May 13, 1996, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96
TAX NOTES TODAY I 04-71 (May 28, 1996). Most of the other submitters advocated instead a published
rulings approach. National Retail Federation Comments Regarding Further Capitalization Guidance Notice 96-7 dated May 6, 1996 (corrected June 17, 1996), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT
File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 98-30 (May 17, 1996); 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 127-21 (June 28, 1996);
Letter dated May 6, 1996 from Bonnie V. Hancock of Carolina Power & Light Company to Internal
Revenue Service, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 98-31 (May
17, 1996); Carol Conjura of KPMG Peat Marwick Comments on tNDOPCO in response to Notice 96-7
dated May 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 97-45 (May
16, 1996); Letter dated May I 0, 1996 from Tim Hammonds of the Food Marketing Institute to Internal
Revenue Service., available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 98-27 (May
17, 1996) (publication of general guidance); Financial Executives Institute Reply to Internal Revenue
Service Notice 96-7 Request for Comments on Further Capitalization Guidance dated June 7, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 120-19 (June 19, 1996) (issue
guidance on "what's generically deductible"); American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Comments on Guidance Under Sections 162 and 263 dated July 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 165-31 (Aug. 22, 1996) (revenue rulings). While many
submitters urged that the Service issue rulings as to general capitalization, most ofthese also focused on
a particular contested deduction or so. Many of them represented interest groups currently deducting a
particular category of expense with future benefit probably assumed correctly that for their particular
issue it would be easier to obtain a ruling resolution than a more global regulation solution. Thus a few
submitters wrote single issue briefs, e.g., as to employee training costs and just-in-time re-egineering
costs. Glenn R. Carrington and C. Ellen MacNeil of Arthur Andersen & Co. Comments Regarding the
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an approach is discussed more thoroughly in this article 123 than m our
Submission.

1.

Judiciary

Public choice 124 literature posits that the judiciary is a more efficient
actor than an agency under the theory that the former is less subject to
capture 125 by the regulated pressure groups. 126 But the IRS appears less

Capitalization of Re-engineering Costs dated Apr. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, Fed tax Library, TNT
File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 98-29 (May 17, 1996)(re-engineering costs); Letter dated May 3, 1996 from
Donna J. Fisher for American Bankers Association to John Moriarity, Internal Revenue Service, available
in, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 98-28 (May 17, 1996) (loan orgination
costs); Letter dated May 6, 1996 from Edison Electric Instilute to Internal Revenue Service Re: Notice
96-7, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 99-82 (May 20, 1996)
(asbestos removal costs); Letter dated May 7, 1996 from Petroleum Marketers Association of America
to Internal Revenue Service, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 9826 (May 17, 1996) (cost of complying with governmental regulations); American Petroleum Institute
Comments in Response to Notice 96-7, Capitalization Issues dated July 12, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 145-55 (July 25, 1996) (same). Yet the postINDOPCO experience indicates that even published rulings are not sufficient to resolve the apparent
conflict between Audit/Field and National Office Chief Counsel. See notes 84 and 89 supra.
123. See note 54 supra.
124. "Public Choice [is) the economic study ofnonmarket decision making or simply the application
of economics to political science." DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1, (1979) cited in Daniel A.
Farber & PhilipP. Frickey, The Jurisprudence ofPublic Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 878 (1987). See
generally notes 373-75 infra and accompanying text. "Public Choice literalure suggests that interest
groups with concentrated interests in legislation may wield asymmetrical influence in the political
marketplace, and that they may exert that influence at the cost of the more diffuse interests of the
public." John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 677 & n.307 (1996) (rests on two premises: (1) market for
legislation (favorable outcomes rewarded with campaign contributions, votes, fulure jobs, honoria, etc.)
and (2) concentrated interest groups have (a) lower organization costs, (b) readier means of policing free
riders, and (c) higher per capita benefits from favorable regulatory outcomes). Professor Manning lists
scholarship arguing that interest group theory overly simplifies political behavior. .Jd. at 678 n.314.
Professor Lee agrees, however, with Professor Manning that interest group influence is important and
disproportionate in shaping public policy and that the interest group model is useful in identifying
tendencies in our political system. /d. at 678 n.315.
125. For a summary of the literature that independent agencies with less clear lines of
accountability are more susceptible than other governmental instilutions to capture see MICHAEL D.
REGAN, REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF POLICY 52-66 (1987). For the view that the judiciary is less
susceptible to capture see Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. &
MGMT. SCI. 335, 350-51 (1974). Diffuse policy making centers (as in IRSffreasury) tend more to resist
capture. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 1511, 1565-66 (1992). This is to a degree exemplied by the split between Audit and Chief Counsel.
126. "Caplure refers to an agency's decisions being strongly influenced, if not dictated, by a
particular special interest or pressure group." S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic
Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REv. 685, 693 n.33 (1991 ). For a taste of the literalure see PAUL J.
QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 4-21 (1981); KAY LEHMAN
SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4-21 (1986);
Roger Noll, The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy, 139 J. INST'L & THEORETICAL EcON. 377
(1983); George J. Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971);
Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 448-49 (1987). The
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subject to capture than more narrow and smaller agencies. 127 IRS and
Treasury have long histories of hard fought for independence. 128 ''Traditionally the Treasury has been seen as less susceptible to interest group
capture than other administrative branches." 129 This article does not view
the IR.Sffreasury drive for "rough justice" as evidencing agency capture.
The much more real danger is of Treasury and the Service yielding to the
current intense political pressure from House of Representatives Committee
on Ways and Means 13°Chair Archer, to preserve the status quo of current
deduction practice issue by issue as sometimes appears to be the case. 131
Nevertheless other factors militate in favor of the Serviceffreasury over the
judiciary in this field.
A primary disadvantage to case-law development of rules (less so
standards) is the tendency for courts not to evenly reach a consensus.
Instead, particularly in this multi-fora tax world they tend to apply
conflicting rules. This increases uncertainty and transaction costs as
discussed in the next topic. Often tribunals mechanically applying rules
conflict with those seeking to reach equitable results more consonant with

general theory holds that agencies are subject to capture for a host of reasons ranging from the mundane
of potential future jobs representing the interests regulated to the more subtle (I) regulators lack power
and thus depended upon industry cooperation; (2) regulation inhibits competition, strengthening
established firms; (3) lacking resources, regulators must compromise; and (4) regulators are dependent
upon outside sources, viz., the regulated firms, for information, policy development and political support.
Compare Seidenfeld, supra note 125; Edna Earle Vass Johnson, Agency "Capture": the "Revolving
Door" between Regulated Industries and Their Regulating Agencies, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 95 (1983);
and ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENviRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: A COURSEBOOK ON NATIJRE,
LAW AND SOCIETY 557-61 (1992); with Richard B. Stewart, the Reformation ofAmerican Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1684-87 (1975).
127. Agencies that regulate a single industry are thought more subject to capture. Jonathan R.
Macey, Organizational Design and Political Cantrol ofAdministrative Agencies, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG.
93, 94 (1992). Flagship departments like Treasury on the balance enjoy better historical reputations in
part because they are harder to capture. Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REv. 23, 83-5 (1995).
128. President Richard Nixon attempted to use IRS audits to harass taxpayers on his "enemies list."
SAM 1. ERVIN, JR., THE WHOLE TRUTH: THE WATERGATE CONSPIRACY 134 (1980); Senate Select
Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, The Final Report, S. REP. No. 93-981, at 7 (1974);
ELIZABETH DREW, WASHINGTON JOURNAL: THE EVENTS OF 1973-1974 152-53, 327-28 (1975); DAVID
BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: THE IRS AND THE ABUSE OF POWER 249-51 (1991); George Lardner,
Jr., Nixon Sought 'Ruthless' Chief to 'Do What He's Told' at IRS, N.Y. nMES, Jan. 3, 1997, at AI
(sought Johnnie Walters for that task but he refused to audit the taxpayers on the enemies list locking
it up unopened in a safe until turned over to congressional investigators the next year). Commissioners
Randolph Thrower and Johnnie Walters resigned in opposition to such policies. And Now A Few
Questions for the IRS, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP'T, Oct. 13, 1975, at 35.
129. Victor Fleischer, Note, "If It Looks Like a Duck": Corporate Resemblance and Check-TheBox Elective Tax Classification, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 518, 550 n.l57 (1996).
130. Agencies are influenced by Congress and its committee shadow governments. Calabresi, supra
note 127, at 83-85; Symposium: The Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215.
131. See notes 52-59 supra.
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the underlying standard. 132 The stories of the no separate asset and the
future benefit doctrines 133 and amortization of purchased intangibles 134
too richly illustrate these tendencies.
Many authorities base capitalization on future benefit 135--<>therwise
there is an "economically inefficient" incentive to cast such a transaction in
a deduction posture, as Judge Posner pointep out in Fishman v.
Commissioner. 136 But well-reasoned decisions have permitted current
deductions under a clear reflection of income analysis along the lines of the
proposed de minimis, short lived, and steady-state recurring exceptions
model or its corollary, impracticality of amortization, 137 notwithstanding
a future benefit capitalization presumption. 138 Such authorities often
conclude that current deduction would not distort the taxpayer's income
(e.g., small, short-term benefits or recurring in relation to revenue increase
from capitalization) as much as capitalization (particularly if without
amortization) would. 139 Some in the IRS National Office 140 and some
commentators 141 have favored these judicial precedents from time to time.

132. See Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 16, at 5.
133. /d. at 51-71.
134. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 93 (judicial inconsistencies as to customer lists
.
and core [bank] deposits).
135. Central Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1183 (5th Cir. 1984)
(advertising costs contributing to acquisition of a capital asset were capital expenditures); Darlington
Hartsville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1968) (costs of eliminating
unproductive middleman capitalized because intended to produce a positive business benefit for future
years); Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1937) (commissions paid to
solicitors in campaign to retain old and obtain new customers capitalized); Rodeway Inns of America
v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 414 (1974), acq., 1975-1 C.B. 2 (payment for cancellation of a territorial
agreement capitalized because acquisition of right to conduct business and earn profits over future years).
136. 837 F.2d 309 (7th Cir. 1988).
[l]ncome and expense must be matched temporally in order to minimize the inevitable
misallocations of resources that a taxing system creates. ... Because of the time value of
money-real riskless interest rates are positive-a deduction taken today is worth more than
one taken a year from now. Hence if an expense incurred to produce future income can be
deducted from current income rather than postponed until it has borne its fruits, taxpayers will
have an incentive to incur such expenses earlier than they would if there were no income tax;
and tax law seeks, to the extent compatible with revenue and distributive objectives, to
interfere as little as possible with the pattern of expenditures that would exist in the absence
of taxation.
/d. at 312.
137. See note 20 supra.
138. "Although the mere presence of an incidental future benefit-'some future aspect'- may not
warrant capitalization, a taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year in which the expenditure is
incurred is undeniably important in determining whether the appropriate tax treatment is immediate
deduction or capitalization." INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87. For an excellent analysis of the Service's
possible interpretations of this passage see Carrington, supra note 21, § 25.02[4)[d) at 25-8 through 25-9.
139. See note 20 supra.
140. See note 21 supra.
141. Gunn, supra note 23, at 456-57, 482; Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 16, at 2426; Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 19, at 15-20; Alexander, supra note 16, at 1513; Gerard, infra
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The resultant uncertainty as to when the exceptions apply argues strongly
against judicial resolution alone of the ordinary versus capital dichotomy (or
perhaps better spectrum). 142 In the sixty years since Justice Cardozo in
Welch v. Helvering 143 told us to look to "[l]ife in all its fullness . . . [to]
supply the answer to the riddle" of what is ordinary, 144 the demarcation
between ordinary and capital expenditures has been the most difficult to
draw in the tax field. 145
As a practical matter, the dueling capitalization versus expensing
precedents mean that taxpayers often have substantial authority for deducting
future benefit costs not fitting the rules proposed in this article. 146 This
poses an administrative nightmare. More fundamentally, a case-law
approach to capitalization too often has to turn in theory on a case-by-case
determination of useful life for amortization of any capitalized expenditure. 147 (The too-often easier analysis is to conclude that when
amortization is not available, current deduction more clearly reflects income,
i.e., under the analysis of this article, produces less distortion of income than
the ''black hole" of capitalization without amortization. 148) Case-by-case

note 148 (recurring and burden outweighs benefits); see note 249 infra for submissions pursuant to
Notice 96-7 also advocating similar factors.
142. Commissioner Goldberg pointed out that the courts were unable to resolve the purchased
intangibles morass. See note 32 supra. Astute tax writing committee members such as Rep. Rangel hold
similar beliefs as to judicial inefficiency. 1993 Hearings, supra note 24, at 1708. Professor Lee has long
thought about whether the ideal evolution of rules implementing standards as judges and commentators
collaborating, which is then administratively codified by the Service and Treasury in administrable
rulings (and ultimately codified by Congress). Section 355 well illustrates part of this process. Earlier,
perhaps more primitive, examples would be the Qijford or grantor trust provisions of Subchapter J of
the Code (and the family partnership provisions of Subchapter K). See Colliton, supra note 56 (evolution
of grantor trust provisions). Professor Boris Bittker's role in the tax issues of (a) capitalization versus
expensing of future benefit costs and (b) year one-year two balancing entry doctrines (tax benefit, claim
of right, cancellation of indebtedness, and Crane/Tufts doctrines, and perhaps less obviously open and
closed transaction doctrines and myriad piecemeal statutory partial codifications, including depreciation
recapture and the no double deduction notion of Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil, well-illustrates the
collaborative judiciaVcommentary mode of tax law reform. Cf William D. Popkin, The Collaborative
Model ofStatutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 541 (1988) (advocating Congressional and judicial
collaboration, which started Professor Lee thinking along the lines of analogous co11laboration with the
Bittker "balancing entry" story in mind).
143. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. Ill (1933).
144. /d. at 115.
145. Lee, Copital Expenditures. supra note 28, at 473; Lee, Clear Reflection ofIncome, supra note
16, and authorities cited therein.
146. There is enough stuff out there on a one out of three, any of us can find authority on
any side, and therefore people will take any side, and so what we need is more direction and
then let the service do what it does best, but with authority.
1993 Hearings. supra note 24, at 1708 (Statement of Professor Lee).
147. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 93.
148. This approach has judicial and some Treasury support. See note 21 supra.
[W]hile capitalizing and amortizing periodic customer development expenditures may
have some theoretical appeal, as a practical administrative matter it is not feasible. More
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useful lives is contrary to the evolution over six decades of more and more
standardized lives for tangible assets as under Section 168. 149 It similarly

importantly, this treatment is not even necessary to achieve a proper accounting of periodic
net income. For an on-going business entity with a steady level of customers, the annual
expense deductions related to periodic customers development expenditures should be roughly
the same as amortization deductions. This also should be the case even for companies with
a growing number of customers, since amortization periods for capitalized new customer
development expenditures typically would be much shorter than amortization periods for
purchased customers. For example, it is well-known in the newspaper publishing industry that
only a small percentage of new subscribers actually renew their subscriptions enough times
to become 'seasoned' subscribers with expected lives of approximately 15 to 25 years, as are
at issue in Newark Morning Ledger. Furthermore, it would be impracticable to identify and
capitalize the proper portions of those periodic expenditures that contribute to customer
development.
Tax authorities and financial accounting authorities have long recognized these
circumstances and, accordingly, have permitted the expensing of periodic customer
development expenditures as incurred. This administratively simple treatment provides 'rough
justice' as it applies evenly to all taxpayers who develop customers, and typically does not
result in a material distortion of net income.
Steven Gerard, The Continuing Controversy over Newark Morning Ledger and the Mass Asset Rule, 58
TAX NOTES 99, 100 (1993). This article argues that often the "platinum mean" of standardized safe
harbor amortization periods is better than current deduction or no deduction from a policy and equity
as well as economic efficiency standpoint.
149. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 93.
In GAO's opinion, conflict between taxpayers and IRS regarding which purchased
intangible assets are amortizable is likely to continue. The fact and circumstance based nature
of the controversy leads to costly disagreements between taxpayers and IRS and inconsistent
treatment for similarly situated taxpayers. A legislative change similar to the changes made
to the tangible asset rules to address these same problems is needed. Keeping the current tax
rules would mean accepting frequent and costly disagreements between taxpayers and IRS,
with the courts acting as the final arbiter.
When these conflicts arise, they are caused by the disparity between the tax treatment
of (1) goodwill and other nonamortizable intangible assets without determinable useful lives
and (2) amortizable intangible assets with taxpayer-determined useful lives. This disparity
gives taxpayers an incentive to establish values and useful lives for purchased intangible
assets other than goodwill. The current tax treatment ofgoodwill and similar intangible assets
fails to recognize the economic benefits that wasting intangible assets contribute over time.
These assets are consumed over time even if a precise period cannot be determined. Denying
amortization deductions does not result in an accurate determination of taxable income since
expenses are not properly matched to income generated. Recognition of these economic
benefits over time for tax purposes can be accomplished by establishing specific statutory cost
recovery periods for purchased intangible assets similar to those now used for tangible assets.
Providing specific cost recovery periods could, therefore, result in a more accurate
measurement of income. It could also eliminate conflicts resulting from the
nondeductibility of purchased goodwill and disagreements over the estimated
length of useful lives.
Administrative concerns, such as the appropriate identification of the categories to which
particular intangible assets belong and the calculation of asset values, should be considered
when choosing the lengths of cost recovery periods and category definitions. These conflicts
were not significant when compared to conflicts over goodwill but could increase as the
number of categories eligible for amortization and the span of cost recovery periods increase.
ld; Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,102 (Apr. 17, 1969):
[W]e fully realize that characterization of expenditures incurred in a silting removal
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conflicts with the almost one-size-fits-all more recently enacted the fifteenyear amortization period for purchased intangibles under Section 197. 150

operation as either "expense" or a "capital improvement'' is not free from doubt. Of
course we still feel that an expense characterization is the only proper classification
where complete redredging is accomplished on an annual basis. However, classification
becomes suspect where silt is removed every three years as in ••• or one-third of the
operation is accomplished every year as in Commodore's Point [Terminal, 18 B.T.A.
386 (1929)]. In either case, whether the removal of silt accumulated during the prior
three years benefits the current year or benefits the succeeding three years conjures
visions in legalistic semantics and often as not the barnyard may wear an entirely
different hue when interpretative chickens come horne to roost. In either event both
sides of the coin have merit.
/d.

150. The GAO had recommended multi-class amortization. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra
note 93.
GAO believes the disagreements between IRS and taxpayers over which intangible assets may
be amortized will continue unless changes are made in the current rules. Recognition of all
intangible assets that waste away over time and the development of gUidelines for their
amortization would help to prevent such disputes and provide uniform treatment for all
taxpayers.
/d. Treasury opposed a multi-class approach on an administerability basis; controversy would remain
as to on which class an expenditure fell. 1991 Hearings on Intangibles, supra note 32, at 31 (Statement
of Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy Gideon) (Ken had represented the taxpayer in a leading
core bank deposit case). Jennie Stathis, Director, Tax Policy and Administration Issues acknowledged
this problem. /d. at 81, 86-7. She estimated that it would take Treasury a year to develop multiple
classes. /d. at 83. Even then a lot of numbers probably would have to be made up based upon the
Service's drafting of the ADR class lives or at least repair ratios. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,802 (Nov.
1, 1989) ("Little is known about what specific costs were considered by OlE in calculating these repair
allowance percentages [under ADR], since all the Office's records regarding this study were routinely
destroyed."); cf Armco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 946 (1987). The story continues. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 38,788 (Aug. 26, 1981):
An interesting question which arises and remains unanswered - were indirect costs included
in the computations in arriving at the percentage repair allowance?
There is no indication in the administrative file whether in setting these [repair ratio]
percentages [for railroads] any indirect costs were taken into account. Inquiry was made of
the Engineering and Valuation Branch as to whether they have this information, and they did
not, but they made a request of the Office of Industrial Economics for the information. They
also referred us to Mr. Seymour Fiekowsky, an economist in the Treasury Department who
worked on the original repair allowances adopted under CLADR. Mr. Fiekowksy said that
in preparing the data on which the original allowances were based the personnel working on
the matter were limited by the information shown on the books of account of the industry
members surveyed. He said that conceptually indirect costs are a part of the expenditures for
repair, etc., but that his group did not have the means to go beyond the accounts in which the
companies surveyed recorded repair, etc., expenditures. Accordingly, he did not know to
what extent, if any, indirect costs were taken into account in setting the repair allowance
percentages. [The individual draftsperson of a 1979 increase in the repair allowance
percentage] said that neither he nor, as far as he could ascertain, any one else in his office
knew whether indirect costs were taken into account in setting the original repair allowance
percentages. He stated that in assembling the information on which the 1979 increase was
based he did not have access to the methodology used in determining the original repair
allowance percentages, and so did not try to follow the same or a modified procedure in
developing the 1979 percentage. . . . The aforementioned individual said that the major
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The paradigm there was based in part on precisely this idea of one-size-fits(almost, but not quite due to special interest exceptions)-all.
In addition to the conflicting precedents, tax audit and litigation and
requests for interpretation generate inflated transaction costs due to
confusion, misunderstanding and lack of expertise of advisers of small
taxpayers. 151 While such costs may as a matter of tax policy be tolerable
as to sophisticated, i.e., high income taxpayers, and even intended as to tax
shelter devices, 152 they are intolerable and unadministerable as to most
other taxpayers, in particular small businesses. 153 This was the message
of IRS/Treasury in 1992 that ''rough justice" in the form of simple rules
right on the average and general principles were preferable to detailed rules.
Professor Lee argued in the 1993 Rangel Miscellaneous Revenue Hearings
that the real concern in the post-INDOPCO capitalization world should be
"avoiding litigation costs on both sides. " 154 Taxpayer representatives
made the same arguments as to pollution clean up costs; 155 and avoidance

problems with which OlE was concerned in developing the 1979 Class 40.1 percentage were
inflation and excluded additions. There was discussion as to whether overhead should be
included, but little or no attention was given to indirect costs. There was a significant
difference between the figures reported by the ten railroads for ADR purposes.
Note that Boris Bittker had a hand in this also. See note 226 infra. Congress (or Treasury) probably
shared these concerns, in that the CLADR regulations were in effect codified in 1971. Nevertheless,
Professor Lee believes that such rule making is within the clear reflection of income prerogative of the
Commissioner.
151. See note 32 supra.
152. Hearings on Tax Shelters, Accounting Abuses, and Corporate and Securities Reforms before
the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 99th Cong. 32-33 (1984) (Statement of Assistant Secretary of
Treasury Chapoton.)
MR. PEASE. Will these [time value of money] proposals that you have, if they are
enacted in total, tend to complicate or simplify the Tax Code?
MR. CHAPoTON. Unquestionably, where they apply, they will tend to complicate, in most
cases would have some complicating effect That is why every attempt has been made
particularly in the time value of money changes to provide exceptions so they do not apply
to the everyday taxpayers in normal transactions and apply principally to large tax
transactions, tax shelters, and otherwise, where very sophisticated planning is involved.
MR. PEASE. So in an effort to close off abuse tax shelters, we are going to further
complicate a tax code that many people feel is already too complicated.
MR. CHAPOTON. I do not think we need to apologize when we complicate the Tax Code
for very complicated transactions, and that is the intent here.

!d.
153. John Lee, The An ofRegulation Drafting: Structured Discretionary Justice under Section 355,
44 TAX NOTES 1029, 1031 n.l7 (1989) (hereinafter Lee, Structured Discretionary Justice].
154. 1993 Hearings, supra note 24, at 1687 (Testimony of Professor Lee).
155. Letter dated July 8, 1993 from Donal E. Flannery and Carol Conjura ofKPMG Peat Marwick
to Samuel Y. Sessions, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Re: Proposals for the Tax Treatment
ofEnvironmental Cleanup Costs, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY
148-25 (July 15, 1993):
The magnitude of the issue and its tax policy repercussions are too great to allow any
resolution other than one in which the weight of authorities and sound tax policies are
considered. Rather than providing taxpayers with useful guidelines for taking a correct tax
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of such transaction costs on both sides had been a major factor in
Commissioner Fred Goldberg's stumping for "rough justice" regulations.156 Indeed, Treasury's support of statutory simplification as to depreciation of intangibles has been long and consistently bottomed on reduction
of administrative costs.

2.

Congress

a.

Historical Experience with Detailed Statutes versus General
Statute with Detailed Regulations

Our Submission outlined at this point some of historical experience
with general and particular statutes and regulations particularly in the taxfree reorganization area. This topic is not considered in this article.

b.

Does Treasury favor legislative resolution?

Probably with Section 197 in mind, Treasury officials have suggested
· that legislation was the best answer to the deductibility of pollution clean-up
expenses imbroglio. 157 Presumably some in Treasury would believe that
the same is true for capitalization in general. This article takes a contrary
position for the reasons discussed below.

c.

The Case Against Initial Legislative Resolution

This article argues that at least initiall/ 58 Congress is not the best
actor in resolving the capitalization versus expensing morass for four
reasons. The first two are structural policy reasons outlined in our

return position the first time, unending litigation would result from a failure to reconsider
these TAMs. We believe such failure would be counterproductive for both taxpayers and the
government, and would only provide taxpayers with the assurance that the Service will
challenge most of their deductions on audit. Taxpayers should not have to resolve their cases
in court if it is possible for the Service and Treasury to interpret the law and existing
authorities in a reasoned, practical manner.

/d.
156. Bennet Minton, Goldberg Urges DJmpromise on Simplification, 53 TAX NOTES 148 (1991)
("Goldberg urged businesses to accept that simplification would produce only 'rough justice.' 'Tax law
is not a work of art; it is a crude, ugly means of financing government. Don't chase an imperfection,'
he advised."). See notes 307-15 infra and accompanying text.
157. Treasury Official Sees Environmental Clean-up Guidance This Year as Warranted, 1993
DAILY TAX REP. 88 d23 (May 10, 1993) (Remarks ofKalinskis).
158. Congress can perform a valuable role in reforming this area by codifying in the future the then
existing structured discretionary rough justice expensing/capitalizing regulations. See notes 232-36 infra
and accompanying text.
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Submission: (1) a quicker tendency to overregulation through too many
rules 159 and (2) a tendency, with sometimes good and sometimes bad
effects, to carve out exceptions for various classes of taxpayers. 160 Such
exceptions seriously violate horizontal equity and too often, but not always,
vertical equity. 161 The latter was the motivating factor at the time of our
Submission. It alluded, however, to the first of the following two political
reasons for Congress not being the best actor here. Professor Lee now finds
these more determinative in supporting that conclusion. Reason (3) is the
proclivity of Rep. Archer, to resort to strong-arming administrative
regulation of capitalization-expensing issues without supplying a substantive
resolution, "limitation riders" in the literature. 162 Former high Treasury
or Service and Joint Committee Staff officials with whom Professor Lee has
enjoyed the good fortune to discuss this issue agree that such approach
would be a very bad thing. We believe that an incremental approach as
exemplified in the published rulings as of the end of 1996 are more subject
to the risk of "limitation riders." 163 (4) Chair Archer may feel compelled

159. Comparison of the over complexity of legislative, administrative and judicial rule making is
difficult The following tentative hypotheses are that Congress creates more classes of exceptions; the
Service and Treasury tend to draw lines more in applying those exceptions. In the end, the regulatory
details are relatively easy to navigate once the statutory lines are understood. Cases usually draw factual
distinctions in applying the statute or its exceptions, but at their best articulate fundamental policy
choices which then the Serviceffreasury can apply, or to which Congress can react. At the same ~me
judicial rule drawing may be the most violative of vertical equity, due in part to the expense oflitigation.
This tendency probably is magnified in refund suits where the taxpayer must also finance the paying of
the contested taxes first. Relating all of this is the joy of Federal taxation. For another view as to the
evolution of tax complexity see Colliton, supra note 56. We agree that the pattern therein described
exists, but suspect, without having counted Code provisions, that it accounts only in a very general way
for the greatest complexity in operation if not in numbers. We suspect that more Code complexity has
arisen from full-blown global approaches to a tax problem. Examples are the time value of money rules,
PAL, recapture, at-risk, and collapsible corporations. Moreover, the Colli ton story does not explain yearyear 2 balancing entry complexities, where case law came back strongest after some legislative tinkering.
And it does not account for the model commentary/judiciary collaborative model which took place after
a fair amount of congressional efforts.
160. See notes 76, 77 supra and note 170 intra.
161. When the similarly situated individual taxpayers are high income (where most preferences are
concentrated, see Selected Materials relating to the Federal Tax System under Present Law and Various
Alternative Tax Systems Prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation in Connection with
a Retreat of the House Committee on Ways and Means Held on March 1-3, 1996 (JCS-1-1996 Mar. 14,
1996), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX Noms TODAY 53-8 (Mar. 15, 1996),
violatons of horizontal equity violate vertical equity as well-vertical equity is another name for
progressivity or the the principle that higher income taxpayers should pay a higher effective rate due to
greater "ability to pay". While these exceptions are often claimed to target "smaller income" individuals,
they are more likely to be middle or high income taxpayers in fact.
162. This term is defined as Congressional interference in agency regulation of an issue by
appropriation or by other legislation without supplying a substantive answer. See Parnell, supra note
118, at 1370-05; Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987
DUKE L.J. 456, 461-63.
163. This notion is more fully discussed in Part Two.
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to go the "limitation rider" route due to counterintuitive and factually
incorrect paygo assumptions .. After our Submission Professor Lee further
researched and thought more about these two issues in connection with
research and thought on cyclical aircraft engine "inspections", i.e.,
replacement, where in the heat of the moment he ignored them. They will
be covered more extensively in Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs. 164
This article will only sketch the direction that thought is now taking.
Hyperlexis and Pressure Group and Other Exceptions

Two sources of hyperlexis 165 spring to mind. One, most clearly
identified by Commissioner Fred Goldberg in the Bush Administration, is
the tendency to spin out ideal rules striving for theoretical purity. The most
extreme recent example is surely that of time value of money rules. 166
This pattern is usually coupled with exceptions based upon the populist tax
policy of simplicity for small taxpayers. 167
The other source, more
commented on by public choice theorists, is the spawning of exception after
exception for special interest or pressure groups 168 which may coincide
with simplicity or be dressed in its rhetoric. Theories here fortunately can
be tested against closely comparable real tax world realities. Section 195,
197 and 263A all deal with aspects of capitalization versus expensing and
serve as laboratories for testing approaches.
The pattern of recently enacted or proposed tax legislation as to
capitalization (Section 263A) 169 and to a lesser extent amortization of

164. See note 40 supra.
165. Professor Lee first carne across this phrase in Gordon D. Henderson, Controlling HyperlexisThe Most Important lAw and ...", 43 TAX LAw. 177 (1989).
166. A former chief counsel under President Carter not involved in the 1984 legislation described
it as the extreme of rules elevating theoretical purity over administrability.
167. See. e.g., I.R.C. §§ 263A(bX2)(B) and (f)(l)(BXiii); 447(dXl); 448(bX3); 453A(bXI);
460(eXl)(BXii); 469(iX3XA); 483(d)(2); and §§ 1274(c)(3) and 1274A. For a discription of certain
income tax provisions that apply to small businesses see Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation,
House Committee on Ways and Means on April24, 1996 (JCS-3-96 Apr. 23, 1996), available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 81-16 (Apr. 24, 1996).
168. Frank Easterbrook, Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 16 (1984). He
posits that the ''more detailed the law, the more evidence of interest-group compromise and therefore the
less liberty judges possess." /d. Ironically, essentially this scenario of construction was followed by the
Board of Tax Appeals in upholding the device (spin-off of newly-incorporated subsidiary holding stock
in third corporation X followed by liquidation of subsidiary and sale of X stock) in Gregory, reversed
by the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court in the classic expansive judicial doctrine, business purpose.
See Lee, Structured Discretionary Justice, supra note 153, at 1033. Easterbrook continues that generalinterest statutes are designed to vest discretion in the courts, as in anti-trust common law. Easterbook,
supra, at 16. In those instances, "decisions of courts are the things for which the parties bargained, and
so judicial power to extemporize is at its greatest." /d.
169. Section 263A generally applies a single set of capitalization rules (implemented through
awesome complexity in regulations) to all costs incurred in (I) manufacturing or constructing real or
tangible property and (2) acquiring property (real or tangible or intangible) for resale. See 1986
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intangibles (Section 197) 170 and the Clinton Administration's proposed
"Brownfields" provision, 171 all display a pattern of hyperlexis, or detailed
rule with detailed exceptions and exceptions to the exceptions piled upon
detailed rules. It may be that Congressional staff are more prone to
hyperlexis than IRS or Treasury staff, but the more likely cause is the far
greater desire on Congress' part to infinitely more narrowly define
beneficiaries and targets of tax legislation 172 than on the part of
IRS!freasury. This compounds in tax legislation the tendency of both
Congress and Treasury to hedge with safeguards broader policy rules. 173
Too much complexity poses administrative problems as well, confusing IRS
field agents 174 as well as taxpayers.
Complex tax legislation often manifests a two track pattern of more
complex (usually anti-abuse) rules for larger taxpayer or tax shelters and

Bluebook, supra note 76, at 509. Representative Downey, member of the House Ways and Means
Committee and important player in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, read the legislative history of Section
263Aas:
suggest ... [ing] that the thrust of the provision was to require various producers of tangible
property already capitalizing direct and some indirect costs to more comprehensively
capitalize other indirect costs. Congress meant to exempt from the new uniform capitalization
rules those taxpayers, or expenditures, that were already exempted under prior law from the
general capitalization rules. For instance, farmers and ranchers were exempted, The
exemption from uniform capitalization rules in the timber industry and the ornamental tress
industry was continued.
134 CONG. REC. E1245 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Downey).
170. Section 197 provides IS-year amortization (depreciation) for a laundry list of intangibles·
mostly acquired in connection with an acquisition of assets constituting a trade or business. I.R.C. §§
197(a), (d) (1994). A large number of exceptions are included in Section 197(e). Some consist of assets
already covered by more favorable specific provisions or rules, e.g., computer software, sports contracts
and mortgage servicing contracts. Conversely other exceptions consist of assets that were traditionally
not depreciable because not a wasting asset, e.g. an ownership interest in a corporation, partnership or
land, or because the acquistion was in a non-recognition transaction, e.g., transaction costs in a tax~free
corporate organizaton or reorganization.
171. The Clinton Administration proposal would allow an election to treat certain environmental
remediation expenditures otherwise chargeable to capital account to be currently deducted if the
contaminated site (I) is used in trade or business, (2) located in a targeted area (empowerment zone,
enterprise community or site included in Environmental Protection Agency brownfields pilot project),
and (3) contains a hazardous substance ("brownfields"). Staff of Joint Committee on Taxaton,
Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the President's Fiscal Year 1997 Budget Proposal
(Released on Mar. 19. 1997) 49 (JCS-2-96 Mar. 27, 1996), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT
File, 96 TAX NOTE'S TODAY 62-6 (Mar. 28, 1996).
172. In this context at least Congress is more subject to capture than Treasury or the IRS.
173. Section 263A and its amendments display all of these elements. That story was researched
after our Submission for Writer's Prepublication Costs Revisited, supra note 40. Therefore this article
only sketches the conclusions reached there.
174. "It is also worth noting the obvious: If IRS employees cannot understand those laws,
regulations, and administrative rules, we will have a hard time administering and enforcing them."
Hearings on Impact, Effectiveness. and Fairness of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 before the House Ways ·
and Means Committee, I 0 I st Cong. 53-56 (1990) (Statement of Commissioner Goldberg) [hereinafter
Hearings on Impact ofTRA 1986).
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more simple rules for smaller taxpayers or those who materially participate
in the activity being regulated. m This was especially the case in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986's tax accounting and tax shelter provisions, 176 but
appears a general populist pattern as well across the Code over the past two
decades. 177
As far as uncertainty goes, we suspect that even more chaos is created
when Congress carves out from already complicated tax statutes special
interest exceptions allowing existing businesses to garner the fruits of their
then favorable existing case law victories. The story of the separate asset test
best illustrates this. 178 For these victories have generally proven pyrrhic,
as if the Service then attacked the thus highlighted current law "flaw."
Professor Lee so testified in 1993} 79
Further case-law development in the tax treatment of self-created
intangibles carved-out from Section 263A might have been anticipated by
staff. Section 195 already provided the example of Congress carving out a
case law exception (based upon the separate asset doctrine) with cases
culminating in INDOPCO subsequently rearranging the underlying case-law
guideposts. 180 The GAO pointed out that pre-Section 197 case law
permitting the expensing of the costs of creating intangibles arose against a

175. For small taxpayer exceptions see note 167 supra. Material participation exceptions or
prerequisites as the case may be are contained in sections 42(hX5)(B), 147(c)(2)(B)(ii) and (C)(i), and
469(c)(I)(B) and (h).
176. See note 167 supra.
177. John A. Miller, Indeterminacy. Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in
the Law ofTDXDtion, 68 WASH. L. REv. I, 20 n.81 (1993) (complexity of partnership allocations).
178. See notes 76 and 77 supra.
179. See 1993 Hearings, note 24 supra:
The special interests' victories proved ephemeral, just as one witness warned in the §
195 hearings of the possible expansion of capitalization doctrines in the business expansion
area. And so it happened, first with business expansion costs at the circuit court level and
then with INDOPCO at the Supreme Court level as to self-created intangibles in general.
Enlightened by Professor Gunn's The Requirement that a Capital Expenditure Create or
Enhance an Asset discovered in researching for the Bittker Treatise and the case law business
expansion cases of the late 1970s and early 1980s and especially Wolfsen Land & Cattle and
NCNB I, I then described in 1986 in the VIRGINIA TAX REviEW (I) the conceptual and policy
weaknesses of the ."separate asset'' doctrine in business expansion and elsewhere; (2)
developed the minimum distortion of income model for distinguishing ordinary deductions
from capital expenditures, set forth above, along with its case law and policy support; and (3)
in particular noted the judicial tendency to reject an income distorting "nothing" under
capitalization without adequate capitalization and to choose instead an also income distorting
irnrilediate deduction. (I also criticized on a technical basis section 195 far more than with
hindsight I would today.)
1993 Hearings, supra note 24, at 1702 (footnotes omitted). Compared with what was to come, section
195 was a success story. Start up issues now appear rarely in the cases. Cobintaxi Corp. v.
Commissioner, 63 F.3rd 614,620-21 (7th Cir. 1995), is a rare exception. They do still appear in rulings.
See notes 76 and 77 supra.
180. Lee, Clear Rejleciion of Income, supra note 16, at 71-77.

680

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

backdrop of amortization not being available, due in perhaps large part to
the difficulty of establishing useful lives. 181 That backdrop shifted after
enactment of Section 197's amortization of (purchased) intangibles. 182
Then Chair Dan Rostenkowski averred in 1991 that the proposal which
became Section 197 in OBRA 1993 would not affect advertising costs. 183
Some members of the Ways and Means Committee presciently warned that

GENRAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 93.
An analysis of purchased intangible asser taxation also requires a familiarity with the
treatment of costs incurred in creating such assets. Generally, costs of creating long-lasting
assets are included, or capitalized, in the cost basis of the asset and deducted over the asset's
life. Because some intangible assets, such as goodwill, are not normally considered distinct
or traceable assets by taxpayers, most costs of creating them, like advertising expenses, are
usually deducted in the year incurred rather than capitalized and amortized over the life of
the asset The result of these tax rules is that purchased goodwill is treated less favorably than
other purchased assets, while the costs of creating goodwill are treated more favorably than
creation costs of other assets. This unusual result must be kept in mind in devising solutions
to the problems of intangible asset tax rules.

181.

Providing specific cost recovery periods for intangible assets may lead to another possible
benefit. Taxpayers may be prevented from deducting as current expense certain purchased
intangible asset costs that should be amortized for tax purposes following a business
acquisition. We have been told that taxpayers may expense certain intangible asset costs after
an acquisition for financial accounting purposes because this procedure _can improve operating
results. At the same time, this practice may cause taxpayers to inappropriately accelerate tax
deductions, which could be prevented if amortization of these costs were required over
specific cost recovery periods.
A capital expenditure is one that is expected to produce returns for future years, while a
current expense is devoted to income production in the current year or other immediate needs.
For tax purposes, capital expenditures are recoverable over the life (or capital cost recovery
period) of the assets they create, while current expenses are generally deducted when incurred.
However, many capital expenditures that create or enhance long·lasting goodwill (or assets
that are functionally equivalent to goodwill) are treated as business expenses and deducted
in the current tax year. For example, IRS allows a current deduction for most advertising
expenses even though the benefit may extend beyond the year in which the cost is incurred.
Taxpayers may expense costs associated with some intangible assets, such as advertising that
creates goodwill, because, in accordance with judicial interpretations, these intangible assets
are not usually considered tO be distinct or traceable. An additional reason for this treatment
for certain assets may be that it is difficult to determine how much of an expense contributes
to the intangible asset and when the asset is created.
A change that would allow recovery of the cost of all purchased intangible assets,
including goodwill, would alter the treatment of goodwill for the first time since 1927 and
would create uncertainty about the future treatment of expenditures that create goodwill and
similar assets. The 1927 regulations disallowing amortization of goodwill have influenced the
treatment of intangible asset creation costs by taxpayers, IRS, and the courts. Clarification of
the future treatment of such expenditures, even ifno change is desired, may be necessary to
avoid confusion.
/d.
182. /d.
183. 1991 Hearings on Intangibles, supra note 32, at 21 (Statement of Chairman Rostenkowski.)
("Some persons have questioned whether this bill was intended to open the door for reconsidering tax
deductions for advertising expenses. Let me be clear. The answer is no.").
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self-created intangibles should not be swept under the rug. 184 Assistant
Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy Ken Gideon refused to be drawn into
the issue. 185
POLITICAL STORIES

"Appropriation Riders" and "Limitation Riders"

The current political climate regarding any tax increases even by
regulations, at least as regards the House Republican majority, displays
characteristics of the tax political climate of two decades ago. Then the
conservative coalition 186 overturned several IR.Sffreasury projects through
"appropriation riders," which forbade staff from being paid to work on the
projects, or "limitation riders," which directed the IRS or Treasury to apply
the law without regard to a particular ruling or regulation. 187 Today's

184. /d. at 27 (statement of Rep. Schulze).
MR. SCHULZE: ... I might also disagree with the chairman, very hesitantly somewhat, but
it seems to me that if we are getting into the area of amortizing intangibles, you cannot avoid
at least looking at the amortizing of advertising, which is probably the largest expenditure on
intangibles in the United States of America, perhaps in the world. So, no matter what we do,
we're going to set a precedent in this area, and there's no use trying to sweep it under the
rug. It's something that's going to have to be viewed and brought into the open.

/d.
185. /d. at 61.
MR. SCHULZE: . . . Ken, from a policy perspective, why should intangible costs or goodwill
costs be written off when the costs associated with their creation, such as advertising or other
expenses, are expensed? They've already being written off.
MR. GIDEON: I want to make clear that this bill, and the proposals before you today, deal
with purchased intangibles and they don't deal with self-created intangibles. Nothing is being
contemplated at this point would deal with self- created intangibles. The way I see what's
happening here is that given the fact that advertising certainly is expensed as incurred,
providing some amortization period for purchased goodwill moves those aspects of the law
closer together instead of at their polar extremes, as they are now. If you incur advertising
expenditures now you basically expense them. On the other hand, if you purchase goodwill,
you're in a situation where you get no recovery whatever.
MR. SCHULZE: Where do you think that will lead us?
MR. GIDEON: I don't think that it necessarily leads us anywhere, Mr. Schulze. I think that
Congress certainly has considered from time to time proposals to require some form of
amortization of advertising, and I have no doubt that there will be proponents of that view
at times in the future. But I don't think that has anything in particular with what we're doing
today.
/d.

186. Political science literature defines this as a majority of Republicans and Southern Democrats
versus Northern Democrats. John Lee, President C/inton"s Capital Gains Proposals, 59 TAX NOTES
1399, 1402 & n.IO (1993).
187. This issue of "limitation riders" under which Congress directs the IRS' regulation of specific
tax issues without changing the underlying substantive provisions is more fully discussed in Lee,
Walberg, & Whitesell, Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs, supra note 40, analyzing political events
in late September and early October 1996 which unfortunately confirm Professor Lee's assessment in
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Republican majority in the House reflects in large part the white Southern
male voter's replacement of conservative Democrats with Republicans for
the first time this century, making the South the most solidly Republican
region in the nation. 188 The Conservative Coalition has become the
Conservative Partisan Southern-flavored Majority. The lesson to be drawn
from those events of two decades ago is the wisdom of building coalitions
with professional groups supporting reform effort (often modified to that
end) as was done in the "collegial" tax reform achievements of the
1980's. 189
In addition to the adverse political climate, regulatory reform will be
structurally more difficult here than in the closely analogous reform of the
tax treatment of purchased intangibles in Section 197. There the very same
large taxpayers that were "losers" under the new legislation (for instance, as
to intangibles like customer lists), were ''winners" as to goodwill or going
concern value, which now could be amortized over 15 years whereas case
law had allowed no amortization. 190 Moreover, in the aggregate winners
and losers tended to balance out. 191 Again there would losers under the
model as contrasted with current practice, but there would be few winners
who could now currently deduct that which they had previously capitalized
and depreciated. This will make revision of the tax treatment of self-created
intangibles very difficult politically. 192 The winner here is certainty and
reduction of transaction costs. 193

Pay As You Go or Paygo Strictures
The ''pay-as-you-go" or "paygo" procedures governing current tax
legislation require any revenue decreases to be offset by (1) increases in
revenue from other new tax provisions or (2) decreases in spending, so that
there is no net increase in the Federal deficit. 194 In performing estimates
for this purpose, the Joint Committee on Taxation establishes a base line

May 1996 of the political climate in the House of Representatives.
188. Lee, Capital Gains Contentions, supra note 53, at 27-28 & n.l08.
189. A more complete treatment of tax limitation riders and collegial tax reform is provided in
Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs, supra note 40.
190. Case law had permitted relatively short amortization periods (under 10 years), GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 93; but Section 197 required 15 year amortization.
191. After Newark Morning Ledger v. United States, 507 U.S. 546 (1993), was decided by the
Court, holding that purchased intangibles could sometimes be amortized, the revenue estimators scored
proposed Section 197 as yielding a substantial revenue gain. See note 196 infra.
192. See note 357 infra.
193. Unofficial Transcript ofIRS Hearing on Uniform Capitalization Regs, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY
246-30 (Dec. 3, 1993) (Statement of Jerry Holt, representing International Mass Retail Association)(favor
rough justice even if it costs more, for the certainty.).
194. Lee, Capital Gains Contentions, supra note 53, at 57.
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which assumes that the "present law" being changed yields a certain amount
of revenue. 195 A decision such as INDOPCO overruling the separate asset
test (under. which most taxpayers currently deducted costs with future
benefits) would be taken as establishing the baseline. 196 Thus a legislative
reinstatement of the separate asset test would be counted as a revenue loser
despite its codifying actual taxpayer practice. This renders near term
legislative resolution of current deduction versus capitalization highly
unlikely. 197

3.

The Case For IRSffreasury Regulation

This article argues that guidance should be through promulgation of
interpretative capitalization regulations rather than issuance of published
revenue rulings because only with final regulations are both taxpayers and
the Service bound. 198 Most of the comments submitted to the Service to
date argued to the contrary for rulings, but typically they were very specific
industry- or issue-oriented 199 and probably assumed (correctly) that narrow
relief was easier to obtain. Administratively and politically a global
resolution is needed.

a.

The Case for (Interpretative) Regulations over other Rulings

The Tax Executives Institute (TEl) makes the case that such guidance
should be through regulations and not through the private or even public

195. Joint Committee on Taxation, Methodology and Issues in the Revenue Estimating Process
(JCX-2-95 Jan. 23, 1995), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 15-15
(Jan. 24, 1995).
196. /d. (story of Newark Morning Ledger as changing radically the revenue estimates of the
enactment of Section 197).
197. See note 119 supra.
198. Taxpayers can use rulings and proposed regulations as a shield. In certain circumstances they
constitute substantial authority for purposes of Section 6662. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3Xiii) (as
amended in 1995). But as an IRS sword they are no stronger in the Tax Court than any other Service
argument on brief, i.e., they prevail only if convincing as an interpretation of the Code with no
presumption attached. Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent
Standards, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 1037 (1995). See generally Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron Judicial
Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 54 (1996). In the 1990s many circuit courts have come
to give more-some even controlling-weight to IRS rulings. Galler, supra, but see Paul Caron, Tax
Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: the Unproven Case ofIncreased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings,
57 OHIO ST. LJ. 637 (1996). The divergent approaches and resultant uncertainty render the rulings
approach as contrasted with regulations even more inadvisable. Moreover, the advantage of the input of
public comments in the regulations process is very important Published rulings would probably end the
split between Chief Counsel and field as to the scope of INDOPCO. Regulations as proposed by this
article would be more certain.
199. See note 122 supra.
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rulings process. 200 (1) Private letter rulings have no precedential value
although they may constitute substantial authority until they. become
stale. 201 (2) The transaction costs are too high taxpayer by taxpayer,
particularly where the issues arise only in audit. 202 The small number of
Private Letter Rulings citing INDOPCO as contrasted with the large number
of Technical Advice Memoranda doing so corroborate this point. 203
Additionally, private letter rulings and most published rulings have
historically been conclusionary with sparse analysis-digest rulings. The
fact specific nature of such rulings does not lend itself to development of
broader principles. A thesis of this article is that the wealth of ruling
experience as to capitalization revealed in pre-INDOPCO General Counsel
Memoranda and post-INDOPCO Technical Advice Memoranda and published Revenue Rulings have set the stage at least for articulating general
principles illustrated by examples and perhaps for structured discretionary
justice as wel1. 204 Following the current incremental path with digest
rulings is likely to result sooner or later in various "limitation riders"
restricting the Service's application of future benefit capitalization to mixed
benefit costs traditionally currently deducted by the taxpayer.
TEl generally urged the Service and Treasury to "promulgate general
guidance" (note that regulations are promulgated, revenue rulings are
published), but in its more detailed discussion it
urges the IRS and Treasury to publish general guidance clarifying the tests
for capitalization or deduction of particular types of expenditures.
Specifically, we urge the government to continue to define the boundaries
of the capitalization guideline articulated in the INDOPCO decision,
including its application to the issues identified in parts V and VI below.
The greatest benefit to the greatest number of taxpayers - and to the
government- will be achieved through the issuance of general guidance.
Where ruling guidelines or principles are extant within the Chief Counsel's
office (but unpublished), we suggest that such guidelines or principles be
publicized in order that taxpayers may have more certainty in properly
preparing their tax returns. 205

In the nine months following TEl's submission, the Service did release some
outstanding TAMs with sound, extensive analysis with sufficient overlap to

200. Comments of TEl on Notice 96-7, supra note 69. TEl has been one of the leading critics of
revenue agents' widespread proposed capitalization of tradtionally deductible expenses in reliance on
JNDOPCO.
201. /d.
202. /d.
203. See note 7 supra.
204. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 103.
205. Comments of TEl on Notice 96-7, supra note 69.
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indicate that "unpublished" guidelines (small, regularly recurring, and shortterm future income) were indeed extant in the Chief Counsel's Office. At
least one National accounting firm publicized these guidelines to its clients
by sending them copies of TAM 9645002 which applied such analysis to
preoperating costs, including employee training costs. 206 The Service
appears to be ignoring TEl's advice as to publicizing such guidelines.
Revenue Ruling 96-62 is more than just another conclusionary digest ruling,
merely holding that training costs, "including the costs of trainers and
routine updates of training materials, are generally deductible as business
expenses . . . even though they may have some future benefit."207 It
announced that "[t]raining costs must be capitalized only in the unusual
circumstance where the training is intended primarily to obtain future
benefits significantly beyond those traditionally associated with training
provided in the ordinary course of a taxpayer's trade or business."208
Ordinary course overlaps recurring and short-term future benefits.
Primarily for significant future benefits beyond ordinary course expenditures
similarly overlaps small. Probably most significant was the traditional
ordinary course factor. The National Retail Federation's Comments urged
the Service to issue a number of public rulings on specific questions
including employee training costs to clarify that "most expenses incurred by
taxpayers in their normal course of business are deductible."209 Similarly,
the Financial Executives Institute argued that common operating expenses
made for the purpose of running a business on a day-to-day basis are
currently deductible. 210 The American Bankers Association explicitly
requested the capitalization of expenses that have been historically deducted
as ordinary and necessary business expenses. 211 But overall, such subtle
reasoning is not to be expected in many revenue agents and especially not
small business people and any of their non-specialist advisers. This is
precisely what TEl and our Submission advised against.

b.

Ideal: Legislative Regulations

206. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996).
207. Rev. Rut. 96-62, 1996-53 I.R.S. I, 6.
208. 1996-53 I.R.S. at 7.
209. National Retail Federation Comments Regarding Further Capitalization Guidance- Notice
96-7 (May 6, 1996), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 98-30 (May
17, 1996).
210. Comments of Financial Executives Institute to the Internal Revenue Service in response to
Notice 96-7 dated June 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY
120-19 (June 19, 1996).
211. Much more soundly the American Bankers Association urged that the standard should be
whether expensing clearly reflects the taxpayer's income. Letter dated May 3, 1996 from Donna J.
Fisher, representing the American Bankers Association to John Moriarty, re: Notice 96-7, available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 98-28 (May 17, 1996).
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Professor Lee proposed to Subcommittee Chair Rangel's 1993 House
Ways and Means Subcommittee's second Hearing on Miscellaneous
Revenue Matters that Congress authorize legislative regulations to be
formulated by the experience the IRS gains from "rulings" applying
capitalization factors which either a code section or the legislative history
would supply. 212 (Professor Lee has since discovered that the Service's
ruling experience before and after INDOPCO supplies sufficient factual
background to act now. Moreover, the recent TAMs display a good grasp
of case law doctrine, 213 unlike the digest published rulings which reveal
only conclusions.). The Subcommittee did not act on this suggestion nor on
the suggestions for taxation of clean up costs. Nor, for that matter, did it
act then on any of the items covered in three days of hearings. So if
IRSffreasury is merely interpreting existing law, a basic question may arise
as to their authority to promulgate "rough justice" solutions arguably going
beyond the case law.
Similar issues as to Treasury's authority to promulgate regulations have
arisen before, e.g., the original Asset Depreciation Range ("ADR")
regulations, 214 indexing basis of capital assets for inflation/ 15 and more
recently the check-the-box notion for elective treatment as a pass-through
or separate entity by most unincorporated entities. 216 On the other hand,
the Chief Counsel's Office has over the years extensively considered the
authority to create safe harbor rules pursuant to its clear reflection of income
mandate under Section 446 and the doctrine of administrative convenience.217 This article advocates that Treasury/IRS should act globally,
providing more detailed and substantive rough justice rules in regulations,
including amortization safe harbors. If such regulations are challenged,
retroactive congressional codification may be available as discussed below.
If the Service instead holds to incrementalism with digest published rulings,
well-reasoned TAMs, and in the end unfettered revenue agents, the end
result is more likely to be "limitation riders" than judicial resolution. The

212. 1993 Hearings, supra note 24, at 1688, 1699, 1705-06; Coolidge, supra note 67.
213.
See notes 18, 206 supra and accompanying text.
See note 232 infra.
214.
21 S. Charles J. Cooper et al., The Legal Authority ofthe Department ofthe Treasury to Promulgate
a Regulation Providing for the Indexation of Capital Gains, 12 VA. TAX REv. 631 ( 1993 ). See also
Linda Galler, Chevron and the Administrative Regulation of Indexation: Challenging the Cooper
Memorandum, 56 TAX NOTES 1791 (1992); Lawrence Zelenak, Does Treasury Have Authority to Index
Basis for Inflation?, 55 TAX NOTES 841 (1992).
216. See Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701-1 through -3 (as amended in 1996). Joint Committee Chief of
Staff Kenneth Kies has questioned whether Treasury has the authority to issue these regulations. Heidi
Glenn, JCT to Go Public about Private Meetings, 73 TAX NOTES 1007 (1996) (Kies recommends
legislation to codify new regulation). See generally Fleischer, supra note 129.
217. See notes 278-301 infra and accompanying text
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Administration's strategy is not really apparent. Stonewalling the audit
activities of agents has no likelihood of success, but often seems a sign of
coming capitulation.

c.

"Interpretative" Regulations: Distilling/Codifying Case Law

Looking back no further than the 1954 Code, three historical patterns
of drafting regulations which codify case-law rules, and more rarely
principles, come to mind. They mirror Professor Davis' paradigm of
evolution of administrative rule making. 218 Such evolution is more fully
discussed below. The first stage is just announcing the conclusion on stated
facts. The Service has aptly referred to comparably laconic published rulings
as "digest" rulings. This in effect was the pattern of the IRS!freasury 199396 capitalization/expensing rulings, sadly including at first blush Revenue
Ruling 96-62. 219 IRS considers only ordinary course of business training
costs with extemely conclusionary reasoning instead of the full range of start
up costs in business expansion and excellent reasoning provided in
Technical Advice Memorandum 9645002/20 from which ·Revenue Ruling
96-62 appears to be digested. The next rung up the evolutionary ladder of
agency rule making, but still in the first stage, is promulgating temporary
regulations in question and answer form, which still mostly state the
question and conclusion but may offer some explanation. 221 In the second
stage the Service develops from its ruling or audit experience general
principles or more often rules implementing the general principles. The
Section 183 regulations' nine profit motive factors, derived primarily from
the case law, well illustrate this stage. 222 In a sense the original 1955
version of the Section 355 regulations with numerous examples illustrating

218. See DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 41. See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Discretionary
Decisionmaking in the Regulatory Agencies, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 101, 103, 117 (1983)("Davis envisions
a process through which initially wide discretion is nanowed- first by standards, then by principles, and
finally by rules."). For the classic description of incremental decisionmaking by administrative agencies
see Lindblom, supra note 42, at 80-88.
219. Rev. Rul. 96-62, 1996-53 I.R.B. 6. Further study of this ruling in light of the submission of
comments pursuant to Notice 96-7 reveals hints as to the reasoning of the Service, but still excessively
opaque compared to Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002. See notes 206-08 supra and accompanying text.
220. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996).
221.
See, e.g., Temp. Treas. Reg.§§ 1.40J(a)-20, 53 FED. REG. 31837 (1988); l.l(i)-IT, 52 FED.
REG. 33579 (Sept. 4, 1987); 54.4976-JT, 51 FED. REG. 31837 (1986); 1.267(a)-2T, 49 FED. REG. 46995
(Nov. 30, 1984); J.J041-JT, 49 FED. REG. 34452 (Aug. 31, 1984).
222. Treas. Reg.§ J.l83-2(b) (1972). See Lee, Section 183 and Beyond, supra note 76, at 395444, 485-86; accord, Benz v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 375 (1975); Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner,
497 U.S. 154, 171, 174 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). This article served as a frame for a number
of issues considered by the Service in its early position papers on "abusive" tax shelters. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 36,577 (Feb. 26, 1976) and O.M. 18,380 (Dec. II, 1975). Of all of the impacts of Professor Lee's
work on regulations, rulings and legislation, he is most proud of this from a populist perspective.
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a few rules or hidden principles and rules without disclosing the
standards, 223 also serves as an exemplum. 224 In any event, the preamble
to any proposed capitalization/expensing regulations along these lines should
identify sources of the examples much as the earliest Section 385 proposed
The third level in the evolution of
regulations' preamble did. 225
administrative rulings is "structured discretionary justice" where regulations
set forth specific factors to be used in balancing tests or rules implementing
the general principles or standard of the statutory provision. 226 Professor
Lee has long thought that the best example is the revised Section 355
regulations, 227 with the new Revenue Procedure on business purposes. 228
These regulations provide (a) the factors to be used in implementing the
standards, (b) balancing tests for applying the factors with directions for
striking the balance, and (c) numerous examples applying all of this. 229
Two unacceptable regulation drafting patterns are (1) the hyperlexis as
in the Section 385 regulations purportedly mechanizing the debt-equity
factors, but really just shifting to the more manageable (i.e., compromisable

223. Treas. Reg.§ 1.355-1 (1989), 20 Fed. Reg. 8,875, at 8913-14 (1955).
224. Almost three decades ago Georgetown Law Center Professor Peter Weidenbruch ably and
memorably taught Professor Lee that lesson with those regulations and its commentators (cited in John
Lee, Functional Divisions and Other Corporate Separations under Section 355 after Rafferty, 27 TAX
L. REv. 453-98 (1972) [hereinafter Lee, Functional Divisions]. He then thanked Professor Weidenbruch
for his influence on the Rafferty piece and Tax Court Judge C. Moxely Featherston for patiently teaching
him the first skills of legal writing. He recalls their help frequently and ever will be thankful.
225. 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957 (March 24, 1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 86,438, reprinted in 1981-1 C.B. 141;
47 Fed. Reg. 141, reprinted in 1982-1 C.B. 531. See also Preamble to Proposed Continuity of Interest
and Business Enterprise Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 361, 362 (Feb. 3, 1997); 61 Fed. Reg. 60,540-41
(Nov. 29, 1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 58,159 and 58,154 (Nov,. 19, 1996); 60 Fed. Reg. 66,5002; 60 Fed. Reg.
66,228; 60 Fed. Reg. 54,942; 60 Fed. Reg. 39,109, 39110; 60 Fed. Reg. 37,578, 37579; Preamble to
Survivor Benefits. Distribution Restrictions and Various Other Issues under the Retirement Equity Act
of /984, 53 Fed. Reg. 31,837 (Aug. 22, 1988).
226. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 41.
227. Professor Lee understands from Mark Yecies, drafter of the 1977 proposed revisions to the
Section 355 regulations, that Lee, Functional Divisions, supra note 224, guided that revision. See also
Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,069 (Nov. 5, 1974); Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,387 (Aug. 25, 1975). Not yet knowing
that, Professor Lee praised the 1977 proposals but suggested that they failed to take account of Rafferty's
"impairment of equity" notion. John Lee, Proposed Regs. Under 355 Overhaul Device Test and SingleBusiness Divisions, 46 J. TAX. 194 (1977). The final regulations marvelously implement the concept
with the "related function" rule. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(iv)(C) (as amended in 1992) and the cross
referenced examples 10 and 11 of Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(c) (as amended in 1989). Now there is
regulation drafting as an art. See Lee, Structured Discretionary Justice. supra note 153.
228. Rev. Proc. 96-30, 1996-19\.R.B. I. See generally Letter from Mark J. Silverman of Steptoe
& Johnson, LLP, to Leslie B. Samuels et al. (May 2, 1996) ("carefully crafted, balanced attempt by the
IRS to revise its ruling standards to respect business realities."), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 89-46 (May 6, 1996).
229. Study of these regulations was the laboratory for Professor Lee's first thinking about these
things.
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in audit) bifurcation arena; 230 and (2) arguably the misstatement of general
case-law principles as under the temporary Section 338 regulations
addressing year 2 contingent income of target corporation as a cost-basis
acquisition with earn-out contingent consideration. 231
The administrative costs of creating and then applying mature
capitalization versus expensing factors regulations might be large. But the
likely revenue costs of not applying them also is apt to be large since the
most likely consequence will be a current deduction sooner or later through
litigation or legislation. But the administrative and revenue costs might not
be as great for the mid-1990's transactions as GAO findings and CEP audits
as the 1980's acquisitions might indicate. That data probably reflects more
the leveraged buyouts of the 1980s than the more frequent stock merger of
the 1990's, with carryover basis and thus no cost basis of "purchased"
intangibles to dispute. Moreover ISP's and reportedly IRS agents in audits
are already examining post-INDOPCO issues, thus administrative costs
saved by not applying a multifactor regulatory approach with uniform
amortization periods are apt to be spent in audit and litigation.

d.

Bold, Ahead of the Curve Regulations Subsequently Codified by
Congress

A bold, politically risky strategy is to promulgate regulations going
beyond the case law as to uniform amortization periods based on the clear
reflection of income override as to tax accounting method (which includes

230. The drafters of the proposed Section 385 regulations reasoned that the reasonable interest or
''bifurcation" rule (bifurcating payment for the single instrument into part debt and part equity)
does not inquire into the nature of the debenture-is it stock or indebtedness? Instead, it
inquires into the nature of the ... advance-is it payment for the debenture or part payment
for the debenture and part contribution of capital? . . . By posing the question in this way,
[this provision] attains three goals. First, it replaces the subjective analysis of the case law
with a definite question-what is the fair market value of the debenture? Second, it remains
responsive to the relevant factors identified by the case law. Many of these factors-e.g.,
maturity date, right to enforce payment, capitalization, ability of the corporation to obtain
loans elsewhere-have a direct bearing on fair market value. [The pertinent provision of the
regulations] weighs these factors according to their effect on the fair market value of the
debentures. Third, [this provision] makes it easier for the Government and the taxpayer to
reach a compromise. Under the case law, debenture is one or the other-stock or
indebtedness. There is not much room for compromise. On the other hand, if the taxpayer
believes that a debenture is worth $400 and the Government believes that it is worth $300,
there may well be a possibility of compromise. The Government does not have to choose
between abandoning its position and driving the taxpayer to litigation.
Preamble, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,956 (March 24, 1980).
231. John W. Lee & Mark Bader, Contingent Income Items and Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions:
Correlative Adjustments and Clearer Reflection ofIncome, 12 J. CORP. L. 137, 235-38 (1987); Michael
L. Schier, Sales ofAssets After Tax Reform: Section 1060, Section 338(h)(1), and More, 43 TAX L. REv.
605 (1988); George K. Yin, Taxing Corporate Liquidations (and Related Matters) After the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, 42 TAX L. REv. 575 (1987).
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capitalization/current deduction practices). Then if commentators criticize
their validity as an interpretation of existing law, Congress can come behind
and codify the principles and most if not all of the rules into legislation.
Historical examples that come to mind of such codification are the Clifford
Regulations, 232 codified by Subpart I of Subchapter J of the 1954
Code; 233 the 1968 revision of the Section 305 regulations, codified by the
Tax Reform Act of 1969;234 and close historical analogy of the 1971
proposed Asset Depreciation Range depreciation regulations which were
partially codified by the Revenue Act of 1971.235 Significantly in the
latter instance Congress specifically approved of the simplification
approaches taken in the proposed ADR regulations:
The committee recognizes that many of [the] elements contained in the
ADR system (including repeal of the reserve ratio test) are designed to
achieve significant simplifications in the administration of the depreciation
rules by substantially limiting the number of situations in which disputes
are likely to arise based on the particular facts and circumstances of the
individual taxpayer's situation. It is contemplated that these elements of
the ADR system will be incorporated by the Treasury into the class life

232. Colliton, supra note 56, at 289-305, lucidly traces the evolution from Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331 (1940) (short duration of trust, beneficiary was taxpayer's spouse, and retention of control
over corpus results in grantor continuing to be owner of corpus), to Clifford regulations (T.D. 54,488,
1946-1 C.B. 19), which supplied rules aimed at duration of trust, power to control beneficial enjoyment
and retained administrative controls. Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953), held these
regulations invalid. Congress in effect codified the approach of these regulations in the 1954 Code.
233. 1954 Code Sections 671-78. See H.R REP. No. 83-1337, at 63 (1954) (generally follow
approach of regulations but "should be set forth in the statue rather than left to regulations").
234. Patricia A. Metzer, 1he "New" Section 305, 27 TAX. L. REv. 93, 97-101 (1971); Louis A.
Del Cotto & Edwin H. Wolf, 1he Proportionate Interest Test ofSection 305 and the Supreme Court, 27
TAX L. REv. 49, 53-7 (1971).
235. Pub. L. No. 92-178 § 109 (former 1954 Code§ 167(m)). Professor Boris Bittker argued that
Treasury did not have the authority [prior to such statutory authorization] to make such "extraordinary
departures [ranges of class lives and "repair deduction allowance" as to rehabilitation and improvement
expenditures] from widely accepted principles regarding the division between current expenditures and
capital items ...." Boris I. Bittker, Treasury Authority to Issue the Proposed "Asset Depreciation Range
System" Regulations, 49 TAXES 265,266-67 (1971). Possibly prompted by Professor Bittker's point on
repair allowance and capital expenditures, the legislative history states:
It is not intended, however, that expenditures which are clearly of a capital nature, such as,
those which substantially increase the productivity or capacity of an existing identifiable unit
of property or those which modify an existing identifiable piece of property to make it usable
for a substantially different use are to be treated as deductible expenditures under this [repair
allowance] provision rather than as capital expenditures.
H.R REP. No. 92-533, at 34 (1971). See also May 3, 1996 Submission of American Taxation
Association, Committee on Tax Accounting Policy, by Professor W. Eugene Seago in response to
Response to Notice 96-7, available in LEXIS, Fed tax Library, TNT File, 1996 TAX NOTES TODAY 99-81
(May 20, 1996). Professor Lee believes that the Service's clear reflection of income mandate authorizes
granting and mandating deductions in tax years other than those in which
they would be placed under more traditional tax accounting rules. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 34959 (July
25, 1982). See notes 286-89 infra and accompanying text.
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system provided by your committee's bill. 236

At the time of our Submission pursuant to Notice 96-7 we caveated that
it was a risky tactic to invite Congressional attention. We warned of the
danger of a repeat of the 1970's limitation riders prohibiting the Service's
regulation of tax issues without providing a substantive legislative
resolution. This we believed was all the more reason to exclude small
businesses from more theoretically pure capitalization rules. However,
further research and thought on this aspect in connection with Cyclical
A{rcraft Maintenance Costs led to the conclusion that Congress' attention
has already been attracted as witness SAIF, soil remediation, and cyclical
aircraft maintenance costs. 237 We believe that this makes the case for an
overall regulatory approach rather than piecemeal rulings which threaten to
follow a pattern of abandoning the Treasury/Service position, unpopular
ruling by ruling. 238
ill. CAPITALIZATION STANDARDS AND RULES
A.

AFTER

INDOPCO

Overview

Why should the doctrinal (and tax policy) analysis not stop with future
benefit in order to more nearly match expenses and income by deferring
deduction of the former until the latter is recognized? The Treasury I
approach to multi-period costs which yielded substantial future benefit was
to capitalize the cost and depreciate it over the period benefitted (with
adjustments throughout the income tax system for inflation). 239 A number
of academics240 and the Treasury staff advocate this approach, generally

236. H.R REP. No. 92-533, supra note 235, at 32.
237. See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text
238. /d.
239. 2 TREAsURY I, supra note 4, at 202-11.
240. Professor Cal Johnson says it most forcefully, seeing probably any deviation a fallacy. See
Calvin H. Johnson, Soft Money Investing Under the Tax Law, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 1019, 1072-77;
Letter dated Jan. 21. 1997 from Professor Cal Johnson to Donald Lubick Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy Re: Notice 96-1, INDOPCO, available in LEXIS Fedtax Library, TNT File, 97 TAX NOTES
TODAY 30-27 (Feb. 13, 1997). Not to be overlooked is Calvin H. Johnson, Capitalization After the
Government's Big Win in INDOPCO, 63 TAX NOTES, 1323 (1994). Treasury's preference may be seen
in TREAsURY I.
Under current law, certain indirect costs, such as fringe benefits and the cost of
borrowing to carry multiperiod production to completion, generally are not capitalized. In
addition, the capitalization rules do not apply uniformly to all activities, and they vary
depending on whether the output is sold or used in the producer's own business. Long-term
contracts, self-constructed assets, inventories, minerals, and timber all have different cost
capitalization rules. The Treasury Department proposals will make the cost capitalization
rules more comprehensive and apply a uniform rule to all multiperiod production activities.
Making cost capitalization rules more uniform would ensure neutrality across types of
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on the grounds of efficiency or perhaps more soundly on neutrality. 241
The short doctrinal answer is that the courts, Congress and the Service have
always tempered the otherwise absolute rule of future benefit results in
capitalization with a host of exceptions. The rationale by-and-large
explaining these exceptions (often unstated) rests on the premise that in
certain circumstances, current deduction of expenditures benefiting future tax
years does not distort a taxpayer's income. The presence or absence of such
distortion should be determined under a sort of "second best,"242 rough
justice balancing of tax accounting and administrative burdens of
capitalizing (and depreciating) future benefit costs with the revenue benefits
to the Fisc of such capitalization. A current deduction would be permitted
where such burdens to the taxpayer, or on more rare circumstances to the
Service alone, outweigh the benefits. In such circumstances current
deduction clearly reflects the taxpayer's income. A better formulation of the
rule is that such deduction does not distort the taxpayer's income more than
minimally.

B.

Timing Distortion of Income

The following proposed rules are derived from the better case and
administrative law "straws in the wind,"243 implementing this notion of

businesses, reduce tax shelters, and improve equity. Uniform rules would eliminate the
current tax incentive for businesses to construct their own plant and equipment, even when
they are not the most efficient producers. In addition, due to the incomplete capitalization
rules, industries with long production processes-the so-called "natural deferral" industries,
such as timber and minerals-are dominated by tax shelter investors. Thus, current law
results in serious dislocations and inequities. Among the many consequences, shelter
investors bid up land prices and drive down product prices in these tax-favored industries; as
a result, low-bracket individuals and businesses with little taxable income to shelter can no
longer earn a sufficient after-tax rate of return from investments in these activities.
I TREASURY I, supra note 4, at 127-28.
·
241. George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1179, 1183
n.l4 (1987), convincingly argues that the case for neutrality, i.e., a tax provision should not modify
behavior unless such modified behavior is preferable to the unmodified behavior, is much easier made
as to a particular tax provision than the case for efficiency, i.e., "behavior that would occur in the
absence of governmental modification probably represents the economy operating as efficiently as
possible, so that any tax-induced modification of this behavior reduces economic efliciency." /d.
242. David S. Davenport, Education and Human Capital: Pursuing an Ideal Income Tax and a
Sensible Tax Policy, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 793, 797, 869-70 (1992) ("mistakes offset each other and
produce a reasonable balance or equilibrium, a kind of 'rough justice"'); Hamish P.M. Hume, Note, The
Business ofLearning: When and How the Cost ofEducation Should be Recognized, 81 VA. L. REV. 887,
911-13 (1995). We view second best more as easier attainable politically or applied than the ideal
solution. See also Hearings on Impact of TRA 1986, supra note 174 (Statement of Commissioner
Goldberg) ("While the laws we have enacted are part of the problem, our regulations and administrative
practices are equally culpable. We must settle for rough justice, we must recognize that the best is the
enemy of the good.").
243. In note 142 supra we outlined Professor Bittker's balancing entry conception undergirding
the Crane doctrine, the tax benefit doctrine, the claim of right doctrine, and the Arrow Smith and Skelly
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mmtmum distortion of income. Expenditures with future benefit are
currently deductible under Section 162 where (1) on the average the "asset"
created by the expenditure provides a "short term" benefit (generally but not
exclusively of one year or less); (2) the expense is "de minimis"; (3) on
average expenditure recurs in a "steady state" or increasing level on a
"roughly" annual basis (say at least every three years 244 ), or (4) where
depreciation is impractical. 245 As a corollary of these rules, if at the time
the expenditure at issue recurs, the prior similar expenditures still will yield
substantial future benefits, then such future benefits are not incidental.
Generally such recurring expenditures should be capitalized and amortized
over the longer period benefitted. Where a substantial expenditure on the
average recurs in a cycle longer than say three years, it generally should be
capitalized as a freestanding amortizable asset (a deferred charge in financial
accounting terms). The amortization period could be determined in a
common law fashion, by regulation drafting based on how often the
expenditure recurs. Uniform amortization periods would save the most
transaction costs.

C.

Character Distortion of Income

The rules as to character distortion are not as well developed as ·the
timing distortion rules. Essentially the current rule is that more than
minimum distortion of income occurs where an expenditure arising out of
a capital or non-tax transaction is currently deducted in full against ordinary
income. Therefore, at this stage the regulation should be limited to the

Oil doctrines. The most audacious of these articles, Boris Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and
the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REv. 277 (1978), spoke of "straws in the wind." In Tufts it shaped the path
the wind blew.
244. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 had 1-3, which is standard interim drafting. Rev. Rul. 96-62 is
more of a digest ruling obfuscating its reasoning. Rather it states that INDOPCO's clarification that
creation of a separate asset was not a prerequisite to capitalization did not
change the fundamental legal principles for determining whether a particular expenditure
can be deducted or must be capitalized. . . . The INDOPCO decision does not affect
the treatment of training costs under section 162. Amounts paid or incurred for training,
including the costs of trainers and routine updates of training materials, are generally
deductible as business expenses under that section even though they may have some
future benefit.
/d. Interestingly the Chief Counsel's Office once believed that a strong case could be made for currently
expensing redredging costs that occurred every three years, but would permit amortization as a
freestanding intangible over the 3 years. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,102 (April I, 1969). See note 149 supra.
This being the case the proposed non-acquiescence as to I 0-year amortization as a freestanding intangible
in A.O.D. CC-1979-221 (Dec. 14, 1979) is puzzling.
245. An example is a writer's prepublication costs due to the impossibility of estimating future
income (for new writers at least) under the income forecast method of depreciation and the impossibility
of determining useful life in such circumstances. Similarly current deduction of soil remediation costs
has been allowed at least in part due to the absence of amortization. See note 21 supra.
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standard of avoiding character distortion, traditionally expressed as the rule
or doctrine of "origin of the claim," which should be expressed more
through examples than definitions for the reasons stated below. The bold
step here, which has the backing of a few commentators and even fewer,
more obscure judicial straws in the wind supporting it than the other rough
justice rules, but still strongly recommended, is to base denial of deduction
of merger costs on the grounds of character distortion. Current deduction
causes character distortion when the corresponding income in the merger
exchange is not recognized by the target corporation either because Section
361 applies or control of target is acquired and no Section 338 election is
made. This would end the growing brouhaha about hostile mergers yielding
no future benefit.
. Although beyond the scope of this article, the following tentative ideal
model for "integration" of the corporate/shareholder tax systems supports the
non-deductibility of most merger costs. The model is a populist adaptation
of Professor Joseph Dodge's two-tier integration model 246 and of Professor
Glen Coven's247 mandatory carryover of basis model for tax-treatment of
corporate acquisitions. Profesor Dodge would couple (a) annual accrual or
realization of gain or loss as to public stock and (b) annual pass-through of
profit (and perhaps losses) as to non-publicly traded stock, with elimination
of the current corporate level tax in both instances. 248 Professor Coven
proposes to treat all transfers of a going corporate business (whether by a
stock or asset transfer, and whether the consideration is stock or other
property) as mandatory carryover basis (and implicitly non-recognition) at

246. Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder
Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REv. 265 (1995).
247. Glen E. Coven, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions: A Proposal for Mandatory Uniform Rules,
44 TAX L. REv. 145 (1989).
248. Dodge, supra note 246, at 266-67 (the rest of the article is rigorous and elegant application
of these ideas). Professor Lee fully agrees with this two tier model. See John Lee, President Clinton's
Copital Gains Proposals, 59 TAX NoTES 1399, 1414, and 1418 (1993) (same proposals in barebones
form). Their reasons are quite different, however, with Professor Lee's being ultimately based on populist
notions of (a) the critical difference between public and closely held corporations being separation of
ownership and control, and (b) and thus the current graduated inside corporate rates where most of the
owners materially participate violating horizontal and vertical equity. See Lee, Entity Classification,
supra note 80, at 67-68, 86-88 and n.ll8, 96, 100-01, 107-08; see also Joseph A. Snoe, Entity
Classification under the Internal Revenue Code: A Proposal to Replace the Resemblance Model, IS J.
CORP. L. 647,649 (1990) (more clear and more elegant articulation of similar model). Professor Lee's
shift from calling for a schedular large business sector tax (or pass-through integration as to public
companies) to annual accrual as to public stock was strongly influenced by David J. Shakow, Taxation
Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REv. II II (1986). Professor
Shalkow's suggestion that closely held companies should be encouraged to go public ignores the real
world of amount of assets (and corollary of amount of income) and absence of outside investors as to
the almost 2,000,000 close C corporations (with very few shareholders on the average) as contrasted with
6,000 or so large public corporations. Instead we should be mandating, or at least encouraging, passthrough treatment as to C corporations where the owners are active in the business.
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the corporate level. 249 Professor Lee's favoring of a passthrough approach
where ownership and management are not separated results in an
"aggregate" approach to an entity where more than one owner/manager is
involved. The essence of the aggregate approach is to treat the owner as
near as possible as if she owned the business directly. 250 Under this
conceptualization two entrepreneuers joining their owner-managed
businesses together would not be taxed because neither has yet disposed of
her business. This is particularly clear in the case of entities actually subject
to Subchapter K of the Code, where built-in gain or loss at the time of the
merger usually must be specially allocated after formation/merger of the
businesses to the owner of the business prior to the merger/formation. m
In short, mergers of publicly traded and closely held corporations with like
corporations ideally should be treated as non-recognition transactions.
Consequently, to allow a current (or any) deduction for the costs of such
income would result in a distortion of income on a character basis rather
than timing basis, as Alan Gunn pointed out over two decades ago. But for
Professor Lee's collaboration with Bittker on his Treatise, Lee would not
have discovered in the late 1970's Gunn's prescient, seminal scholarship
here.zsz
D.

Rough Justice Exceptions to the Future Benefit Capitalization
Presumption

Professor Lee has long advocated the following "rough justice"
rules, 253 now the apparent consensus of practitioner commentators and
taxpayer representatives including many of the submitters (as least as to

249. Professor Coven bases his proposal in large part on the notions that (a) a transfer of an entire
business more resembles the mere continuation of a single corporation and (b) cost basis treatment in
such circumstances constitutes a tax subsidy. Coven, supra note 247, at 148, 158, and 167-68. Professor
Lee agrees with these points but again is more driven to the same conclusion by viewing publicly traded
corporations as made up of employees, business assets and managers with outside capital whose source
is unimportant to the model. Therefore if the first three largely continue (allowing for downsizing) there
is a mere continuation of the corporation.
250. John Lee, Pannership Profits Share for Services: An Aggregate Exegesis of Revenue
Procedure 93-27 (Pan/), 62 TAX NOTES 1733, 1744 (1994); Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 80,
at 89 n.l26.
251. See John Lee, Pannership Profits Share for Services: An Aggregate Exegesis of Revenue
Procedure 93-27 (Pan 2), 63 TAX NOTES 97, 103 (1994).
252. This character distortion of income notion presumably underlies Section 197(h)(7)'s barring
of "amortizable section 197 intangible" status to transactions costs "incurred by parties to a transaction
with respect to which any portion of the gain or loss is not recognized under part III of subchapter C"
governing corporate orgnizations and reorganizations.
253. Lee, Qear Reflection ofIncome, supra note 16, at 25; Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note
19, at 683; accord, Alexander, supra note 16, at 1516-17; /993 Hearings, supra note 24, at 1700
(Statement of Professor Lee).
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steady state recurring and de mmtmis amounts and the balancing
process)254 and of student commentators. 255 Moreover, the Solicitor

254. Comments of Tax Executives Institute, INC. on Notice 96-7 dated March 20, 1996, available
in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 60-19 (March 26, 1996)
the recurring nature of periodic expenses, coupled with the incidental nature of the future
benefit, compels the conclusion that income is more clearly reflected by permitting a current
deduction .... Both the IRS and the courts have stated that expenditures that result in future
benefits do not have to be capitalized if the amount is so small that permitting a deduction
does not distort the clear reflection of income.
Glenn R. Carrington and C. Ellen MacNeil of Arthur Andersen & Co. Comments Regarding the
Capitalization of Re-engineering Costs (in response to Notice 96-7) dated April 30, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 98-29 (May 17, 1996) (recurring); John J.
Motley III, on behalf of the National Retail Federation, Comments Regarding Further Capitalization
Guidance dated May 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY
98-30 (May 17, 1996) (regular and recurring and de minimis rule); Carol Conjura of KPMG Peat
Marwick Comments on INDOPCO in Response to Notice 96-7 dated May 6, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 97-45 (May 16, 1996) (recurring); N. Jerrold Cohen,
American Bar Association, Comments concerning Guidance Regarding Capitalization Issues dated May
13, 1996, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 104-71 (May 28, 1996)
(safe harbor for expenditures with short-Jived benefit [one-year rule]); Stephan G. Dollinger, Comments
by the American Petroleum Institute in response to Notice 96-7 regarding Capitalization Guidance dated
July 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 145-55 (July 25,
1996) (recurring aircraft engine maintenance should be currently deductible); Deborah Walker on behalf
of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Comments on Guidance Under Sections 162 and
263 In Response to Notice 96-7 dated July 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96
TAX NOTES TODAY 165-31 (Aug. 22, 1996) ("costs a business incurs to attract and maintain customers.
Such expenditures are ordinary, recurring business expenditures. They may involve payments for shelf
space, advertising, sales commissions, bonuses to customers or numerous other marketing expenditures").
See also Steven Gerard, The Continuing Controversy over Newark Morning Ledger and the Mass Asset
Rule, 58 TAX NOTES 99, (I 993); C. Ellen MacNeil (writing on behalf of the Cellular Telephone Industry
Association), Cellular Telephone Sales Commissions Expense, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT
File, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY (Oct. 27, 1994)
[C]apitalization and amortization would require measurement, on an annual basis, of the longterm benefit derived from expenses that historically have been viewed as deductible operating
expenses. The impracti+wlity, unfairness and burden of such a rule is apparent and need no
explanation. Second, the tax system would be rife with conflicts between the IRS and
taxpayers about what should be capitalized and over what period the capitalized amount
should be recovered. In short, to require capitalization of the expenses and costs of developing
a customer base whose patronage is not assured contractually for the long-term (e.g., more
than one year) would create problems that far exceed, in magnitude and gravity, the problems
that led to the enactment of section 197. Requiring the authorized agent commissions
addressed herein to be capitalized is a step down that road. Countless operating expense items
in the cellular industry and every other industry will follow.
/d.

255. Note, Distinguishing Between Capital Expenditures and Ordinary Business Expenditures: A
Proposal fora Universal Standard, 12 MICH. J. OF L. REFORM 711,712-13 n.l2, 716,728-38 (1986);
Alexander, supra 16, at 1516-17; John P. LeBlanc, Note, The Supreme Court Attempts to "Iron Out"
the Wrinkles in National Starch, 54 LA. L. REv. 437, 454, 455 (I 993); Note, Tax Treatment of
Prepublication Expenses ofAuthors and Publishers, 82 MICH. L. REv. 537, 546 (1983); Robert F. Brown
& William F. Lee, Note, Deductibility of Start-Up Expenditures Under Section 162- The "'ClearReflection-of-Income" Test, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 618 (1976). On the other hand the "separate asset''
test was rather uncritically accepted by some student commentators. See Note, Income Tax- Costs of
Expanding an Existing Business: Current Deductions Versus Capital Expenditures- North Carolina
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General's office raised similar arguments in INDOPCO as to the recurring
component of the model (which is the acid test for the minimum distortion
of income approach).
While capitalization is conceptually necessary for all expenses that create
a material future benefit, the goal of achieving an accurate measure of net
income is a pragmatic one. Expenses of advertising and maintenance
create both present and future benefits, but capitalization is not required as
a practical matter even though some future benefit results, because the
current benefit predominates and the expense is a regularly recurring one,
so you achieve essentially the same statement of income whether you
deduct the entire expense in the current year or whether you amortize a
portion that relates to the future benefit each year. Since the current
deduction for those kinds of recurring expenses would not materially
misstate income, they are allowed?56

National Bank v. United States, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1127 (1982); Edward A. Benjamin, Note,
Deductibility ofInvestigatory Expenses lncu"ed in Business Expansion: North Carolina National Bank
v. United States, 35 ME. L. REv. 423 (1983). For a much more interesting analysis see Timothy E.
Johns, Note, Tax Treatment of the Costs of Internally Developed Intangible Assets, 57 S. CAL. L. REv.
767 (July 1984). The definitive work is Professor George Mundstock's Taxation ofBusiness Intangible
Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1179 (1987). Professor Lee believes that Sarah R. Lyke, Note, INDOPCO,
Inc. v. Commissioner: National Starch Adds Wrinkles to Capital Expenditure Issue, 88 NW. U. L. REv.
1239 (1993), is accurate in its observation that the gloss was not criticized at the time only as to student
commentators. For contemporaneous criticisms see Gunn, supra note 23; Lee & Murphy, supra note 28
at 474-75, 524-25, 537-38, 541-43, 546. Both of these were cited by Note, Commissioner v. Lincoln
Savings & Loan Association: ""Separate and Distinct Asset" as a Condition Sufficient for Capitalization,
2 VA. TAX REV. 315 (1982), which the Northwestern piece does cite. Oh well. See generally Lee, Clear
Reflection of Income, supra note 16, at 51-57, 64-67.
256. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 25, INOOPCO, Inc., Petitioner v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1991 WL 636242 (No. 90-1278) ("lNOOPCO Oral Argument
Transcript''). Justice Blackmun changed the subject. "What about a hostile takeover, and expenses
incurred in connection with that?" /d. But later the question of a basic standard was raised again and
Assistant Solicitor General Kent Jones again advocated a "pragmatic" or rough justice test.
QUESTION: But what do you think the test is, Mr. Jones, for knowing what must be
capitalized and what isn't? What is the taxpayer to apply as the test in preparing a return?
MR. JONES: The test is a functional one of properly matching expenses with the years they
benefit income, but it's a pragmatic test at the same time. It's not pushed to extremes. We allow
-by regulation and rules we allow advertising expenses to be deducted currently, even though to
some extent QUESTION: Well, is it possible to articulate the test in any- at any level of generality, and isn't
the tax Jaw an area where it's desirable to have some kind of clear standard?
MR. JONES: It is - it is possible to, as I've already tried to do, articulate the functional test.
Given the functional test, it is possible, and the courts have articulated categorical rules, but the
rules are subject to exceptions. It is, for example, a categorical rule that courts have consistently
held that reorganizational expenses should be capitalized. It is a categorical rule that advertising
expenses, on the other hand, may be deducted currently, but we nonetheless recognize exceptions.
For example, advertising that was designed solely to promote a product not yet in production
would be capital in character, and they would be required to be capitalized and either amortized
- and amortized over some appropriate period.
/d. at 28-29. See also id. at 39
MR. JONES: I'd like to discuss the suggestion of petitioner that in Lincoln Savings the Court
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The Chief Counsel's Office in TAM 96-45-002 recently reasoned
correctly that:
Capitalization is not required for every expenditure that produces a future
benefit. This proposition was explicitly stated by the Supreme Court in
INDOPCO when it noted that the mere presence of an incidental future
benefit may not warrant capitalization. 503 U.S. at 87. Further, the logical
extension of requiring capitalization of all costs that produce future income
is that almost every business expenditure is capitalizable. That this position
proves too much was acknowledged by the court in Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1982)(cost of
editorial services in developing a new book held to be capital), rev 'g T.C.
Memo. 81-255 (1981). In that case, the court started with the proposition
that where income is generated over a period of years, the expenditures
should be classified as capital. 685 F.2d at 214. But the court went on to
note the practical difficulties in using this approach which would result in
practically every expenditure being capitalized. 685 F.2d at 217. The court
reasoned that the distinctions between recurring expenditures and
nonrecurring expenditures provides a crude demarcation in determining
whether an expenditure should be capitalized or deducted currently. /d.
Based on these distinctions, the court held that the royalties at issue were
capital. See also Mountain Paper Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 287
F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1961) (nonrecurring nature of expenditures a factor in
determining that capitalization was appropriate); Rev. Rul. 89-23, 1989-1
C.B. 85 (recurring or nonrecurring nature of costs is an important factor
in distinguishing capital expenditures from currently deductible costs).
Although a capitalization result was ultimately reached, Encyclopedia
Britannica is important because the court acknowledged that not every cost
producing future income must be capitalized and that the recurring nature
of expenditures helps distinguish between items that are deductible under
section 162 and those that must be capitalized under section 263.m

adopted the separate and distinct asset test as a panacea for all capitalization questions. In a
literal sense, the fact that an expense creates an asset that is separate and distinct is neither
necessary nor sufficient for capitalization. Prepaid rent expense for 6 months is a distinct
capital asset, but it's fully deductible if it's fully consumed in the current year. A ballpoint
pen is an asset, and it may well provide benefits beyond a single year, but it's folly deductible
as a regularly recurring ordinary business expense.
/d. (emphasis added). These points, of course, were presented on brief. Brief for Respondent at 13-14,
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1983) (No. 90-1278).
257. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996) (footnotes omitted). The TAM continued:
The recurring nature of the costs at issue supports allowing Taxpayer a current
deduction for the pre-opening costs. As noted above, "the distinctions between recurring
expenditures and nonrecurring expenditures provides a crude demarcation in determining
whether an expenditure should be capitalized or deducted currently." Encyclopedia Britannica,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 214 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Rev. Rul. 89-23, supra.
In this case, the pre-opening costs are recurring costs that Taxpayer incurs in operating all its
stores. These costs include the cost of stocking the stores with inventory and supplies, staff
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Unfortunately some of the strength of this reasoning is dissipated with the
publication of Revenue Ruling 96-62 in superficially digest form granting
a current deduction for worker training costs. 258 No explicit reasoning is
provided beyond platitudes that INDOPCO did not change the capitalization
doctrine. The implicit reasoning such as this Article reads into the sparse
statements of facts should satisfy the craft bias of tax academics and
professionals as to complexity. Professor Lee is beginning, however, to
think that if Appeals begins to apply its audit stances as to post-INDOPCO
capitalization of traditonally deductible costs of business operation,
legislative suspension until regulations ideally "negotiated" and employing
"structured discretion" as "rough justice" factors are promulgated might not
be a Second or Third Best or so strategy. It wouldn't be the first nor even
the second time Professor Lee's understanding has evolved here.
The minimum distortion of income/rough justice analysis in TAM 9645-002 is consistent with the leading judicial authorities and administrative
reasoning. Justice Harry Blackmun in Lincoln Savings and Loan, now
properly read for the proposition that an expenditure incurred to enhance or
create an asset producing substantial future benefit generally should be
capitalized, 259 caveated that "the presence of an ensuing benefit that may
have some future aspect is not controlling; many expenses concededly
deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable year."260 Justice
Blackmun two decades later in INDOPCO reiterated that the mere presence
of an incidental future benefit may not warrant capitalization. 261 He left
to others the cataloging and explaining of the exceptions.
Judge Richard Posner in Encylopaedia Britannica cautioned that
capitalization of all costs producing future income would result in almost
every business expense being capitalized, an unadministerable result.
If one really takes seriously the concept of a capital expenditure as

training, store promotional costs, utilities, rent and other related miscellaneous expenses for
goods and services already provided to Taxpayer. The recurring nature of these costs suggests
that they should not be capitalized under section 263.
/d.

258. See notes 207-210 supra and accompanying text
259. Black Hills Corp. v. Commissioner, 73 F.3d 799, 805-06 (8th Cir. 1996); Rev. Proc. 90-63,
1990-2 C.B. 664; Rev. Rul. 89-23, 1989-1 C.B. 85; Gen. Couns. Mem. 96-41-004 (Feb. 27, 1987);
Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-41-004 (June 25, 1991); Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-38-002 (June 3, 1994); Tech. Adv.
Mem. 90-24-003 (March 2, 1990).
260. Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. 345, 354. This was the peg for the separate asset doctrine. Gunn,
supra note 23 and Lee & Murphy, supra note 28, showed that the separate asset doctrine was unsound
and not mandated by Lincoln Savings. The doctrine was by and large a reaction to IRS overreaching in
requiring capitalization without allowing any (or only inadequate) depreciation. NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 959;
Lee, Start-Up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 16, at 51-6.
261. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87.
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anything that yields income, actual or imputed, beyond the period ... in
which the expenditure is made, the result will be to force the capitalization
of virtually every business expense. It is a result courts naturally shy away
from .... It would require capitalizing every salesman's salary, since his
selling activities create goodwill for the company and goodwill is an asset
yielding income beyond the year in which the salary expense is incurred.
The administrative costs of conceptual rigor are too great. 262

Professor Boris Bittker had earlier used the same reasoning and example as
Encyclopaedia Britannica:
[I]f the IRS seriously endeavored to disallow every cost contributing to the
profits of future periods, it would be necessary to divide almost every
salary and advertising expense between its immediate impact on the
customer and its contribution to the company's long-lived goodwill.
Recognizing this fact ofbusiness life, the Supreme Court has said that "the
presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is not
controlling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect
beyond the taxable year." 263

The Fourth Circuit panel in NCNB I similarly described these
exceptions as "situations involving considerations of pragmatism and
uncertainty in which, with the blessing of the Commissioner, taxpayers may
deduct currently certain expenditures, notwithstanding the presence of

262. Encyclopedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at217; Tech Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996) (read
opinion for logical extension of future benefit capitalization proves too much and recurring nature helps
distinguish current and capital expenditures); see Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-38-002 (June 3, 1996). Judge
Posner later referred to "considerations of expediency discussed in Encyclopaedia Britannica . . . ."
Fishman v. Commissioner, 837 F.2d 309, 312 (7th Cir. 1988).
263. 1 BORIS I. BITIKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES AND GIFTS ~ 20.4.1, at20-67
(1st ed. 1981) (quoting Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971)).
Professor Lee had long found both statements compelling. Upon rereading Lee, Section 183 and Beyond,
supra note 76, at 462, for this project, he can see why: "increase in earning power or benefit to future
years is not alone sufficient [for capitalization], otherwise all ordinary and necessary business
expenditures resulting in greater profit would have to be capitalized, which is not the law." /d.
(criticizing increase in earning power rationale for capitalizing start-up costs). The "law" Lee had in mind
was above all Judge Tannenwald's concurring opinion in Primuth. (Note that Judge Samuel Sterrett
worte the majority opinion in Primuth and decided the sleeper Wolfsen Land and Cattle.) He had been
a clerk at the Tax Court when it was decided in court review and recalls the excitement we all felt at the
new development Then Lee might know the rule, but not likely the reason therefor. In any event, once
Lee mapped out the minimum distortion of income/rough justice exception to future benefit capitalization
model, if start-up costs and clear reflection of income isn't attention grabbing enough, he'll keep on
sorting out the rough justice rules and restating them and the minimum distortion of income standard.
Lee keeps on chewing that old rag, because he keeps finding proof in the case law, Service or staff
policies and commentary that his trouble or better care is worth it. Lee is grateful to all who have
encouraged that care over the years, not the least of which has been repeated scholarship support from
the College of William and Mary and the Law School used on aspects of this subject over the years. And
he thanks all who have listened and given him feedback in the halls, lounges and classrooms or
wherever, and to the critics who helped sharpen the focus. And always Lee thought of Bittker's
pragmatism as he worked on this task.
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probable future benefit."264 The panel majority dubbed this a "not-worththe-trouble exception."265 Judge Tannenwald in Sun Microsystems 266
employed the more neutral term of "incidental future benefits" used in
INDOPC0. 261 In Sun Microsystems the taxpayer, a beginning high-tech
company, argued that issuance of stock warrants to a new, major customer
based upon volume of future purchases constituted sales discounts; while the
Government argued that under the "new look" that was given to the issue
of business expense versus capital expenditure by INDOPCO, the stock
warrants represented the capitalizable cost of an investment opportunity to
develop a long-term relationship with the customer. Judge Tannenwald
responded:
We fmd it unnecessary to refme this claimed "new look" for the pwpose
of our decision herein. In the first place, INDOPCO stands primarily for
the proposition that a separate asset is not necessary in order to
characterize a payment as a capital expenditure. In the second place,
INDOPCO articulated this proposition in the context of a situation which
clearly involved a capital transaction. Finally, the Supreme Court
recognized that, while realization of future benefits is important in
determining existence of a capital expenditure, "the mere presence of an
incidental future benefit - 'some future aspect' - may not warrant
capitalization". INDOPCO . ... '[T]he anticipated long-term benefits to
SMS [the taxpayer] from the relationship with CV [the customer] were
'softer' and were speculative, compared to the immediate benefits to SMS
of the anticipated sales of computer workstations to CV under the Purchase
Agreement."
We conclude that the instant situation falls within the "incidental
future benefit" category reflected in INDOPCO. Cj Snyder v. United
States, 674 F.2d 1359, 1365 (lOth Cir. 1982)(author's expenses in
connection with a book to be published in future held deductible); Primuth
v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374 (1970)(fee in order to secure employment
held deductible); Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57 (INDOPCO does not

264. The Commissioner allows current deductions for some repair and educational expenditures
which will benefit a taxpayer during subsequent tax years. In addition, Congress has made many
exceptions to the general rule, for instance, by providing for the current deductibility of research and
experimental expenditures. See I.R.C. § 174 (1997). Finally, there is a residuum of current expenditures
which will have some future benefit but which "cannot, as a practical matter, be associated with any
other period" and allocation of which "either on the basis of association with revenue or among several
accounting periods is considered to serve no useful purpose. These also are currently deductible. An
example might be the salary of a high corporate officer whose time is not practically allocable between
present operations and future projects.
NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 961-62.
265. /d. at 953.
266. 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 997 (1993).
267. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87 ("although the mere presence of an incidental future benefit' some future aspect [is not controlling, from Lincoln Savings}- may not warrant capitalization .... ).

702

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

preclude deduction of advertising expenses having a future benefit); see
Lee, "Doping out the Capitalization Rules after JNDOPCO ", 57 TAX
NOTES 669 (Nov. 2, 1992); Note, "Deductibility of Takeover and NonTakeover Expenses in the Wake of /ndopco", 45 TAX LAW. 815 (1992).
Indeed, the long-term benefits herein appear to be no different than those
present in stock options given to employees which were held not to impair
their compensatory character even before the enactment of the statutory
framework that now exists. See Commissioner v. LoBue . ... 268

1.

Balancing Test

While the author of the majority opinion in NCNB I probably intended
a disparaging import to the "more trouble" description, he in fact succinctly
described the proper approach to expensing versus capitalization/depreciation. It is a balancing test as shown by the Court of Claims in its
landmark opinion in Cincinnati N. 0. & Tex Pac. RR:
Where the burden on both taxpayers and Service to account for each item
of property separately is great, and the likelihood of distortion of income
is nil or minimal, the Code is not so rigid and so impracticable that it
demands that nevertheless all items be accounted for individually, no
matter what the trouble or the onus. 269

268. The Chief Counsel's Office casts further light on the "incidental benefit'' notion in Tech. Adv.
Mem. 96-45-002 (business expansion costs in the same geographic area generating predominantly shortterm benefits currently deductible notwithstanding incidental future benefits citing Iowa-Des Moines Nat 'I
Bank, Sun Microsystems [importance of immediate sales], and advertising authorities). Judge
Tannenwald, for decades highly regarded for his command of and influence on tax doctrine, played a
major role in developing the doctrine as to capitalization. He was the author of Fort Howard Paper Co.
v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 283 {1967), the seminal reading of Sections 263 (capitalization of
amounts paid for permanent improvements or new buildings) and 446 (taxpayer's tax accounting method
must "clearly reflect income") are "inextricably intertwined. A contrary view would encase the general
provisions of section 263 with an inflexibility and sterility neither mandated to carry out the intent of
Congress nor required for the effective discharge of respondent's revenue-collecting responsibilities.").
Fort Howard in tum provided the conceptual underpinning for Cincinnati N.O. & Tex Pac. RR v. United
States, 424 F.2d 563, 569 (Ct. Ct. 1970), for its adoption of a minimum capitalization rule under the
clear reflection of income standard. (Both cases appeared to have inspired Professor Lee's friend Alan
Gunn.) Moreover, Judge Tannenwald's concurring opinion in Primuth, 54 T.C. at 381, 382, is among
the first to note that educational and advertising expenses are currently deductible despite future benefits.
Judge Tannenwald's opinions 25 to 30 years ago looking across narrow doctrinal lines to underlying
concepts in the business expense and capitalization area inspired Lee back then to try to think that way.
An early attempt along those lines caught Boris Bittker's eye (his letter asking for a reprint has hung
framed on the wall ofl..ee's several offices for the past 24 years) probably resulting in Bittker's honoring
Lee by asking him first (with two others) to Collaborate on his Treatise. That endeavor lead Lee to Alan
Gunn's work and the first steps beyond doctrine. Alan has helped Lee over the years take more. So has
Lee's colleague and friend, Charles Koch, always good at the mot juste as well as beau geste.
269. Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 572. The opinion also noted that "[t]he burden on plaintiff, if the
minimum rule is not to be followed for income tax purposes, would be heavy; at the same time, the
clearer reflection of income would be exceedingly slight if there were any at all." /d. The court found
that the distortion was nil by comparing ''both on a year-to-year basis and on a 17-year overall basis, the
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The Eighth Circuit in Iowa-Des Moines National Bank implicitly endorsed
such a balancing approach: ''where the prospective benefit is very slight,
capitalization is not easily supported. " 270 Again Judge Posner summed it
up well in Encyclopaedia Britannica in rationalizing the current deductibility
of steady-state recurring expenditures: "the benefits of capitalization are
unlikely to exceed the accounting and other administrative costs entailed in
capitalization. " 271
Congress, too, has approved on occasion a balancing approach as to
capitalization versus expensing issues. For instance it authorized Treasury
to take just such that approach to fashioning exceptions under legislative
regulations to the uniform capitalization rules: ''The [Section 263A]
regulations may adopt other simplifying methods and assumptions where, in
the judgment of the Secretary of the Treasury, the costs and other burdens
of literal compliance may outweigh the benefits."272 The Service based
the Notice 88-62273 safe harbor on just that easing of administrative
complexities. The Notice granted an elective safe harbor for tax accounting
for qualified costs incurred by authors, photographers, and other artists in
producing creative properties. Eligible taxpayers could capitalize all
aggregated qualified creative production costs incurred during the taxable
year and deduct 50% of such costs in that year and 25% of such costs in
each of the two succeeding tax years. 274 The Service explained in Notice
88-62 that this creative costs safe harbor was provided in response to
Congress' (a) awareness of possible administrative complexities of
application of Section 263A (and depreciation now under Section 167(g))
and (b) its grant of rulemaking authority under Section 263A to "adopt ...
other simplifying methods" under a balancing test of costs and burdens of
literal compliance outweighing the revenue benefits, similar to that proposed
in this article. It did not hurt that Congress was in the process of

disallowed minimum rule expenses . . . to the amount of depreciation that would have been allowed
under the defendant's method." /d. at 571-72. See generally Gunn, supra note 23, at 456-7. Alan
pointed to the exceptions to future benefit capitalization for tools, professional books and equipment, and
work uniforms, concluding that
In none of these cases will a current deduction reflect income more clearly than would
capitalization and depreciation, but the burden on the taxpayer of accounting for such costs
through capitalization and depreciation would not justifY the small increase in the accuracy
of determining taxable income that would result from capitalization.
/d.
270. Iowa-Des Moine Nat') Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979).
271. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 215.
272. S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 76, at 142. See id. at 140 ("appropriate exceptions where
application of the rules might be unduly burdensome.").
273. Section 3.02, 1988-1 C.B. 548.
274. H.R. REP. No.I00-795 (1987) (implied safe harbor clearly reflected income).
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retroactively carving such costs out from Section 263A anyway. 275
Benefits of capitalization may be analyzed on several levels: (1) the
horizontal equity of treating most all costs benefiting at least several tax
years (i.e., 4 or more) alike. This would effect the tax policy goals of
neutrality or economic efficiency and horizontal equity and is probably the
position of Treasury staff. (2) Benefit to the courts applying such a
balancing test to capitalization means whether over a multi-year period
capitalization will yield more revenues to Treasury than expensing would.
This analysis comes closest to Professor, now Judge, Sneed's tax policy of
adequacy of revenues. 276
The burdens of capitalization can be analyzed as well on several levels.
The administrative burdens to the taxpayer are greatest where no or
inadequate depreciation is available or the small taxpayer for whom record
keeping is difficult. Also the administrative burden is great where the
Service and taxpayers have frequent audit and litigation disputes. This is
then Professor now Judge Sneed's tax policy factor of simplicity. 277
2.

Administrative Convenience

The Service has not yet explicitly adopted such a balancing approach
to resolving expensing versus capitalization issues. From time to time,
however, the Chief Counsel's Office has recommended adoption of one or
another of the rough justice exceptions advocated in this article. Generally
that Office's rationale for such recommendation has been "administrative
convenience."278
Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,968,279 advocating without

275. Writer's Prepublication Costs, supra note 40, traces the 1987 and 1988 efforts culminating
in the exclusion of "creative costs" from Section 263A.
276. Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria ofFederal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN, L. REv. 567, 569-70
(1965); Edward Yorio, The President's Tax Proposals: A Major Step in the Right Direction, 53
FORDHAM L. REv. 1255, 1263 (1985) ("In its narrower sense, the adequacy criterion refers to the
aggregate revenue effect of a particular provision in the tax law. If a proposed change in the Internal
Revenue Code will result in a significant loss in revenues, the criterion is badly served. If the proposal
will generate additional revenues, the criterion is satisfied." (Footnotes omitted).)
277. Sneed, supra note 276, at 573; Yorio, supra note 276, at 1256-57.
278. Package design procedures explicitly state that various safe harbor amortization rules are for
"administrative convenience" to "minimize controversies." Rev. Proc. 90-63, Sec. 3.05, 1990-2 C.B.
664, 665; Rev. Proc. 89-17, Sec. 3.02, 1989-1 C.B. 827. (Rev. Rut. 89-23, 1989-1 C.B. 85, required
capitalization of package design cost with a useful life of greater than one year.) Since Rev. Proc. 90-63
the Service's Examination Division has allowed taxpayers to change their method of tax accounting for
package designs and elect any one of the 3 methods outlined in the revenue procedure. This practice
was formally approved in the Food ISP, Sept. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File,
93 TAX NOTES TODAY 179-33 (Aug. 27, 1993). Commentators have referred to Rev. Proc. 90-63 as
"administrative grace". Hal Gann & Roy Strowd, INDOPCO - Time for the Second Shoe To Drop, 69
TAX NOTES 1045 (1995). Then Assistant Chief Counsel (Income and Tax Accounting) Glenn Carrington
held up the package design settlement as a model for capitalization issues. IRS Environmental Cleanup
Guidance May Be Out By July, Official Says, 1993 DAILY TAX REPoRT 89 d15 (May 11, 1993)
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success a current deduction safe harbor for writer's prepublication costs,
extensively discussed the concept of administrative convenience. The GCM
pointed out that there was ample legal precedent for capitalizing such
prepublication costs because they yield future benefits in the form of a
manuscript intended to produce royalties. 280
While there would thus appear to be a sound legal basis for requiring
authors to capitalize all of their expenses, such a requirement gives rise to
considerable practical difficulty in the case of a professional author, whose
work over a period of time will encompass numerous literary projects.
Particularly where such an author works on several projects during a
taxable year, as may often be the case, it would be most difficult for him
to capitalize and allocate to particular projects all of his recurring-type
costs, such as rent, supplies, and secretarial assistance. To make such an
allocation with any degree of accuracy would in many cases require the use
of a rather complex cost-accounting system, based on careful records of
time spent on various projects. And in many cases the actual tax effect of
recovering expenses through capitalization would be little different from
recovering them through current deductions, since a professional author

A second option would be to publish an analysis similar to that for package design,
under which taxpayers would capitalize the costs and write them off over a period of
five years or I 0 years, Carrington said. However, IRS is concerned that many taxpayers
would not buy into that system, he said. "It may help people in the very gray area and
other people would continue to do what they're doing and it won't be useful," he said.
Asked whether IRS believes it has regulatory authority to "arbitrarily" require
capitalization over a fixed period, such as five years or 10 years, Carrington responded,
"It would be arbitrary, but we've done arbitrary-reasonably arbitrary-things in the
past"
/d. It might be noted that the Service had gone through a few gyrations in treatment of package design
costs before arriving at this resolution. Rev. Rul. 89-23 requires package design costs incurred after 1986
to be capitalized. The ruling originally stated that the cost of package designs could not be amortized
under Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 because a useful life could not be ascertained. Rev. Proc. 90-63 revoked
Rev. Proc. 89-16, 1989-1 C.B. 822, and Rev. Proc. 89-17, 1989-1 C.B. 827.
279. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,968 (November 18, 1968).
The ruling to be published should make clear that the decision to permit current deduction
of overhead-type expenses is based on administrative, rather than legal considerations, so that
the Service will not be prejudiced in litigating cases involving taxpayers other than
professional authors in which it is deemed appropriate to take a position that overhead-type
expenses should be allocated to acquisition of a capital asset rather than deducted.
!d.
280. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,968 (November 18, 1968).
The principal published rulings on this point, I.T. 1287 and Rev. Rul. 68-194, indicate a
Service position to the effect that an author may never currently deduct expenses incurred in
writing books, but must capitalize all expenses by allocating them to his basis in particular
manuscripts. This position would appear to have a sound legal basis in section 263(a), since
it can be said that expenses incurred by an author in writing a book are costs of improving
the value of property, i.e., the manuscript, within the meaning of section 263(a). There is
even considerable legal support for requiring capitalization of overhead-type expenses, such
as office rent and secretarial salaries.
/d.
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may be expected to have continuing income from his writing over the
years, as well as continuing expenses of an overhead nature.
In view of the foregoing considerations, we believe the Service should
adopt an administrative policy of permitting professional writers to deduct
currently their expenses of a continuing nature, and we recommend
publication of a ruling to state such a policy. 281

Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,262282 indicates the nature of some of Chief
Counsel's administrative concerns in this area. That GCM recommended that
the Service "administer the deductions attributable to the cost of such
elements [e.g., purchased customer lists covered twenty-three years later in
Section 197] with rulings or revenue procedures rather than have the courts
do it on the authority of Cohan. The latter type determinations (Manhattan
is an example) are not predictable."283 The Chief Counsel's Office has

281. /d. Note the emphasis on burden to the taxpayer and minimal increase in revenues to the
Treasury. No ruling was ever issued; instead the Government lost its denial a refund claim by a
professional writer for a deduction as to prepublication costs. To similar effect as Gen. Couns. Mem.
33,968, see Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,410 (June 18, 1980). In articulating "the proper standard for
determining whether a cost is a capital expenditure under I.R.C. § 263," it stated that
We previously considered these cases in G.C.M. 35,116, ••• I-4895 (Nov. 14, 1972)
and in a proposed G.C.M. in ••• I-4178 and expressed the opinion that any expenditure
resulting in either the acquisition of an asset having an economically useful life beyond the
taxable year of acquisition or the securing of an advantage having a life greater than one year
constitutes a capital expenditure. We also noted that the recurrent (or nonrecurrent) nature
of the expenditure is an appropriate basis on which to distinguish capital from ordinary
expenses. Applying these standards, we concluded that the expenses incurred in ••• were
nonrecurring expenses that would substantially benefit future periods through acquisition of
the core of a credit system and were, therefore, capital expenditures. Further, we concluded
that, with the exception of timetable costs and station rentals, the expenses in ••• were
nonrecurring expenditures that would substantially benefit future periods and, therefore, were
capital expenditures.
While we believe our position has substantial merit, we accept your [separate asset]
approach as outlined above and its application to these cases in view of the practical
considerations involved, including the lack of sympathetic appeal of our position due to the
total denial of deductions and the continued losses in the circuit courts. See Briarcliff Candy
Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.ld 775 (2d Cir. 1973); Jack's Cookie Co. v. United States, 597
F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1979). This, of course, will not resolve the myriad questions concerning
what is and is not a separate asset or property interest that will have to be answered in future
cases.
/d. (Emphasis added).
282. January 30, 1970, considering Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65.
283. The GCM has attached a Tax Court Division of Chief Counsel's Memorandum dated
November 19, 1969, which is the source of the quotation in text and which offered the following
equitable solution.
Third, inasmuch as the amount of litigation in this area is increasing, it may be
appropriate to discuss the question with the Assistant Commissioner (Technical) to determine
whether some of the problems can be handled with rulings or procedural guidelines rather
than litigation. It may be that some portions of the cost of an asset traditionally considered
to be a "mass asset'' represent depreciable elements of such asset. In the long run it may be
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recommended in a handful of other private rulings a position on the basis
of administrative convenience while believing that the correct technical
interpretation of the law was to the contrary. Hopefully not typical was
General Counsel Memorandum 35,044/84 where the Chief Counsel did not
object on grounds of administrative convenience to treating a federal
employee as receiving in 1971 a payroll check (dated January 1, 1971)
deposited for credit in his checking account on December 31, 1970, but
asked that no public ruling be made. 285

to the interest of the Service to administer the deductions attributable to the cost of such
elements with rulings or revenue procedures rather than have the courts do it on the authority
of Cohan. The latter type determinations (Manhattan is an example) are not predictable: We
cannot determine without a litigation how much of the cost of a particular "mass asset''
represents a depreciable element Nor are we presently aware of an accepted factual basis
upon which such an apportionment of costs can be made. We think that a precedent
establishing the use of Cohan on this issue will lead to excessive litigation. Generally, the
taxpayer will come away with something and therefore it will be to his interest to litigate.
Moreover, for similar reasons we also suggest that some consideration be given to the
problem of the useful life of each particular element of the depreciable portion of the "mass
asset," assuming that the Manhattan approach is followed. Specifically, would it not be
feasible to allow taxpayers to establish an average useful life by proving the useful life of a
representative number of the elements of such asset Using Manhattan as an example, and
accepting the Tax Court's determination that 75 percent of the cost of the laundry customer
list is allocable to depreciable elements, would it not be feasible, from the administrative point
of view, to allow the taxpayer to establish the period over which such asset is to be written
off by showing the useful life of the representative number of customers on the list. Thus,
if the taxpayer was able to show that the length of time he will continue doing business with
the customers in the representative sample is five years, an amortization period of five years
could be used rather than requiring him to prove the useful life of the data relating to each
and every customer on the list. It may also be possible for taxpayers to establish statistically
that a specified percentage of the elements of the "mass asset'' will be consumed by the end
of a time certain. An amortization period could be based upon such a "fail rate" and would
produce the "reasonable allowance" required under section 167. Compare sections 1.47-3,
1.47-4, and 1.47-5 of the regulations and Rev. Rul. 67-378, 1967-2 C.B. 45, the latter
containing the standard mortality dispersion table which taxpayers may use to compute the
qualified investment in mass assets in lieu of data from their own experience.
/d. at 14-16 (footnote omitted). Gen. Couns. Mems. 34,006 and 34,105 (Jan 2, and April 22, 1969,
respectively) also recommended Cohan-like "rough approximations." (The Cohan doctrine is discussed
in Part Two.). Extensive analysis of some of the issues in such rough approximations are discussed in
Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,994 at pp. 7-9 (Dec. II, 1968), considering Rev. Rul. 69-78, 1969-l C.B. 61.
284. September 20, 1972.
285. [W]e recognize that based solely on administrative convenience your conclusion has
some merit. To achieve the correct legal result herein would cause great difficulty in
preparing Forms W-2 and for data processing operations, since the Form W-2 generally
controls the amount of compensation received in a year. Adoption of the conclusion we
believe to be correct could force a time consuming reprogramming effort and force agencies
to confer with individual employees before preparing year-end Forms W-2.
Thus, because of these administrative considerations we have no objection to your
position. However, if it is challenged in court, we will have much difficulty defending it.
Therefore, we suggest that you reconsider publication of this ruling.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,004 (Sept. 20, 1972).
Similarly, Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,109 (Nov. 10, 1972), recommended hiding the ball in Rev. Rul. 73-188
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This contradistinction between administrative convenience and the
conceptually pure rule may have been part of the reason why the
Commissioner frequently, even mostly, ignored the Chief Counsel's
recommendations of simple solutions to the tax treatment of expenditures
benefitting present and future tax years. 286 Another issue may be that
audit does not have to face the courts as Chief Counsel does. As discussed
above, 287 these solutions should be viewed instead as rough justice or
equitable solutions, easier to administer and fair on the average, in lieu of
more theoretically correct rules. This is especially so where the standard is
clear reflection of income. Rough justice rules implement the more practical
minimum distortion of income gloss. An oblique indication that the Chief
Counsel's Office may be coming around to balancing burdens and benefits
of capitalization/depreciation may be seen in TAM 96-38-002288 where for
the first time a TAM cited Iowa-Des Moines for the proposition that where
the future benefit is slight the burdens of capitalization/depreciation will
outweigh such benefit, resulting in a current deduction. Unfortunately the
strength of TAM 96-38-002 is undercut by the issuance of Rev. Rul. 96-62
in an almost digest form. 289

3.

Clear Reflection of Income Authority

Other Chief Counsel's Office analyses of rough justice expensing/capitalization rules do indeed focus on the Commissioner's broad enforcement

by stating that the useful life of a depreciable "business advantage" (governmental mandated
improvements benefiting and paid for by the taxpayer but belonging to the governmental unit when really
he period stated was only the period over which the taxpayer had to make the payments. Much more
defensible was Chief Counsel's reasoning in Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,074 (Nov. II, 1974), considering
Rev. Rul. 75-62, 1975-1 C.B. 188: "In view of the lack of any demonstrable legislative purpose or legal
reason, we think it appropriate to consider questions of administrative convenience."
286. Chief Counsel suggested administrative convenience safe harbor rulings (that were never
published) as to minimum capitalization, current deduction of writer's prepublication expenses, and
separate asset test as to business expansion, see notes 291-94 and 307 infra and 279-280 and note 18,
supra respectively.
287. See supra notes 254-56.
288. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-38-002 (June 3, 1996); see Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 (June 21,
1996) (cited Iowa-Des Moines for the proposition that "expenditures to produce current income are
deductible currently even though some incidental future benefit may result"). Both TAMs are very well
written and reasoned as well as a joy to deconstruct. Georgetown Law Center Professor Peter
Weidenbruch, Jr., then director of the LL.M. in Taxation program and later Assistant Commissioner
Technical in charge of IRS rulings, taught Professor Lee to tum to law reviews first for research and
turned him on to Section 355 and deconstructing regulations. Auditing now Emeritus Professor Art
White's Tax Research Methods at William and Mary (in preparation for teaching it), further honed tea
leaf reading of Government documents. LEXIS research over the past few years in the Fed tax Library,
Memos and Rels files has added immeasurably to my understanding ofhow the Office of Chief Counsel
institutionally approaches issues. Lee is ever thankful to our Law Librarian Professor Jim Heller and
LEXIS.
289. See notes 18 and 208-11 supra and accompanying text.
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authority under the clear reflection of income standard. That standard lies
at the heart of capitalization as ably recognized by the Court of Claims in
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway v. United States following
Judge Tannenwald's lead in his Fort Howanf 90 opinion. In General
Counsel Memo 34,959291 Chief Counsel's Office recommended a
"minimum capitalization rule," derived from Cincinnati, New Orleans &
Texas Pacific Railway v. United States, 292 that would have provided a
practical guide for any taxpayer having small items used in her trade or
business or in the production of income. Purchases under $100 could
automatically be expensed while larger amounts benefitting future years also
could be expensed if such method of tax accounting "is generally accepted
by the accounting profession for that industry and produces no distortion of
income. "293 The GCM bottomed this rule on the clear reflection of
income standard of Section 446 which also underlies the capitalization rules.
The scheme of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is to tax income
in the year it should properly be taxed pursuant to appropriate accounting
methods and standards. Thus, the accounting provisions (e.g., Code§§ 446
and 461) generally operate to override the more specific deduction or
nondeduction provisions. A deductible item is to be deducted in the year
paid or incurred unless a proper application of the accounting provisions
requires or permits a different result.
Code §§ 446 and 461 provide the general authority to prohibit
deductions in the year the expense item is paid or incurred if to allow the
deduction in that year would not clearly reflect income. See G.C.M. 3454 7,
*** 1-3029 (July 1, 1971), at 2. However, Code§ 446(b) and (c) provides
the Commissioner with very broad authority to determine (1) whether a
particular taxpayer's method clearly reflects income, and (2) whether
particular methods of accounting generally may be used by various
taxpayers even though such methods may deviate in certain respects from
traditional tax accounting methods. Thus, while we believe those
provisions provide authority for the Commissioner to prohibit deductions
where such is necessary to prevent a distortion of taxable income, we also
believe they provide authority for the Commissioner to permit certain
deductions where a deduction is seemingly proscribed by a particular

290. Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 569 ("this court agrees that the capitalization and depreciation
provision ... and the method of accounting provision ... are 'inextricably intertwined' and must be
used in conjunction in deciding the ultimate success of the taxpayer's method in clearly reflecting
income.").
291. July 25, 1972.
292. Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 571-2, approved a minimum expensing rule of $500 which ICC
required railroad companies' accounting systems to follow. Gunn, supra note 23, at 457 n.61, points
out that the 1954 ALI Draft Code contained a $500 minimum capitalization rule expenses. That would
be more than $2,500 in current dollars.
293. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959, supra note 66, at 3-4.
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provision of the Code.
We recognize that by regulations and longstanding ruling practice the
Service has definitely limited the Commissioner's discretion in this area.
However, we are unaware of any such limits that would prevent the
exercise of the discretion we now propose. As we suggested in G.C.M.
3454 7, pp. 9-12, we believe section 461 gives the Commissioner authority
to direct the timing of deductions in a manner that will clearly reflect
income. Although the exercise of this authority has generally been aimed
at proscribing methods that fail to clearly reflect income, there is little
doubt that it is broad enough to permit the recognition of additional
methods that allow a clear reflection of income, even though such methods
may appear to be a variance with a narrow interpretation of specific
language of the Code.
Code§ 162(a) provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business, *** ." With respect to the types
of items frequently included within the category of "small items" (for
example, materials and supplies), Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 provides that a
deduction may be taken in the year such items are actually consumed and
used in the production of income. With respect to incidental items for
which physical inventories are not kept, however, that provision also states
that "*** it will be permissible for the taxpayer to include in his expenses
and to deduct from gross income the total cost of such supplies and
materials as were purchased during the taxable year for which the return
is made, provided the taxable income is clearly reflected by this method."
Although it might be argued that this provision assumes that the items in
question have a useful life of less than one year, although that life may
extend into a second taxable year, we believe that it provides direct support
for a "small item carve-out." Furthermore, Treas. Reg. § 1.461-l(a)(3)
provides, in part, that when in a going business there are overlapping
deductions, if they "*** do not materially distort income, they may be
included in the years in which the taxpayer consistently takes them into
account." Both provisions are recognition that there is no absolute rule that
capital expenditures, in the strict traditional sense, must in all cases be
capitalized. Rather, the rule is that such expenditures may be currently
deducted if such treatment does not materially distort income. 294
In General Counsel Memorandum 34547, 295 the Service examined the

treatment of contributions to pension and profit sharing plans attributable to
the taxpayer's production process. The Memorandum reasoned that "section
461 gives the Service the authority to direct ''the timing of any deduction

294.
295.

/d. at 12-4.

July I, 1971.
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in such a manner as to clearly reflect the income of the taxpayer."296
Based on this interpretation pension and profit sharing contributions should
be capitalized (and accordingly depreciated or amortized) as part of the selfconstructed assets to which they relate. 297 This area is now covered by
Section 263A.
Administratively and judicially the period of amortization of intangibles
has been on a case-by-case basis. Sixty years of experience with
depreciation of tangible property has taught that uniform lives is the only
administrable way. The Service should employ in determining first in
rulings and after refinement later in regulations whether the standard life for
classes of such amortizable expenditures would be as short as sixty months
or as long as fifteen years. 298 General Counsel Memorandum 34,547299
read Section 446's mandate that the taxpayer's "method of accounting ...
clearly reflect income" together with Section 461 's requirement that "[t]he
amount of any deduction or credit . . . shall be taken for the taxable year
which is the proper taxable year under the method of accounting used in
computing taxable income. " 300 Thus, "section 461 gives the Service
authority to direct the timing of any deduction in such manner as to clearly
reflect the income of the taxpayer. This confirms the view expressed above
that the accounting sections should be considered to govern the taxable
period in which deductions permitted by the Code are to be taken." The
Service based this reading of a clear reflection of income mandate into
Section 461 upon a thorough tracing of the legislative history of Section 461
and its predecessors stretching back to that fateful first tax reform act, the
Revenue Act of 1921, and the first technical corrections revenue bill, the
Revenue Act of 1924.301 Thus, IRS!freasury has authority for de minimis

296. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959, supra note 66, at 12.
297. Note statement that ''there is no appropriate distinction between capitalizing expenses under
section 263 and inventotying them under section 471, ..." Note also the recommendation that Rev Rul.
53-141 (interpreted as "giving taxpayers an election to either inventory or deduct depreciation and cost
depletion") be revoked and supporting interpretation of Rev. Rul. 70-346, which permits taxpayers using
accelerated depreciation to inventory the straight line portion of depreciation of capital assets directly or
indirectly involved in the production of inventory, while currently deducting the excess accelerated
depreciation over straight-line. /d.
298. Cf Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,259 (Mar. 6, 1973)and Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,547 (July I, 1971).
299. July I, 1971.
300. Emphasis supplied.
301. An examination of the legislative history of sections 446 and 461 supports the position
we herein adopt The significant part of this legislative history begins with the Revenue Act
of 1921, which, in sections 214(aX6) and 234(aX4}, authorized the Commissioner to allow
the deduction of losses in a year other than that in which "sustained" when, in his opinion,
it was necessary to clearly reflect income. When the 1924 Revenue Act was enacted,
Congress decided to extend this discretionary authority of the Commissioner to all the
deduction provisions. Thus, section 200(d) of the 1924 Act, the predecessor of section 461
of the 1954 Code, provided that:
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and recurring rules and authority in determining that, for example, 60-month
amortization clearly reflects income whereas neither an immediate deduction
nor capitalization without amortization does.

E.

The Case for "Rough Justice"

1.

Rough Justice as Simplicity and Equity on a Group Basis

The core idea of "rough justice" for purposes of this article is the use
of simple administrable rules that work well enough on the average in lieu
of either (a) detailed rules pursuing theoretical purity or (b) case-law
uncertainty. The general principle in capitalization is clear reflection of

"The tenns 'paid or incurred' and 'paid or accrued' shall be construed according
to the method of accounting upon the basis of which the net income is computed
under section 212 or 232. The deductions and credits provided for in this title
shall be taken for the taxable year in which 'paid or accrued' or 'paid or incurred',
dependent upon the method of accounting upon the basis of which the net income
is computed under section 212 or 232, unless in order to clearly reflect the income
the deductions or credits should be taken as of a different period." (emphasis
added)
The following highly instructive statement regarding the above provision is contained
in the committee reports relating to the 1924 Act:
"In subdivision (d) of this section authority is granted to the Commissioner to
allow or require deductions and credits to be taken as of a year other than that in
which 'paid' or 'accrued' when, in his opinion, it is necessary in order to clearly
reflect the income. The Revenue Act of 1921 in sections 214(a)6 and 234(a)4
authorizes the Commissioner to allow the deduction of losses in a year other than
that in which sustained when, in his opinion, it is necessary to clearly reflect the
income. The proposed bill extends that theory to all deductions and credits. The
necessity for such a provision arises in cases in which a taxpayer pays in one year
interest or rental payments or other times for a period of years. If he is forced to
deduct the amount in· the year in which paid, it may result in a distortion of his
income which will cause him to pay either more or less taxes than he properly
should." (emphasis added)
H.R REP. No. 68-179 (1939); 1939-1 C.B. (Pt. 2) 241, 249 (1939). To the same affect seeS.
REP. No. 68-398 (1939), 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 266, 273 (1939). It is noted that section 214(a) of
the 1924 Act (Deductions Allowed Individuals) and section 234(a) (Deductions Allowed
Corporations) both contained the same "shall" directive as in the present deduction sections.
It is important to mention that the "unless" clause in section 200(d) of the 1924 Act
(underscored above), remained in the law until the enactment of the 1954 Code. And,
although the clause is not contained in section 461, it is clear from the 1954 Code committee
reports that no substantive change in prior law was intended, and that section 461 is simply
a rewritten version of its predecessors. See H. Rept. No.l337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954),
which states at p. A 161 the following:
"Section 461 adopts the provision of section 43 [which included virtually the
identical language which first came into the law in section 200(d) of the 1924 Act]
of the 1939 Code in rearranged form. The timing of deductions and credits
otherwise allowable is determined by the taxpayer's method of accounting. The
method must clearly reflect the income of the taxpayer."
Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,547, at pp. 12-15 (July 1, 1971).
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income; 302 the ''rough justice" implementation is m1mmum distortion of
income taking into account (1) the revenue advantages to Treasury of more
exact matching of expenses with income and (2) the burden of capitalization
(and especially amortization) to the taxpayer.
Case-law precedent,
commentators and the "rough justice"/simplification policies advocated by
Commissioner Fred Goldberg support this approach. Any other approach
short of legislation most likely will run aground on the shoals of judicial
adoption of rules of practicality. Distortion of income can arise from a
difference in timing of a deduction or a difference in character between the
tax treatment of the deduction (ordinary) and the related income (capital
gain or exemption preference). Underlying timing distortion, therefore, is
the notion of matching of expenses with income, which is no longer in
vogue in the literature303 or in Congress when such matching would
produce substantial deferral of income. 304 But INDOPCd05 reiterated
such matching as the case-law standard for capitalization of expenditures to
prevent timing distortions. Congress recently approved the matching of
expenses with income notion to defer deductions until related income is
realized in the new Section 167(g) codifying the income forecast method of
depreciation. 306
All of the proposed deduction, capitalization and amortization rules are
designed to effect ''rough justice" rather than theoretical purity where the
practical burdens of such purity are great and the revenue benefits are
minor. This balancing and "simplification" approach has been followed by
the IRS/Treasury in the pasf07 as well as the courts308 and on rare

302. See note 7 supra.
303. Mundstock, supra note 241, at 1184, speaks of the "current fad in tax policy is ... the
fmancial accounting notion of 'matching."' He tellingly points to the tax treatment of pre-paid income
and attributable future expenses. See also Alan Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal ofTax
Accounting, 4 VA. TAX REv. I (1984).
304. Congress in the legislative history to Sections 167(g) and 263A speaks of matching expenses
to related income (by capitalizing and depreciating them). H.R REP. No. I 04-586, at 140 (1996) ("in
theory, the income forecast method is an appropriate method for matching the capitalized cost of certain
property with the income produced by such property."), and S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 76,
respectively. See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,034 pp 34-6 (Aug. 7, 1979).
305. Supra note 6.
306. See note 304 supra.
307. E.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959 (July 25, 1972) (small); Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,618 (January
23, 1981) (recurring costs of short-lived computer software deductible); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,483
(March 5, 1986) (recurring); Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,410 (June 18, 1980)(separate asset); Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,743 (July 14, 1988), considering Rev. Rul. 88-57 ("Consideration could perhaps be given to
developing some mechanical rule for determining whether a cyclical repair should be treated as capital.
Thus, for example, if the taxpayer spends 50 percent (or more) of the original cost of the asset, the
expenditure would be capitalized."); Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,968 (Nov. 18, 1968) (prepublication costs
of professional writers while conceptually capitalizable because they produce a manuscripts benefitting
future years should be currently deductible for administrative convenience.).
308. See note 20 supra.

714

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

occasions Congress. 309 In practical effect these proposed rough justice
rules constitute simplified tax accounting rules. As such, this article
maintains that solely as a matter of substantive tax policy these rules for
simplification should be limited to the classes of taxpayers to whom
Congress traditionally limits simple tax accounting rules such as the cash
method, i.e., small business excluding tax shelters. But as a matter of
procedural tax policy, i.e., administerability and revenue, as well as tax
politics, this article suggests that the Service!Treasury should extend the
simplification regulatory rules to large C corporations as well because that
is where the largest dollar volume of controversy over capitalization and
expensing currently arises.
The then novel Treasury and ms "Business Plan 1992" announced that
"[w]ithin the framework of existing law, ... [the] overall objectives are to
enhance voluntary compliance and reduce taxpayer burden."310 To that
end the plan considered the following:
•
•

Our highest priority is simple, practical, and user-friendly guidance.
In carrying out Congressional intent, we should assume that Congress
intended to enact administrable and workable laws.

308. See note 20 supra.
309.
H.R. REP. No. 100-795, at 531 (1987) (accompanying then unenacted provision; enacted with
retrospective effect in 1988), succinctly stated the case for administrative costs outweighing the benefits
of capitalization/depreciation of writers prepublication costs:
[T]he application of the uniform capitalization rules to authors, photographers, and artists is
unduly burdensome for those authors, photographers, and artists who do not elect the
simplified method provided by the Internal Revenue Service. The otherwise deductible
expenses of these authors, photographers, and artists must be allocated among each project
and generally are deductible over the period that income is estimated to be derived from the
project.
/d. The clear implication of this passage is that application of the elective simplified three-year frontloaded depreciation method was not unduly burdensome in the eyes of the Committee. Representative
Thomas Downey, in introducing the 1988 legislation which explicitly exempts "qualified costs" from
Section 263A pointed out that in 1987 "the Committee on the Budget report concluded that 'the
application of the uniform capitalization rules to free-lance writers and photographers is unduly
burdensome." 134 CONG. REC. E 1245 (1988) (Extension of Remarks of Rep. Thomas Downey)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-391, at 1533 (1987)). Downey continued that ''very substantial
administrative and accounting burdens, including allocation and income forecasting requirements that are
unlikely to be manageable by either taxpayers or the Internal Revenue Service would be imposed on freelance writers, photographers, and artists by the uniform capitalization requirements." /d. He concluded
that: "[t]here is little question that any theoretical benefit of applying capitalization requirements to the
expense of professional free-lance writers, photographers, artists, and small independent film and video
makers is far outweighed by the countervailing burden imposed on these taxpayers by the rules." /d.
See also Senator Pete Domenici, in his 1988 introduction ofS. 2351, which became Section 263A(h),
exempting "qualified creative costs" from section 263A, which provides an excellent exposition of the
administrative problems of artists in capitalizing and then depreciating their creative costs under the
income forecast method, where the allocation administrative problems rival the forecasting administrative
problems. 134 CONG. REC. S5244-45 (Remarks of Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M.).
310. Business Plan 1992, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, lNT File, 92 TAX NOTES TODAY,
104-50 (May 18, 1992).

1997]
•
•
•

RESTATING CAPITALIZATION STANDARDS

715

Our interpretation of the tax law should be driven by our commitment
to administrability, common sense, and fair play, not by revenue
considerations.
We should make do with "rough justice" and accept the fact that life
is messy rather than be motivated by a quest for theoretical purity.
General principles are often better than detailed rules. All too often,
detailed rules result in the worst of both worlds - they suffocate the
many taxpayers who try to do what's right, while providing a road
map for the few with larceny in their hearts. 311

"Rough justice" in regulation drafting was Commissioner Fred
Goldberg's avowed goal; all of the above are variations on that theme. His
starting point early on was concern about
the health of tax administration today, as we emerge from a decade of
unprecedented legislative activity ... [T]here is a dark side to the frenzy
of tax legislation during the past ten years [the 1980s]. The cumulative
impact of repeated law changes- coupled with a statutory, regulatory and
administrative focus on theoretical purity - have imposed a staggering
burden of complexity, uncertainty and administtative costs on many large
and small businesses and all too many individuals. 312

He sought to lift "from taxpayers the oppressive burden of seeking answers
to metaphysical questions. " 313 Commissioner Goldberg drew upon his

311. /d.
312. Hearings on Impact ofTRA 1986, supra note 174, at 57 (Prepared Statement of Commissioner
Fred Goldberg). Professor Lee traced the pattern of that tax legislation sprawl over the past three
decades: (1) budget surpluses created by bracket creep (inflation-pushed into higher brackets on the same
real income) funded increase in tax preferences and partial give-back individual tax cuts through bracket
adjustments until 1981; and (2) after the enormous deficits triggered by the combination of (a) the rate
and capital recovery tax cuts of President Reagan's Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, {b) indexing
of brackets ending bracket creep; and (c) the defense budget build-up, the pattern of tax acts, often
revenue reconciliation acts, raising revenues by addressing deductions and exclusions but not rates (with
the conspicuous exception of President Clinton's OBRA 1993 which also raised the individual rates of
the top 5% or so of families). Commissioner Goldberg was referring to the last part of the first
phenomenon and the first part of the second. Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 80, at 128-39.
313. /991 Hearings on Intangibles, supra note 32, at 51 (Prepared Statement of Commissioner
Fred Goldberg). Tax complexity began in earnest with Professor Stanley Surrey's tenure as Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy 1961-68 first under President John Kennedy and then President Lyndon
Johnson, who favored complexity increasingly in surrogate provisions to curb consensus tax abuses. Lee,
Structured Discretionary Justice, supra note 153. But the quest for theoretical purity more clearly
flavored the Tax Reform Act of 1976 as well as TEFRA in 1982 and the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,
along with a fair measure of surrogate measures such as the at-risk provisions; the Tax Reform Act of
1986 manifested some elements of such quest but was more driven by the goal of effecting rough justice
through base broadening (largely through surrogate measures such as the alternate minimum tax and
passive activity loss rules) funding rate cuts. The continuing budget reconciliation acts for the last
decade have indeed contained strong elements of detailed rules aimed at revenue raising at the margin
and too often theoretical purity. A common thread, however, to much of the legislative complexity are
the twin goals of (a) of hopefully retarding and at least increasing the transaction costs of perceived
abuses, too often by tax shelters, and {b) carving out exceptions for special interests. This area reflects
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experience as "a private practitioner and as the IRS Chief Counsel, as well
as ... [his then] current role as Commissioner of Internal Revenue" to offer
the Senate Finance Committee in a 1991 Hearing on Tax Simplification the
following "general observations on the subject of tax simplification":
2. Simplification versus certainty. Some suggest that the price of
simplification is more uncertainty. To the contrary, simplification is the
one true prerequisite for certainty. The 1980's were devoted to a wellmeaning effort to provide certainty through detailed laws and regulations.
With the benefit of hindsight, I am convinced that the quest was doomed
to failure. Each new rule spawns its own measure of uncertainty,
unintended consequences, and the need for special exceptions. We have
generated thousands of pages of laws, 1'egulations and rulings - and a
system that is rife with uncertainty.
3. Simplification versus equity. Some suggest that the price of
simplification is greater inequity. The complexity imposed by current law
is hardly fair or equitable. Providing "equity" for this particular taxpayer
or that particular taxpayer through a special provision in the law may
appear fair from the perspective of that taxpayer. But the net result is to
impose "inequity" on all other taxpayers who must understand and deal
with that provision. No matter how careful, well-intentioned, and skillful
we may be, our efforts to fine tune rules to deal with special circumstances
are sure to visit unintended inequities, costs, and burdens on other
taxpayers in the system.
I urge the Committee, as well as those of us responsible for
implementing regulations, to embrace rough justice and beware of the
purists. By background and training, many of us tend to chase the
theoretically complete answer. We seek to resolve every imaginable
question, address every imagined loophole, deal fairly with every special
circumstance. We are sure to fail- and leave the American public with
an unworkable and unadministerable system.
We should remember that the tax system is a means, not an end in
itself. We should be content with general rules and straightforward
provisions that meet our overall objectives, and not worry about the edges.
As the saying goes, the best approach is often to "Just Say No!" When we
hear of the special case, the need for the special exception, the unanswered
question, or the potential abuse - we should remember that our efforts to
do something may not succeed, and that the rules we write are sure to be
everyone else's burden and everyone else's transaction cost. 314

such legislative exceptions. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. Commissioner Goldberg
warned against this Congressional temptation as well. Section 197 came off was well as can be expected
with only 2 or 3 major special interest exceptions and a few inclusions.
314. Hearings on Tax Simplification Bills (S. 1364, S. 1394, and H.R. 2777) before the Senate
Finance Subcommittee, I 02d Con g. 319-20 (1991) (Prepared Statement of Commissioner Goldberg); see
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Transaction costs constituted Commissioner Goldberg's root concern:
The Service now treats the issue of tax simplification differently. In
drafting guidance, the Service now asks: "What is it doing to the taxpayer?
What are the implications in terms of record keeping, administrative costs,
transaction costs?" Goldberg emphasized that the Service must understand
that a modification that saves the government a dollar, but costs the
taxpayer two dollars, is a "bad deal" and that "we can't make those kinds
of deals."
He recounted the initial attempts to craft the new rules and recalled
the difficulties he encountered in changing old habits. For example,
Goldberg indicated that, in formulating rules for an employee's first
business trip of the day, various concepts "involving the number of miles
driven, minimum distances, the distance between home and business, and
the reimbursement of increments" were tossed around and referred to as the
"Donut Rule," the "Jelly Donut Rule" and the "Roll Your Own Rule."
There also was a suggestion, he said mockingly and in falsetto voice, that
there can be "a time value of money concept" when cash is advanced to an

Hearings on Tax Simplification and Technical Corrections Acts of 1991 (H.R. 2 777, H.R. 2 775, and H.R.
1555) before the House Ways and Means Committee, 102d Cong. 426-27 (1991) (Statement of
Commissioner Goldberg).
[T]he greatest challenge our tax system faces during the 1990s is to ease the burden on the
American public. I think the cost, the burden on the private sector of living with the tax
system as it exists today is simply unacceptable .... I urge the committee to embrace rough
justice and to beware the purists. We all have a tendency to chase the theoretically complete
answer. We have a tendency to worry about the outlier case. I believe that those are two of
the primary cause of the complexity in our system. Write a simple, straightforward rule; don't
worry about the edges.
/d.
"The Service also must 'buy into a notion of rough justice,' Goldberg said. 'Many of the
problems we have in the [tax] system right now are traceable back to an honest, genuine, but
terribly misguided quest for theoretically pure answers.' Continuing, he commented that we
'really cannot live with theoretically pure answers. [We need, instead,] to be looking for
simplifying assumptions.' He added, '[w]riting a rule to take care of one individual or one
company or one set of problems [is a bad deal] if the net result ... is to consume tens of
thousands of hours ... and millions of dollars of other people's time and money ... trying
to figure out what the rules are."'
Joe Spellman, On The Road Again: Goldberg Pushes His Simplification Plan, 48 TAX NOTES 1214, 1215
(Sept 3, 1990).
Former Assistant Treasury Secretary Frederic Hickman of Hopkins Sutter Hamel & Park
complained that "hyperintelligent, hyperinexperienced" Treasury staff had a propensity to
draft elaborate rules because they tried to take care of every contingency. "We were mostly
hyper, and singleminded about being correct," quipped Hickman's partner and former
Treasury staff attorney Mark Perlis. "We lose simple consistency in the pursuit of
correctness." Hickman and others decried the fanatical devotion among tax staffs of getting
the correct result without regard to the administrative headaches it would cause.
Lee Sheppard & Marianne Evans, Simplification Means Tough Choices: No Easy Cure for Tax
Complexity, A/CPA/ABA Conferees Agree, 46 TAX NOTES 381, 383 (Jan. 22, 1990); see Lee, Structured
Discretionary Justice, supra note 153, at 1031 n. 17.
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Commissioner Goldberg was particularly concerned about the transaction
costs to the Serviceffreasury of establishing rules by litigation in the
capitalization arena. 316 Professor George Mundstock's landmark Taxation
of Business Intangible Capitaf 11 bottoms the basic tax policy criterion of
simplicity on transaction costs. "A tax provision is sound when it is simple
for taxpayers to comply with and for the I.R.S. to enforce. Simplicity
assures that the provision does not impose undue administrative costs upon
those complying with and enforcing the provision."
Many commentators use the term "rough justice"; few attempt any
definition other than context. In the literature, 318 the core concept of
''rough justice" is use of rules that are simple to apply, eliminating expensive
factual inquiry, and achieving rational or just results in most cases. 319 In
short, ''rough justice" is an atavar of the factor of simplicity. A trade-off is
that "rough justice" for groups does not effect perfect justice for each
individual. 320 "Rough justice" often applies general principles rather than

315. Spellman, supra note 314.
316. See supra note 303.
317. Mundstock, supra note 303, at 1182.
318. Professor Lee searched "rough justice" in the LEXIS; Law review library allrev File. He also
searched Fed tax Library, TNT, and Casrel Files.
319. Elizabeth Warren, Formal and Operative Rules under Common Law and Code, 30 UCLA L.
REv. 898,932 n. 190 (1983) (explaining the basis of rough justice as "the assumption that a rule oflaw
may eliminate expensive factual inquiry and yet achieve results that are rational in most cases," but
failing to define the term "rough justice"); Bernard S. Jackson, The Development ofLaw in the Ancient
Near East: Modeling Biblical Law: The Covenant Code, 70 CH!.-KENT L. REv. 1745, 1812 (1995)
(describing how the "'arbitrary' tests" of the Covenant Code do "(rough) justice in the majority of cases,
the remaining cases of injustice being the price that is paid for the advantage of efficient processing of
the more typical cases."); Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 941, 960 n.93 (1995) (criticizing alternative methods of claims aggregation that
suppress "a claim's individual characteristics in the interests of systematic efficiency, a 'rough justice'
version of horizontal equity."); 1991 Hearings on Intangibles, supra note 32, at 51 (Statement of Fred
T. Goldberg, Jr., Commissioner, Internal Revenue) ("The ideal solution here [amortization of purchased
intangibles] is one that is broad in scope and uniform in application; that is, one that minimizes the
distinctions in the treatment of the intangibles that are covered.").
320. Paul Savoy, The Spiritual Nature of Equality: Natural Principles of Constitutional Law, 28
How. L.J. 809, 878 (1985) (assessing affirmative action and noting that "a society which operates on
the basis of rough justice for groups, and then insists on perfect justice for individuals when it comes
to evaluating entitlements to affirmative action, is practicing the most insidious form of racial
discrimination."); T.A. Smedley, Some Order Out of Chaos in Wrongful Death Law, 37 V AND. L. REv.
273, 294 (1984) ("the laws of intestate succession may well achieve a good measure of 'rough' justice
- 'rough' in that the operation of such a broad general rule will not always accurately satisfy the
legitimate needs of each particular survivor"); Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 16, at 25 ("a
common shortcoming of "talismans" [e.g., 1-year rule, separate asset rule, new business vs. existing
business]: promoting rough justice in commonplace application, but yielding inequities in borderline
areas.").
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detailed rules, but it connotes as well an approximation of the just
result. 321 In some cases "rough justice" denotes a tax "second best"322
surrogate or proxy tax, 323 but generally its goal is to effect better results
than an unjust resulf 24- fair on the average for a class of taxpayers but

321. For instance, a percentage exclusion of capital gain has been argued as "rough justice"
alternative to indexing. Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains
Preference, 48 TAX L. REv. 319, 340, (1993) (concludes historical exclusion was "so rough as to provide
no justice"). They are too right Lee, Capital Gains Contentions, supra note 53, at 4 (nominal capital
gains of top 1% of families are 50% to 80% economic on the average in good market years, whereas
nominal capital gains of bottom 80".4. on the average are all inflation gains- they often suffer an
economic loss taking account for inflation. The economic gains of the rich often nicely even out the
economic losses of the moderate income. But we always knew that the rich get richer and the poor get
poorer.).
322. See note 109 supra.
323. William A. Klein, Tailor to the Emperor with No Gothes: The Supreme Court's Tax Rules
for Deposits and Advance Payments, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1685, 1731 (1994) (discussing the effects of
shifting the tax burden of disguised interest from one party in a transaction to the other and suggesting
that "this 'surrogate taxation' may result in rough justice (and rough economic neutrality"). When
amortization was denied for goodwill prior to Section 197, it served as a proxy for no ordinary income
recapture. Cf. Panel Discussion, Accounting Principles or Pooling of Interests, 25 TAX LAw. 29, 54
(1971) (statement by Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy Edwin S. Cohen). Cohen explained
that the underlying basis for the Service's opposition to buyer amortization of purchase premium
historically had been that if the Treasury:
[W]ere to allow a write-off of purchased goodwill over a long period of time as a deduction
from ordinary income while the sale of goodwill would produce capital gain, we would have
a situation in which the purchaser would be able to write-off the goodwill against ordinary
income, but the seller would always have capital gain.
I think one of our problems is whether we could ever change one rule without changing
the other.
I think that people would be rather reluctant to see the sale of goodwill treated as an
ordinary income item under section 1245 or otherwise, and it might be necessary to take the
bitter with the sweet. This is part of the problem that would face us.
/d. Similarly, some have argued that pre-Section 197 lack of amortization for purchased intangibles
offsets the "improper'' deduction for developing the intangible further, such as advertising with respect
to purchased goodwill. See, e.g., Gerard, supra note 148, at 99 (criticizing the "double deduction"
argument that contends '"rough justice' would be achieved under the Mass Asset Rule since taxpayers
are permitted to expense the cost of attracting the new customer who is offsetting the loss of a previously
purchased customer."). Professor George Mundstock debated a related point with Professor Eugene
Seago in the 1991 House Hearings on Intangibles. 1991 House Hearings on Intangibles, supra note 32,
at 318-20. At the time of the 1991 House Hearings, Professor Mundstock had spent six years studying
the taxation ofbusiness intangibles and wrote a landmark article on the topic. See Mundstock, supra note
241. Professor Seago, who had been writing about intangibles for nearly twenty years at the time of the
Hearings, represented the American Taxation Association and called for a provision like Section 195.
Professor Seago would play a role in the evolution of Section 197, particularly in its interface with the
partnership provisions.
324. Rough justice is preferable to none. See Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes, 53 LA. L. REv.
877,886 (1993) (discussing the valuation of community property assets in divorces); James Lindgren,
Seeing Colors, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1059, 1078 (1993) (reviewing ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND
CONSTITIITION (1992)) (presenting Kull's claim that affirmative action "works rough justice-unjust, but
less unjust than doing nothing"). Cf., Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, Present Law and Proposals
Relating to the Federal Income Tax Treatment of the Cost of Acquiring Goodwill and Certain other
Intangibles 40 (JCS-9-92 April 27, 1992) ("It may be argued that goodwill is not amortizable under
present law principally because taxpayers cannot overcome their burden of showing over what period
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necessarily just as to each affected taxpaye~ 25- and above all in the
context of federal income taxation, to effect rules that are easier to apply by
the taxpayers and tax administrators alike than more theoretically perfect
substantive rules. 326
Jurisprudentially, "rough justice" may viewed as equity versus rule (or
law in the Anglo-American lexicon) or substance versus form- an age-old
battle327 between the letter and the spirit of the law. 328 Under this view
"rough justice" is "equity" once again overriding the rule of law. 329 For

goodwill wastes. Thus, specifying a recovery period for the cost of goodwill is arguably appropriate in
that it would provide a measure of 'rough justice."'). Interestingly, Justice O'Connor in Hillsboro Nat 'I
Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 380 n.11 (1983), in effect employed a "rough justice" rationale
to support a year 2 balancing entry adjustment under the tax benefit and related doctrines: "While annual
accounting precludes reopening the earlier year, it does not prevent a less precise correction - far
superior to none - in the current year, analogous to the practice of financial accountants. . . . This
concern with more accurate measurement of income underlies the tax benefit rule and always has." This
is not surprising since both the balancing entry doctrines and expense/ capitalization/amortization doctrine
are most soundly based on notions of avoiding distortion of income. See Lee & Murphy, supra note 28,
at 504-09 (Professor Lee had worked out the core of the balancing entry model [except for the role of
the Crane doctrine] including the characterization aspect manifested in Arrowsmith and the "origin of
the claim" doctrine in the mid-1970s ); accord Note, The Transactional Approach to the Origin of the
Claim Doctrine: A Proposed Cure for Chronic Inconsistency, 35 BROOK. L. REv. 905 (1989). This
thesis is more fully spelled out in Lee & Bader, supra note 231, at 173, 207-09 (1987) (discussing all
of these doctrines as ultimately based on the clear reflection of income principle manifested in the least
distortion of income rough justice rule). See note 142 supra. Both Professor Bittker and Judge
Tannenwald played leading roles in this story, too.
325. See Smedley, supra note 320, at 294 (explaining how intestacy laws sometimes fail to provide
justice for each survivor). See Packwood Says Taxpayers Must Choose between Simplicity and Fairness,
90 TAX NOTES TODAY 248-9 (December 7, 1990):
Responding to criticism of the tax code for being neither simple nor fair, Senate Finance
Committee ranking minority member Robert Packwood, R-Ore., asked attendees at the Tax
Foundation's annual conference December 5 if they really knew what they wanted. "Which
do you want? Simplicity or fairness. Ladies and gentlemen ... you cannot have both," said
Packwood. Using a flat tax as an example, he explained that the more simple a tax system
it, the less fair it becomes.
"When we tried to do the 1986 tax reform bill, when we were forced to a decision, we
opted for fairness rather than simplicity, and we knew what we were doing," said Packwood.
"In 1986 we were driven by one overriding desire, we wanted people to make investments
from an economic standpoint." He explained that, by eliminating deductions and reducing the
number of tax brackets, simplicity and progressivity increased. But if exemptions were
granted to each special interest that could arguably prove that the tax system had placed it at
a disadvantage, then the 1986 act's simplicity and rough justice would soon be lost.
/d.
326. Peter C. Canellos & Edward D. Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound Interest: Interest
Deferral and Discount after I 982, 38 TAX L. REv. 565, 583 (1983) ("a rule of convenience designed
to do rough justice").
327. Paul Savoy, The Spiritual Nature of Equality: Natural Principles of Constitutional Law, 28
How. L.J. 809, 814 (1985).
328. Jd. at 820-21 (rigor of the law and yielding of mercy/equity).
329. Comments of the Tax Division of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(A/CPA) on the Proposed Regulations Under Section 263A Regarding the Capitalization of Interest,
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 91 TAX NOTES TODAY 220-240 (Oct. 25, 1991) ("The
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one, perhaps the paramount, feature distinguishing the Anglo-American legal
system from the various civil law systems is the bifurcation of judicial
processes between law and equity. The origins of this split are historical and
largely accidental. The early English law courts developed elaborate rules
of pleading which, by Elizabethan times, had led to the modern notion of
the law as a body of rules which could be applied to a given set of
facts. 330 By contrast, the chancery courts were less concerned with rules
and precedent and more determined to reach an equitable resolution of a
particular case, frequently blurring law and fact in the process. The essence
of equity, thus, was the absence of binding rules. 331
In the context of complex statutes including the Internal Revenue Code,
regulations, and ad hoc line drawing, courts, however, generally are
reluctant to override the rules with equity. 332

proposed regulations are 124 pages of complex rules which will intimidate and burden the average
taxpayer with complicated computations and increased recordkeeping, instead of encouraging voluntary
compliance. Less sophisticated taxpayers will find the proposed regulations to be unadministerable, and
may choose to implement their own form of 'rough justice."'); cf. Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American
Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116, 124 (2d Cir. 1991) ("In 1988 congressional hearings on arbitration reform,
a securities industry spokesman noted that arbitrators in the industry are regarded as being free to grant
or deny awards without complying with applicable legal standards."). See, e.g., Arbitration Reform:
Hearings on H.R. 4960 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the Comm. on
Energy and Finance, 1OOth Con g. 85-86 (1988) (statement of Theodore Krebsbach, vice president and
associate general counsel of Shearson Lehman Brothers). The spokesman stated that arbitrators
frequently made decisions that did not reflect legal standards but rather sought to do rough justice: 'A
lot of times ... you don't say one person is 100 percent wrong or 100 percent right and you do what
makes sense under the circumstances.' /d. at 138. A member of the plaintiffs' bar concurred. See id.
(Statement of Theodore G. Eppenstein, Esq.) ('many times arbitration panels will split the baby[;] ...
the way they split it, they will try to figure out how much the claimant has to pay his attorney and that
will be the size of the award .. .') (emphasis supplied).
330. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 122 (3d ed. 1990).
331. /d. at 126. The famous observation on these proceedings, attributed to John Selden, was that
if the measure of equity was the chancellor's conscience, one might as well determine the measure of
a foot by the length of the chancellor's foot. /d. (citing TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (F. Pollack
ed. 1927)).
332. Monongahela Valley Hospital, Inc. v. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., 945 F.2d 576, 593 (3d Cir.
1991) ("In this complex area of regulation, ad hoc determinations, invocations of the 'spirit and purpose'
of the regulations, and 'rough justice,' however appealing, simply will not do.''); Philadelphia & Reading
Corp. v. United States, 944 F.2d 1063, 1076-77 (3d Cir. 1991) (Becker, J., dissenting) ("applying
equitable principles or rough justice to tax refund cases would do inestimable mischief to the rigorous
statutory scheme"); Fruit Of The Loom, Inc. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 867 (1994), T.C.
Memo 1994-492:
We decline to adopt a position that would thwart the purpose of the period of limitations and
convert the mitigation provisions into a form of general equitable relief that applies in any
case involving an arguable double tax benefit. Incorporating rough justice or equitable
principles into the elaborate scheme of the mitigation provisions would add inestimable
mischief to the rigorous statutory scheme. Adherence to the detailed requirements of this
scheme is obligatory for respondent and taxpayers alike.
/d. The Cohan doctrine was an exception to this bias, but increasingly has been limited in the last two
decades.
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In many respects, the search for the ideal regulatory structure is the
attempt to balance the law court concept of fixed and definitive rules with
the equity concept of delivering justice in a particular factual situation.
Professor Kenneth Davis' Discretionary Justicl? 33 convincingly argues that
rules and principles can be combined by laying out rules for effecting of the
general principles along with balancing tests or weighting procedures for
applying such rules. Rules for expensing and capitalizing with standard life
amortization self-created intangibles based upon such notion are set forth
below.
Over the past quarter of a century when Congress has addressed capital
recovery areas where the existing rules were fragmented, varying class of
taxpayer by taxpayer or even taxpayer by taxpayer, it has repeatedly opted
for the simplification of one or just a few sizes fit all. The legislative
pattern of Section 167 Asset Depreciation Range, Section 168 Accelerated
Cost Recovery System, and Section 197 amortization of purchased
intangibles make the case for rough justice rules as to (a) expensing and (b)
amortizing over standard periods, the costs of self-created intangibles. 334
2.

Theoretical Purity: Economic Efficiency

The core notion of economic efficiency in the context of federal
income taxation is that such tax system should "interfere with private
decisions about resource allocation as little as possible. " 335 Treasury I, the
landmark 1984 Treasury Study which launched the Tax Reform Act of
1986, explained the theory of economic efficiency or neutrality as follows:

333. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 215-16.
334. Confronted with similar chaos in the area of tangible assets, Congress usefully
intervened in the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (added by the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981) that allowed cost recovery over predetermined recovery periods fixed by statute
rather than the useful lives of tangible assets. The Senate Committee Report explained that
one of the reasons for the change to predetermined recovery periods was that "the committee
had heard copious testimony that the present rules are too complex. These rules require
determinations on matters, such as useful life ... , which are inherently uncertain and thus too
frequently result in unproductive disagreements between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue
Service." We have concluded that the best solution for taxpayers and the Service is a simple,
stable, "rough justice" legislative solution.
1991 House Hearings on Intangibles, supra note 32, at 52 (Prepared Statement of Commissioner Fred
Goldberg) (footnote omitted). In the earlier simplification step of Asset Depreciation Range ("ADR")
Congress focused on easing administration. H.R. REP. No. 92-533 at 32 (1971) ("[M]any of elements
contained in the ADR system (including the repeal of the reserve ratio test) are designed to achieve
significant simplifications in the administration of the depreciation rules by substantially limiting the
number of situations in which disputes are likely to arise based on the particular facts and circumstances
of the individual taxpayer's situation. It is contemplated that these elements of the ADR system will be
incorporated by the Treasury into the class life system provided by your committee bill."); see S. REP.
No. 92-437, at 48 (1971).
335. Yorio, supra note 276.
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One of the primary advantages of a free market economy is its
tendency to allocate economic resources to their most productive uses. For
example, market forces lead business firms to produce what consumers
want in ways that are relatively efficient and economical. Any tax
inevitably discourages the type of activity that is taxed. An ideal tax
system would, however, interfere with private decisions as little as
possible. That is, it would not unnecessarily distort choices about how
income is earned and how it is spent. It would not unduly favor leisure
over work, or consumption over saving and investment. It would not
needlessly cause business firms to modify their production techniques or
their decisions on how to finance their activities. A neutral tax policy
would not induce businesses to acquire other firms or to be acquired by
them merely for tax considerations. It would not discourage risk-taking or
the formation of new businesses. It would not discourage competition by
granting special preferences only to one industry or one type of fmancial
institution. In short, an ideal tax system would be as neutral as possible
toward private decisions. Any deviation from this principle represents
implicit endorsement of governmental intervention in the economy - an
insidious form of industrial policy based on the belief that those
responsible for tax policy can judge better than the marketplace what
consumers want, how goods and services should be produced, and how
business should be organized and fmanced.
Economic neutrality is furthered by a few simple rules of tax design.
Perhaps most importantly, income from all sources should be taxed
equally; otherwise, too many resources will be devoted to activities subject
to the lowest taxes. For the same reason, tax liability should not depend
on how income is spent. Uniform treatment of all sources and uses of
income requires a comprehensive defmition of income for tax
purposes. 336

The Joint Committee Staff in describing the House version of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 succinctly explained the underlying economic theory:
The output of the economy depends not only in the size of the capital
stock but also on its composition. In the absence of taxes, the operation
of a competitive economy causes capital to flow to sectors where it is
expected to earn the highest rate of return. This results in the allocation
of investment that produces the largest amount of national income.
However, if non-neutral taxes are imposed, potential output may be
reduced because too much capital will tend to accumulate in lightly taxed
sectors, and too little capital will be invested in highly taxed sectors. Thus,
in evaluating the effects of tax reform on capital formation it is necessary

336. 2 TREAsURY I, supra note 4, at 13. Professor Mundstock pointed out the difficulties in
determining economic efficiency or inefficiency of particular tax provisions and, therefore, used ''the
more modest neutrality criterion." Mundstock, supra note 241, at 1183 n.l4.
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to examine both the level and allocation of investment. 337

Judge Richard Posner, a leading academic and judicial proponent of
law and economics, applied an economic efficiency analysis to expensing
versus capitalization in Fishman v. Commissioner: 338
[I]f a member of this panel rents a safe-deposit box to keep his securities
in, he can deduct the annual rental under section 212; but if he buys a safe
he must capitalize its purchase price - he can't just deduct the price from
his investment income in the year of purchase. Otherwise taxpayers would
have an incentive unrelated to the efficient use of resources to buy rather
than rent safe places for their securities.

The same thought iies behind Justice Blackmun's capitalization of
depreciation costs as to equipment used in self-constructing depreciable
assets in Idaho Power v. Commissioner. 339 Blackmun noted that the
purpose of depreciation accounting is allocation of the cost of using an asset
to the various tax years benefited by the asset;l 40
When the asset is used to further the taxpayer's day-to-day business
operations, the periods of benefit usually correlate with the production of
income. Thus, to the extent that equipment is used in such operations, a
current depreciation deduction is an appropriate offset to gross income
currently produced. It is clear, however, that different principles are
implicated when the consumption of the asset takes place in the
construction of other assets that, in the future, will produce income
themselves. In this latter situation, the cost represented by depreciation
does not correlate with production of current income. Rather, the cost,
although certainly presently incurred, is related to the future and is
appropriately allocated as part of the cost of acquiring an incomeproducing capital asset.
An additional pertinent factor is that capitalization of constructionrelated depreciation by the taxpayer who does its own construction work
maintains tax parity with the taxpayer who has its construction work done
by an independent contractor. The depreciation on the contractor's
equipment incurred during the performance of the job will be an element
of cost charged by the contractor for his construction services, and the

337. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, Economic Issues Relating to the House-Passed Tax
Reform Bill (H.R. 3838), 99th Cong. 7 (Comm. Print 1986) (footnote omitted). See generally, Yorio,
supra note 276, at 410-28.
338. 837 F.2d 309, 312 (7th Cir. 1988).
339. 418 U.S. I, 16 (1973). The Court reasoned that the purpose of capitalization under
Section 263 (and corresponding basis increase under Section 10 16) is largely timing: to "prevent a
taxpayer from utilizing currently a deduction properly attributable, through amortization, to later tax years
when the capital assets become income producing." /d.
340. /d. at 10.
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entire cost, of course, must be capitalized by the taxpayer having the
construction work performed. The Court of Appeals' holding would lead
to disparate treatment among taxpayers because it would allow the firm
with sufficient resources to construct its own facilities and to obtain a
current deduction, whereas another firm without such resources would be
required to capitalize its entire cost including the depreciation charged to
it by the contractor. 341

Thus, while the depreciation cost of trucks used to transport workers to the
work site of a self-constructed power plant was presently incurred, because
it related to the future rather than day-to-day operations it had to be
capitalized as part of the cost of the anticipated revenue stream from the
new plant. Otherwise the tax system would favor self-construction over
contracting out construction, for example, of power plants. 342 Of course
many large corporate taxpayers today may find that the advantages of
concentrating on a core business and out sourcing other activities dictates
using outside contractors rather than self-constructing tangible assets despite
any tax advantages to the latter.
Professor Mundstock builds a strong case that expensing of self-created
intangibles provides "more generous treatment for many expenditures related
to intangible capital than for economically similar expenditures related to
tangible assets. " 343 He contrasts the tax treatment of the cost of
institutional advertising, which the economic literature shows in many cases
has effects for some years after incurred, 344 with the cost of a tangible
piece of equipment of equivalent life. 345 At the same time Professor
Mundstock appears less critical of other self-created intangibles such as
R&D or investment in human capital. 346 The economic evidence on the
latter is mixed, even negative, in some cases. 347 Professor Gene Seago
pointed out in his submission on behalf of the American Taxation
Association that a broad reading of INDOPCO and slow or no amortization
would result in the cost of creating intangibles being tax disfavored. 348

341. /d. at 11, 14.
342. NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 951-52.
343. Mundstock, supra note 241, at 1193, 1199-1205; Pete V. Domenici, The Unamerican Spirit
of the Federal Income Tax, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 273, 278 (1994); Gregory M. Beil, Comment,
Internal Revenue Code Section 197: A Cure for the Controversy over the Amortization of Acquired
Intangible Assets, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 731, 738-39, 785 n.363 (1995).
344. Mundstock, supra note 241, at 1187-88.
345. /d. at 1193-95, 1228-32.
346. /d. at 1205.
347. Training and Jobs: What works? THE ECONOMIST 13, 19-221 (April 6, 1996). But see
Professor Mundstock's survey of the economic literature on human capital. Mundstock, supra note 241,
at 1190-92.
348. As a result of INDOPCO, justification for capitalization may be easily found. Indeed,
one of the cases cited by the seventh circuit as a situation where the courts were reluctant to
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Professor Calvin Johnson also shows that taking account of time value
of money is more correct "conceptually" in the words of Assistant Solicitor
General Kent Jones349 than the more pragmatic current deduction of
recurring expenditures, even if steady state. 350 Professor Johnson criticizes
Judge Chabot's dissent in Von Raden v.
the "steady state fallacy."
351
Commissioner supports Professor Johnson's view. This raises the
fundamental issue whether the theoretical purity of capitalization and
amortization of self-created intangibles should yield to a more simple and
easier administrable "rough justice" current deduction? And if so, when?

require capitalization, Briarcliff Candy Campany v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, was
effectively overruled by INDOPCO. In Briarcliff the taxpayer was allowed to deduct the cost
of change in the method of distributing its products and expanding its markets. Those costs
would now be deemed capital expenditures because of the significant future benefits but not
subject to amortization because of the indefinite useful life of those benefits.
It follows that the capitalization of expenditures for all unattached expected future
benefits will result in overcapitalization - that is, the capitalization of some costs that will
not produce future benefits. The capitalization of an expenditure that will not in fact produce
future benefits and the failure to properly amortize those costs that do produce future benefits
increase the effective tax rate on investments in these types of expenditures. Thus, while one
commentator argued that the pre-INDOPCO law favored investments in intangibles (which
includes unattached expected future benefits) as compared to the tax impact on investment
in tangible assets, the opposite may now be true.
ATA Submission, supra note 235.
349. While capitalization is conceptually necessary for all expenses that create a material
future benefit, the goal of achieving an accurate measure of net income is a pragmatic one.
Expenses of advertising and maintenance create both present and future benefits, but
capitalization is not required as a practical matter even though some future benefit results,
because the current benefit predominates and the expense is a regularly recurring one, so you
achieve essentially the same statement of income whether you deduct the entire expense in
the current year or whether you amortize a portion that relates to the future benefit each year.
Since the current deduction for those kinds of recurring expenses would not materially
misstate income, they are allowed.
INDOPCO Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 104, at 25 (Argument of Kent Jones).
350. Calvin H. Johnson, Soft Money Investing Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 1019,
1072-77 (1989); Calvin Johnson, Capitalization after the Government's Big Win in INDOPCO, 63 TAX
NOTES 1323 (1994).
351. Stretched too far, however, the rule of consistency could produce distortion of income as
shown by Judge Chabot's dissent in Van Raden v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1083, 1117 (1979) (Chabot,
J ., dissenting):
[T]here is a big difference between showing that deductions even out over a period of years
and showing that tax consequences even out over a period of years. This difference can result
from, among other things, the time value of money (e.g., accelerated depreciated deduction
provisions designed to encourage investment in depreciable property by reducing the current
"value" of the investors' overall tax liabilities), changes in marginal tax brackets (a deduction
in a high marginal tax bracket year is worth more than a deduction in a low marginal tax
bracket year}, and different methods of tax treatment (as illustrated in Spitalny by the playoff
of ordinary deductions against nonrecognized gains). We may assume that, if the tax
distortions truly canceled out over a number of years in the case before us, the case before
us would not be before us.
71 T.C. at 1118-19.

1997]

3.

RESTATING CAPITALIZATION STANDARDS

727

Rough Justice Versus Theoretical Purity

The short answer is yes, where under a cost/benefits analysis, the
burden of taxpayer and IRS compliance costs of capitalization and
amortization outweighs the revenue (and in some cases the perceptional)
benefits. Precisely such conditions underlay judicial and Commissioner
Goldberg's adoption of rough justice rules over theoretical purity in the
capitalization versus expensing controversy. The argument is well stated by
practitioner Steven Gerard.
[W]hile capitalizing and amortizing periodic customer development
expenditures may have some theoretical appeal, as a practical
administrative matter it is not feasible. More importantly, this treatment is
not even necessary to achieve a proper accounting of periodic net income.
For an on-going business entity with a steady level of customers, the
annual expense deductions related to periodic customers development
expenditures should be roughly the same as amortization deductions. This
also should be the case even for companies with a growing number of
customers, since amortization periods for capitalized new customer
development expenditures typically would be much shorter than
amortization periods for purchased customers. For example, it is wellknown in the newspaper publishing industry that only a small percentage
of new subscribers actually renew their subscriptions enough times to
become "seasoned" subscribers with expected lives of approximately 15 to
25 years, as are at issue in Newark Morning Ledger. Furthermore, it would
be impracticable to identify and capitalize the proper portions of those
periodic expenditures that contribute to customer development. m

Professors Mundstock and Johnson, of course, are theoretically correct.
(1) Many intangible expenditures provide benefits over a period of years, so
that a current deduction not only reduces transaction costs but also provides
a tax subsidy or preference - a two-for-one. (2) While the condition of
steady state recurring expenditures reduces such distortion of income lrom
such tax preference, taking account of time value of money is more correct
theoretically.
This article nevertheless advocates adoption of rules of practicality or
reason. The guidestone should be Bittker & Lokken's focus on clear
reflection of income over definitional rules. Such clear reflection should be
measured by a cost/benefit analysis of burdens and benefits of capitalization

352. Gerard, supra note 148, at I 00 (emphasis added). For an extensive cost-benefits analysis of
revenue benefit of capitalizing loan origination costs versus the administrative burdens see Donald
Susswein, Should Loan Origination CostS Be Copitalized or Expensed For Federal Income Tax
Purposes? An Analysis Prepared For The Savings & Community Bankers of America, available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 105-38 (June 1994).
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and depreciation versus current deduction. 353 This process supported by a
number of cases and reasoning in a number of private rulings as well on
occasion by Congress, for determining whether the "rough justice" of a
current deduction should override the theoretical purity of capitalization and
amortization. 354 It almost goes without saying that if amortization is not
available for most wasting assets, then a current deduction is in order as less
income distorting. Professor Lee and others have been preaching that
message for over 20 years. For the last ten years Professor Lee has
propounded the corollary that the Service's striving for that result in
litigation often leads to courts awarding the taxpayer a current deduction as
''rough justice." With more irregular and substantial expenditures the better
"rough justice" would be capitalization and amortization over some
period. 355 Words can not express his pleasure in seeing these lessons
applied in recent Service rulings, e.g., the story of Technical Advice
Memorandum 9315004 and Revenue Ruling 94-38.
4.

Political - Packwood Principle

Widescale base broadening is said to said to require universal
application. Showdown at Gucci Gulch 356 recounts the telling story of the
willingness of Senate Finance Chair Bob Packwood, R-Ore., to see
elimination of special capital gains treatment for timber (Section 636(c))
"[a]s long as there is 'equal treatment' for all industries"; 357 i.e., all share
the pain. 358 Ron Pearlman, who was there, has expressed to Professor Lee
profound admiration for Chair Packwood's principled position. Lee agrees,
believing it was one of Senator Packwood's finest hours. 359 Nevertheless,

353. This process should NOT be implemented case-by-case. but instead in regulations providing
bright-line "rough justice" tests of de minimis, short-lived or recurring for current deductions and
·
uniform amortization periods for irregular or substantial costs.
354. See note 281 supra and accompanying text
355.
Gene Seago reaches the same conclusion in his Submission.
356. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAW MAKERS,
LoBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 83 (1987).
357. /d. Cf 1991 House Hearings on Intangibles, supra note 32, at 58 (colloquy between Assistant
Secretary Gideon and Representative Robert Matsui, 0-Cal.). and Explanation of Section 197 exceptions.
Section 197 applies to most intangible assets acquired after the date of enactment; the 15-year
amortization provision generally does not apply to self-created intangibles, churned assets, and certain
specified intangibles (such as separately acquired mortgage servicing rights, sports franchises, and offthe-shelf computer software. Similarly PAL provides an exception for oil and gas, I.R.C. § 469(c)(3).
So there can be a few exceptions, perhaps broadened later as in the case of the real estate operator
exception of section 469(c )(7).
358. TRA 1986 did achieve on individual side as to capital gains and tax shelters and on the
corporate side by the uniform capitalization rules and to a lesser extent by the alternate minimum tax
provisions. Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 80, at 136-37.
359. Just as the finest hour of Senate floor manager (soon to be formally Senate Finance
Committee Chair) Senator Russell Long, D-La., was his 1964 rejection on the Senate Floor of House
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the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and some subsequent reform tax legislation
reveal a pattern of significant exceptions not preventing attainment of the
overall goal of more horizontal equity. Sometimes "vexceptions"360 for
specific industry or constituent group win out. 361 In summary, horizontal
equity appears as a necessary ingredient for fundamental tax, particularly in
this era of ''paygo."
Some view "rough justice" in the tax world as a rule hurting some
taxpayers or interest groups while benefitting others. 362 Public choice
theory holds that interest groups competing against each other for that result
is as good as legislation or regulation gets in a special interest world. 363

Ways and Means Committee Chair Wilbur Mills' I 963 overly complicated two-step two-classes of capilal
gain preference with the well-laken populist point that the rich already did well enough with capilal gains
(at low 20% effective rate at the highest income individual level when nominal top individual rates were
in the 70%'s and 80%'s). Lee, Capital Gains Contentions, supra note 53, at 60-61 n.218.
360. This slarted out as a typo and Professor Lee liked its sound and import.
361. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
362. Cf Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 486 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the slatute at issue was enacted by the Minnesola legislature to ''promote the
economic interests of the local dairy and pulpwood industries at the expense of competing economic
groups"); Hearing on Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets (S. 1245. H.R. 3035, and H.R. 42/ 0) before
the Senate Finance Comm., I 02 Cong., 2d Sess. I 3 I (I 992) (prepared slatement of Duane A. Suess on
behalf of the Coalition for Open-years Election)
A single life for all inlangible assets is "rough justice." Some laxpayers will have assets with
somewhat longer lives, others will have assets with shorter lives, and others will be able to
amortize goodwill that previously was nondeductible. In exchange for a single life for all
inlangible assets, taxpayers and the government will have much desired cerlainty and
efficiency. Valuation, allocation, and useful life questions will be virtually eliminated.
Taxpayer and government resources will no longer be spent unproductively in an attempt to
answer questions that have no clear answers.
/d. 199/ House Hearing on Intangibles, supra note 32 (Statement of Rep. Raymond McGrath) ("this
'one size fits all' approach of 3035 [bill first considering § 197], the 14-year, fixed slatutory period, that
there are a lot of winners and losers all over the place."); id. at 22 (Siatement of Rep. Bill Archer, RTex.) ("In this case, since we're lalking about creating potentially large winners and losers, we need to
hear from those who would be affected by these bills, in both directions.").
363.
David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 113,
126 n.24 (1993) (describing the ''pluralist model of democracy" as a system "under which optimal
outcomes are thought to be produced by the competition among interest groups); Neil Duxbury, Faith
in Reason: The Process of Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 60 I, 645-48
(1993) (discussing the interaction of interest groups and government); Richard A. Posner, Legal
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. I 79, I 93 (I 986) (stressing the impact of special interest groups in shaping legislation); John Vitha,
Comment, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County, West Virginia:
The Supreme Court Gives "Welcome Stranger" Tax Assessments a Cold Reception, 56 BROOK. L. REv.
1383, 1407 (1991) (discussing judicial review of laws enacted by constitutional referendum or supported
by grassroots organizations); Daniel Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L.
REv. 919, 921-22 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATIJTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988)) (discussing
Eskridge and Frickey's view of the "legislative process as a continuous series of bargains among
competing interest groups"); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 (1986) (explaining the
"so-called interest group . . . theory of legislation which contends that 'market forces' provide strong
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Paygo tax legislation is the ideal under this view. 364 A minority of
practitioner representatives claim, however, that "rough justice" always hurts
the taxpayer. 365 To the contrary, sometimes IRS!freasury is able to

incentives for politicians to enact Jaws that serve private rather than public interests, and hence statutes
are supplied by lawmakers to the political groups or coalitions that outbid competing groups"); Ernest
Gellhom, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 377 (1972) (explaining
how public interest groups have "drawn agency attention to new techniques for fulfilling their mandate");
Frederick R Anderson, Revisiting the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.
L. REv. 277, 284 (1987) (explaining that the "democratic process ideal presumes the value of interest
group competition and representation in the political process"); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or
Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM.
J. TAX POL'Y 221, 227 (1995) (pointing to the impact of special interest groups on the distribution of
wealth); Mark R Killenbeck, A Matter ofMere Approval? The Role of the President in the Creation of
Legislative History, 48 ARK. L. REv. 239, 248 (1995) (discussing the impact of a "lawyer-lobbyist'' on
legislative history). Commentators have criticized interest group competition as leading to economic
"waste." Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding ofPublic Law, 65 CHI.KENT L. REv. 123, 132 (1989) (discussing the history of interest group involvement in agency and
noting that critics have seen interest groups as "pursuing their own ends"); Dennis Honabach & Roger
J. Dennis, The Seventh Circuit and the Market for Corporate Control, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 681, 72528 (1989) (explaining how the "interest group approach . . . views legislation as the product of
compromise among competing interest groups" and arguing that the court's role should be to enforce the
bargain struck between the interest groups as reflected in the legislation.); Douglas M. Branson, A
Corporate Paleontologist's Laok at Law and Economics in the Seventh Circuit, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
745, 753 (1989); Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective,
67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 707, 737 (1991) (criticizing the notion that "legislation enacted by a representative
body is ... more likely to realize 'the common good"'). Other commentators criticize such competition
as preserving the status quo. Ethan Fishman, Loper, Begging and Civic Virtue, 46 ALA. L. REv. 783,
794-95 (1995) (explaining that "(w]hen civic virtue is defined by competing interest groups, it becomes
possible for cohesive minority interests to have a disproportionate influence on public policy").
364. Lee, Capital Gains Contentions, supra note 53, at 57 ("(T]he 'pay-as-you-go' or 'paygo'
procedures of OBRA 1990, as extended by OBRA 1993, require revenue decreases to be offset by (a)
increases in revenues, which is unlikely due to the Republican aversion to tax increases, or (b) decreases
in spending, so there is no net increase in the deficit.") (footnotes omitted). But the potential for
legislative complexity is doubled with both a new tax expenditure provision and a new revenue raising
provision, both with opportunities for exceptions.
365. Unofficial Transcript ofIRS Hearing on Uniform Copitalization Regs, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY
246-30 (December 3, 1993) (Statement of Michael Frankel representing the American Institution of
Certified Public Accountants).
MR. FRANKEL: I always liked these bright lines, these rough justice ideas, that leads to
simplification. At the same time, it's amazing to me how simplification always hurts the
taxpayer.
Ever since rough justice came in with the Joss disallowance rules, I have given up on that idea.
(Laughter.)
/d. Other AICPA representatives "[o]ver the past several years ... have been pleased with the approach
to 'rough justice' generally espoused in the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service, and
we hope that will continue." Hearings on President Clinton's Proposals for Public Investment and
Deficit Reduction, 103d Cong. 519 (1993) (Part 1). (Statement of Leonard Podolin immediate past
Chairman of the Tax Executive Committee of the AICPA's Tax Division).
Commissioner Goldberg has emphasized "that the private sector must share the blame. Small groups
of taxpayers have pushed for laws and regulations that have imposed inappropriate burdens on the system
- all in the name of equity, certainty, transition relief, or special circumstances. And all too often, the
private sector views simplification as a one-way street- support it when it reduces taxes and oppose
it when it increases taxes. That road is a dead end. Once again, simplification entails rough justice -
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achieve ''rough justice" by offsetting rules that hurt the same class of
taxpayers with rules that benefit it. 366 Indeed, Treasury and taxpayer
representatives viewed Section 197 (amortization of purchased intangibles),
the closest analogue to expensing and capitalizing self-created intangibles,
in just that light. 367 Moreover, on occasion Treasury has advocated a
"rough justice" measure that might allow some taxpayers to have an
unwarranted tax advantage so long as "it would achieve the economically
correct . . . results for taxpayers who are legitimately trying to [carry on

some short cuts that raise revenue, other short cuts that lose revenue. Hearings on Impact ofTRA I986,
supra note 174 (Statement of Commissioner Goldberg).
366. Sheppard & Evans, supra note 314 ("IRS Associate Chief Counsel (Technical) Kenneth Klein
insisted that simplicity in the regulations had arrived. 'Simplification invariably hurts someone, so we
make the changes in groups that both hurt and help taxpayers, and that way we get rough justice,' he
said."); Hearings on Impact of TRA I986, supra note 174, at 53 (Statement of Commissioner Fred
Goldberg)
A. The Joys of Rough Justice - If tax legislation were a team sport, then the trade of the
century would have been the [1986 Code's] elimination or curtailment of numerous itemized
deductions and passive losses, plus strengthening the minimum tax, in exchange for higher
standard deductions and lower rates. Many taxpayers have benefited from this exchange,
others have not In the aggregate, however, the net result has been dramatic simplification for
many taxpayers ....
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 taught Professor Lee also to think in these terms; he has long viewed that
Reform Act as fair on the average although not perfect justice in the case of every individual taxpayer.
367. MR. VANDER JAGT: Mr. Gideon, you are attracted to the simplicity and the clarity which
H.R. 3035 provides to the Code, and I am, too. But I think from you answers to questions,
you do agree that this one-size-fits-all approach of H.R. 3035, the 14-year fixed statutory
period, results in a lot of winners and losers all over the place.
MR. GIDEON: There are asset winners and losers. It is less clear, Mr. Vander Jagt, that there are
company winners and losers. I think that we probably heard over here from one category like that.
But in many cases, the people who benefit and the people who lose are the same folks, and I think
that's the reason why the bill basically makes sense.
If you are in the situation where you're on both sides of the issue here, you may decide
that the certainty of 14 is a pretty fair cut, and you 'II take the certainty rather than arguing
over what the pieces are.
MR. VANDER JAGT: There will be instances like that But you will have companies that have
a useful life that can be shown that's three years and if they have to write it off over 14, that
company would be a loser.
MR. GIDEON: But surprisingly, to me at least, the number who seem to be in that category
seem to be fairly discreet.
MR. GIDEON: ... I think that most people we're not hearing from for the reason that most
people are really on both sides of this issue. When they look at the businesses they acquire,
they see that they have some customer lists, they see that they have some goodwill, they see
that, yes, they have some other things that might be shorter, but they say "On balance, 14
years is a pretty good cut for me, simply because when I look at this average and the fact that
I'm no longer going to have to litigate, I'm going to know what my answer is, I'll live with
that"
I think that's the reason why, for many, many people, they find themselves in this bill
both winners and losers and on balance they accept the simplification and the clarity of the
result
I99I House Hearing on Intangibles, supra note 32, at 59.
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their business affairs] in a cost-effective way." 368

5.

Simplified Accounting Methods and Small Taxpayers

In essence the "rough justice" approaches called for are nothing more
than simplified tax accounting methods. That strongly suggests as a broad
tax policy matter that they be limited to the same class of taxpayers to
whom such simplified methods traditionally have been granted to reduce
transaction and tax costs. The statutory limitations on use of the cash
method of income tax accounting under Section 448 369 constitutes a
congressional highlighting of the classes of taxpayers for whom it believes
the burdens of more complex rules outweighs the clearer reflection of
income. Conceptually even closer are the limitations on expensing of small
amounts of depreciable assets under Section 179. 370 Therefore the "rough
justice" proposals should be explicitly barred to tax shelters. Rather than

368. Lee Sheppard, News Analysis: Liability Hedging after Arkansas Best, 46 TAX NOTES 634, 640
(1990).
369. Section 448(a) and (b) first bar the use of the cash method to corporations and tax shelters
and then except farms, qualified personal service corporations and entities with gross receipts of not more
than $5,000,000. The Supreme Court in Catto v. United States, 384 U.S. 102, 110-11 (1966), describes
the traditional administrative permission for fanners to use cash accounting even where "inventories" of
farm animals as based on the need "to provide a unitary and expedient bookkeeping system for fanners
and ranchers in need of a simplified accounting procedure" even though such method distorted the
fanner's income. The Joint Committee Staff put it well:
Small businesses generally are provided exceptions from normative tax accounting rules in
order to alleviate their record-keeping burdens. In most instances, these simplified methods
also reduce the tax liability of the qualiied small business. Thus, the simplified methods of
present law serve the dual purpose of easing the administrative burdens of, and providing a
tax subsidy to, small businesses.
Joint Committee Staff, Small Business Taxation, infra note 379.
370. Section 179 allows elective expensing (first year deduction) instead of capitalizing and
depreciating the costs of tangible personal property up to a relatively small dollar amount (increasing
from current $18,000 to $25,000 by 2003) reduced dollar for dollar by purchases over $200,000.
Sections 179(b)(l) and (2) and (d)(l). In addition to the dollar limitations aimed at smallness, other
limitations are aimed at tax shelters, viz, the non-coverage of read estate and of non-corporate lessors
of equipment. Section 179(d)(l) and (5).
Section 179 was enacted as part of the Technical amendments Act of 1958, which added
other tax provisions targeting toward benefitting small businesses, including treating losses
on certain small business stock as ordinary rather than capital losses; extending the carryover
period for net operationg losses; instituting subchapter S; increasing the minimum
accumulated earnings credit (since repealed); and providing an extension of time from
payment of estate tax attributable to investments in closely held enterprises.
Joint Committee Staff, Small Business Taxation, infra note 379, at •n.l6.
The present-law section 179 expensing allowance also is viewed as a simplification measure
for small businesses because annual depreciation calculations and records become unnecessary
for expensed property. However, this simplification goal is fully achieved only if the amount
of the taxpayer's qualified investment for the taxable year does not exceed the $17,500
limitation. Otherwise, the taxpayer must identify, and properly account for, property to which
the expensing allowance applies and property to which it does not.
/d.
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adopt the statutory definition of "tax shelter," this article advocates that in
the case of pass-through entities at least 50% of the ownership interests must
be held by members who materially participate in its business (or perhaps
a related business). 371
The argument that simplified expensing and uniform capitalization lives
should not be extended to tax shelters is supported by the Public Choice
theory of statutory interpretation to those code sections as well. Where the
factfinder - the Service in rulings and the courts in litigated cases - can
determine that a particular tax provision is the product of private
compromise and produces asymmetrical benefits, as with simplified
expensing and uniform capitalization lives, the terms of the statutory
"contract" should not be extended to other similar tax items. Instead,
taxpayers are entitled to the preferences Congress awards by relying on form
even where little or no economic substance exists apart from tax
preferences. 372 Further, the factfinder may impose "equitable" doctrines
even to the items covered by the contract, such as business purpose or
economic substance, to increase transaction costs. Where a statute does not
betray such origins or use, such as where it is "public-regarding" rather than
"rent-seeking," the factfinder should utilize a traditional fill-the-gap
approach. The creative role of the factfinder should be particularly broad
where the legislative history specifically carves out an explicit role for the
judiciary or the Service, particularly as an exception to a private
compromise provision. The "clear reflection of income" standard constitutes
such a role.
This argument, like the Tax Court's "generic tax shelter" rules of
interpretation, reflects the public choice theory by narrowly interpreting
special interest legislation. Classic public choice theory views legislation as
a private contract between legislators bent on re-election and private interest
"Public Choice [is] the economic study of nonmarket
groups.
decisionmaking, or simply the application of economics to political
science."373 Under the public choice theory, where the special interest
groups and Congress acted against a backdrop of a reserved judicial or
agency overview power, that power should be applied broadly. 374

371. For example, a real estate operator renting self-constructed property who materially
participates in the development and construction of the property more than in renting.
372. Professor Lee believes that this notion underlay the Tax Court's "statutory tax shelter" as
contrasted with "Generic Tax Shelter" doctrine (articulated in Rose v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386 (1987)
(Cohen, J.), aff'd on other grounds, 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989). For an exceJient discussion of the
"generic tax shelter'' test, see Cranston Reade Williams, Note, The Tax Court's Rose Test: More Thorns
in the Sides of Taxpayers, 8 VA. TAX REv. 905 (1989).
373. D. MUELLER, PUBuc CHOICE I, (1979) cited in Farber & Frickey, infra note 374, at 878.
374. See Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4
(1984). Easterbrook posits that the "more detailed the law, the more evidence of interest-group
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Some critics argue that empirical evidence does not support key public
choice tenets. 375 Lee's study of the history of the Tax Reform Act of
1986,376 as well as of earlier tax acts, and subsequent budget reconciliation
tax acts leads to the conclusion that in the case of federal tax legislation,
distinctions between private interest (or "rent seeking") and public interest
(or "public regarding") origins can only be made provision-by-provision, not
tax act by tax act. While public choice theory is subject to many telling
criticisms in practice, the analysis provides insights into the competence of
courts to supplement and correct congressional and agency law. 377
Increasing our understanding of judicial statutory interpretation, it alerts
judges to the misdirection of the legislative process. 378
The far harder question is whether expensing and amortization safe
harbors should also be limited to small income taxpayers. The Joint
Committee Staff recently pointed out small businesses are granted many
exceptions from the normal tax accounting rules, i.e., tax preferences.
Small businesses generally are provided exceptions from normative tax
accounting rules in order to alleviate their record-keeping burdens. In most
instances, these simplified methods also reduce the tax liability of the
qualified small business. Thus, the simplified methods of present law serve
the dual purpose of easing the administrative burdens of, and providing a

compromise and therefore the less liberty judges possess." Ironically, essentially this scenario of
construction was followed by the Board of Tax Appeals in Gregory v. Commissioner, in upholding a
transaction meeting the letter of the reorganization statute but not the spirit as adumbrated by the Second
Circuit. For a more detailed discussion of the public choice theory of judicial statutory interpretation,
see Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes· Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983); Eskridge, supra note 52,
at 1512; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873
(1987); Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. OF LAW
& EcoN. 875 (1975); Lee, Structured Discretionary Justice, supra note 153, at 1029; RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 265-67, 286-93 (1985); Richard A. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 869 (1983);
Richard D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339 (1988).
375. Farber & Frickey, in Classic Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 883
(1987), conclude (1) that "[a]lthough it is true that legislators are influenced by special interests, and that
legislatures are faced with the possibility of incoherence, legislatures need not be mere pawns of special
interests, nor are they doomed to chaos." (2) "[T]he behavior of members of Congress is dictated by
three basic goals: achieving reelection, gaining influence within the House, and making good public
policy." /d. at 589. (3) "The economic theory of legislation ... does not perform well empirically."
/d. at 895. (4) "Our best view of the political process ... is a mixed model in which constituent interest,
special interest groups, and ideology all influence legislative conduct. In addition ... , political parties
and chief executives, among other forces, also influence outcomes." /d. at 873 and n.165. I would add
that popular press and, in particular, investigative tax reporting also can influence outcomes.
376. Contrary to Doemberg & McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability
of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REv. 913 (1987), I agree with Professor Eskridge, that the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 on the whole was public-regarding, with some industry exceptions (oil and gas, insolvent savings
and loans, and corporate use of real estate) and, of course, except for rifle-shot transition rules.
/d. Eskridge, supra note 374, at 280.
377.
378. /d. at 280-81.
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tax subsidy to, small businesses. . . . The perceived difficulty of some of
the tax accounting methods from which small businesses are granted
exceptions are a result of the need to measure income under the presentlaw income tax. These methods generally attempt to match income and
expense by requiring capitalization of costs that benefit future periods and
providing when and how these capitalized costs are taken into account. 379

Sections 446 and 179 as well as 263A, the uniform capitalization rules also
manifest a pattern of exceptions from more complex and more theoretically
correct rules for small business (under the general policy of simplicity).
Section 263A holds true to the model of administrative convenience
exceptions to more clearly reflect income capitalization rules for small
taxpayers. Senator Pete Domenici, (Republican from New Mexico) noted
Section 263A's exception for small manufacturers and retailers. 380
Representative Thomas Downey (Democrat from New York), more broadly
reasoned that:
[A] review of the legislative history behind section 263A suggests that the
thrust of the provision was to require various producers of tangible
property already capitalizing direct and some indirect costs to more
comprehensively capitalize other indirect costs. Congress meant to exempt
from the new uniform capitalization rules those taxpayers, or expenditures,
that were already exempted under prior law from the general capitalization
rules. For instance, farmers and ranchers were exempted. The exemption
for research and experimental expenditures was continued. The exemption
from uniform capitalization for the timber industry and the ornarnental
trees industry was continued. Hadley versus Commissioner correctly held
that free-lance writers were exempted from the pre-1986 rules. Therefore,
the rules should not apply to writers and their counterparts in the creative
fields of photography, film, and the arts. 381

In addition to casting light on whom Congress generally targets with

379. Joint Committee on Taxation, Impact on Small Business ofReplacing the Federal Income Tax
(JCS-3-96 April23, 1996), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 81-7
(April 24, 1996).
380. 134 CONG. REC. 85243.
As a result of tax reform, the artists, sculptors, writers and photographers were put in the
same category as manufacturers and anyone else who has overhead expenses. On the surface
that makes some sense under the theory that taxpayers with the same tax circumstances and
types of deductions should be treated the same. However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was
not internally consistent because it exempted the small manufacturer and retailer with sales
of less than $10 million.
The 1987 Ways and Means Committee Letter, supra, had made previously this point: "subjecting
individual creators to these requirements is totally inconsistent with our decision in closely-related areas
- e.g., permitting individual taxpayers in all cases to utilize cash method accounting and exempting
retailers with $10 million or less in annual sales from uniform capitalization rules."
381. 134 CONG. REC. E 1245.
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simplified tax accounting rules, other administrative tax accounting
exceptions illuminate factors taken into account in determining clear
reflection of income. The commonality with capitalization issues is that
clear reflection of income in tax accounting does not require exact matching
of income and economic benefit. Taking account of an item in one year or
the next does not distort income. This parallels the proposed regularly
recurring exception to future benefit capitalization. Pursuant to the exercise
of the Commissioner's discretion under Section 446, Revenue Procedure 7121, 382 provides that, in limited circumstances, an accrual method taxpayer
can defer taking into income amounts actually received in one taxable year
for services to be performed by the end of the next taxable year. 383 Under
this approach, payments received for services to be performed in the future
are treated similarly for tax and financial reporting purposes in order to
"facilitate reporting and verification of such items from the standpoint of
both the taxpayer affected and the Internal Revenue Service. " 384 Although
deferral of income is limited to the succeeding taxable year, clearer
reflection of the taxpayer's income is still achieved through matching
income with the costs associated with the production of these revenues by
deferring recognition of income until the services are completed. 385
Despite the somewhat parallel treatment of deferred revenue with respect to
contracts for performance of services, the Service has refused to extend the
same approach to income associated with rents or property rights. 386
Similarly to avoid disrupting normal business and accounting practices,
Congress provided an exception in Section 461(h)(3) allowing a taxpayer to
treat certain recurring expenses, in which the accrual accounting method "all
events test" for determining the tax year in which an item of income or

382.
Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549.
383. See also Treas. Reg.§ 1.451-5 (as amended in 1986), concerning advance payment for goods,
which provides another limited instance in which deferral is allowed.
384. Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549. ("The purpose of this Revenue Procedure is to reconcile
the tax and financial accounting treatment of such payments in a large proportion of these cases without
permitting extended deferral in the time of including such payments in gross income for Federal income
tax purposes.").
385. This treatment comports closely with financial accounting treatment in which the amount
received for services would be recorded as a liability until the obligation to perform the service has been
discharged. Income is then recognized pro rata as services are rendered and income is thereby earned.
See JAN R WILLIAMS ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 189-90 (3d ed. 1989).
386.
See e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,177 (Mar. 5, 1984) (Payments under a television contract to
broadcast taxpayer's games were made in exchange for property rights and not services, and therefore
under Rev. Proc. 71-21 may not be deferred for income tax recognition to the succeeding taxable year);
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,434 (Oct. 25, 1985) (Annual credit card membership fee paid to taxpayer relates
to the acquisition of a property right-the right to use money- and may not be deferred under Rev.
Proc. 71-21).
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expense is accounted fo~ 87 is otherwise met, as incurred in year 1, even
though economic performance with respect to the item does not occur until
a subsequent tax year. The four statutory preconditions availability of the
"recurring" expense exception388 suggests the tax policies that the
Serviceffreasury should consider in fashioning any recurring expense
exception to capitalization of future benefits. Indeed the consideration under
Section 461(h)(3)(iv) of concepts of materiality and proper matching of
expense against income would seem to be analogous to notions of clear
reflection of income with exceptions for small recurring items in the
capitalization arena. Allowing the treatment of an item for financial
reporting to be taken into account for determining the item's materiality for
income tax purposes would ensure that any liability that is material under
GAAP would also be material for income tax purposes. 389 Surely to this
limited extent GAAP could be controlling. Thus smaller taxpayers would
not have to be concerned with the disparate treatment of certain liabilities
reported under GAAP for income tax reporting purposes. However if the
item is immaterial under GAAP, it may still be material for purposes of
Section 461, 390 ensuring a more theoretically accurate reflection of income.
For example, assume that a calendar-year taxpayer enters into a one-year
maintenance contract on July 1, 1985. If the amount of the expense is
prorated between 1985 and 1986 for financial statement purposes, it should
also be prorated for tax purposes. If, however, the full amount is deducted
in 1985 for financial statement purposes because it is not material under
generally accepted accounting principles, it may (or may not) be considered
an immaterial item for purposes of this exception.
In some circumstances, items that are not material for financial
accounting purposes may be treated as material items under this provision.

387. The all events test is met if all events have occurred which determine the fact of liability of
the taxpayer, or of an obligor of the taxpayer as to an income item, and the amount of such liability or
income can be determined with reasonable accuracy. I.R.C. § 461(h)(4) (1996).
388. These four conditions are:
(I) the all events test applied, without regard to economic performance, is satisfied with
respect to the item during the taxable year;
(2) economic performance occurs within a reasonable period (but in no event more than 8 112
months) after the close of the taxable year;
(3) the item is recurring in nature and the taxpayer consistently treats items of that type as
incurred in the taxable year in which the all events test is met; and
(4) either(a)the item is not material, or
(b) the accrual of the item in year one results in a better matching of the item with income
to which it relates than would result from accruing the item in year two in which economic
performance occurs.
I.R.C. § 461 (h)(3)(A) (!Hiv) (1996).
389. Treas. Reg.§§ 1.461-5(b)(4)(ii) and (iii) (as amended in 1995).
390. /d.
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For example, an item of expense which is immaterial for purposes of
consolidated financial statements that combine a corporate taxpayer's
financial data with those of affiliated companies may be material if the
taxpayer is viewed separately. Also, an item of expense, which is
immaterial for purposes of the financial statements but which is significant
in terms of absolute dollar size, may be treated as material under this
provision.
Congress intended that where the item is directly related to an activity,
the materiality of the item will be separately determined with respect to that
activity. The materiality of overhead expenses that relate to several
activities of the taxpayer will be measured against those collective activities.
Should capitalization regulations draw a similar distinction between big
and small incomes? Approaching the question solely from a perspective of
a cost\benefits analysis as to the taxpayer, Professor Lee would answer yes.
Hopefully apart from his general populist perspective in his more recent
work, 391 Lee has advocated a two-track regulatory system with simpler
rules where greater numbers of smaller taxpayers are affected. 392 Elaborate, more theoretically correct rules may be okay for those who can handle
them. Arguably that is the case for more theoretically correct, but
frightfully complex provisions such as Section 263A (and Section 453A and
above all the time-value-of money provisions and their small business
exceptions). But this article concludes that the proposals should apply to
large corporate taxpayers for one statutory interpretation reason, one
practical reason, and two policy reasons - political and transaction costs
from the Service's perspective.
First the practical. Capitalization and expensing issues are significant
audit issues only at the big, usually public, C corporation level. If that
"niche" is excluded from the simplification proposals, then all of us have
put a lot of work into a pointless project. More significantly that sector is
where the revenue is - 80% of C corporate sector income and 56% of
combined C corporation sector and sole proprietorship sector. 393
The second reason is that an interpretative regulation can rise not
higher than the statute and its case-law glosses. Unlike Congress the authorities have tended not to draw independently big/little taxpayer distinctions
except for the notion, often having the same effect, that absolute size as well

391.

Rebeccah Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE W.

REs. L. REv. 965, 10552 n.267 (1989). The roots of Lee's populism run deep. John Lee, 'Death and
Taxes' and Hypocrisy, 60 TAX NOTFS 1393, 1398 n.34 (Sept 3, 1993).
392. Lee, Structured Discretionary Justice, supra note 153, at 1031 nn.17-18.
393. See note 80 supra and accompanying text
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as relative size is a factor in substantiality. 394 Where the taxpayer is small
so that burden of capitalization is heavy, especially if useful life is
difficult/costly or impossible to establish, a current deduction should be
allowed.

394. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-24-002 (Feb. 9, 1994); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,743 July 14, 1988); Tech.
Adv. Mem. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996).

